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Mum. Dad. Lizzie. 
 
It runs in the family. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis questions how theatre can act as a site of resistance against the political structures 
of madness. It analyzes a variety of plays from the past 25 years of British and Irish theatre in 
order to discern what modes of resistance are possible, and the conceptual lines upon which 
they follow. It questions how these modes of resistance are imbibed in the representation of 
madness. It discerns what way these modes relate specifically to the theatrical, and what it is 
the theatrical specifically has to offer these conceptualizations.  
It achieves this through a close textual and performative analysis of the selected plays, 
interrogating these plays from various theoretical perspectives. It follows and explores different 
conceptualizations across both political and ethical lay lines, looking at what composes the 
theatrical practical critique, how theatre can alter and play with space, how theatre capacitate 
the act of witnessing, and the possibility of re-invigorating the ethical encounter through 
theatrical means. It achieves this through a critical engagement with thinkers such as Michel 
Foucault, Henri Lefebvre, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. Engaging with the 
heterogeneity of madness, it covers a variety of madness’s different attributes and logics, 
including: the constitution and institutional structures of the contemporary asylum; the cultural 
idioms behind hallucination; the means by which suicide is apprehended and approached; how 
testimony of the mad person is interpreted and encountered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Personal Development Towards Thesis 
This thesis provides an interrogation of the representational politics of madness and how 
theatre can act as a site of resistance. The genealogy of madness has long drawn upon 
structures of performance and performativity. Yet, within theatre and performance studies, 
there has been a comparative dearth of sustained engagement with the politics of madness. In 
particular, there has been little rigorous conceptual wrangling with what it means to resist 
through performance in the context of representations of madness. This thesis will attempt to 
remedy this lacuna. 
There is no easily identified path, or moment of revelation that conceived this project, or the 
work. Rather, it has been the slow sedimentary accumulation of the thoughts and gestures in 
the world around me, that has led to a fascination with the connection between performance 
and madness. Far from a Damascean revelation, it has been the observance of ugly trends and 
quiet violence in everyday life that has formed the intellectual anger that has sustained this 
work: the persistent assumption that madness is performed, that it is possible to read madness 
upon the body; the shock of the revelation of the mad person who has managed to ‘pass’ as 
normal, often followed by a weird form of congratulation; how those who decide to express 
their status as ‘mad’, through a combination of the voyeurism surrounding them and an 
insistent cultural logic, are forced into a foreign, confessional mode; a slow accumulation of 
political awareness, around psychiatric survivors, around practices of sectioning, around 
enforced treatment. 
Whilst there is no originating moment, the structure of this thesis can be threaded alongside 
my own history in academia. My joint honours BA in Politics and Philosophy at Cardiff 
University prompted the intellectual curiosities that would mature in this thesis. My studies in 
philosophy ventured across literary theory, philosophical apprehensions of language and 
discourse, marking out hermeneutics circles, across thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Paul de 
Man and Hans-Georg Gadamer. In politics, I returned to the contradictions embedded in 
sovereignty, its relationship to constitutional structures, constructions of agency, the theory of 
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international relations. Between these two disciplines, a sustained interest emerged, in how 
structures of language inform political codifications of agency and, in parallel, how political 
operations of power preclude possibilities of language and exercise power through the practice 
of definition. 
Beginning to think through theory and its implications, my MA at the Royal Central School of 
Speech and Drama shifted this to an appreciation of how aesthetics – specifically drama - can 
interplay with conceptions of language, sovereignty and agency. As I studied Writing for Stage 
and Broadcast Media, I was encouraged by my tutor, Tony Fisher, to apply my knowledge of 
philosophical and political discourse to dramatic structure. In both my own work, and in 
analysis of playwrights such as Simon Stephens, Caryl Churchill and David Mamet, I appreciated 
drama as a potential bridge between my concerns of language and sovereignty. 
This development, from philosophy and politics to writing for stage, is what has capacitated this 
thesis. It draws upon a range of conceptual work, and interrogates them, in order to analyze 
how certain theories can help us illuminate the processes at play in certain performances. This 
work rarely involved an explicit engagement with madness. But in retrospect, madness 
constantly reoccurs, incessantly in the background. Philosophies of language frequently return 
to madness, through allusion or inspiration. Notions of sovereignty, the question of the 
sovereign citizen, are always punctured by madness; madness exists in a state of exception, 
incorporated into the law, yet excluded at the same time. Likewise, in plays studied and plays 
written, questions of madness and agency reoccurred, across depression to post-natal 
psychosis, from observable malady to disruption of world. If madness has not always been my 
object of intention, it has nevertheless seemed to pulsate throughout my development. 
What is Madness? 
Prior to an elaboration of the nature of this research, the questions engendered, and the 
caveats of this research, it is necessary to perform a brief exploration of what I mean by 
madness, and my reasons for using the term. This task, appropriately, quickly proves evasive. At 
the beginning of Madness: A Brief History, Roy Porter declares any definition of ‘madness’ to be 
impossible (Porter 2002: 4). The language surrounding madness, appropriately, seems to evade 
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definition. The work of defining madness (if even desirable) would be the work of another 
thesis. This thesis is less interested in fully engaging with this conceptual ouroboros, any 
attempt at definition will necessarily be heuristic. Indeed, the attempt to define madness, can 
itself involve an act of containment and violence. However, this does not negate a respect and 
response to the genealogy of these terms. Drawing upon this genealogy, I shall outline the 
particular use and rationale behind the terms I shall be using throughout this thesis. This is not 
to suggest I am unaware of the potential negative connotations of the terminology I shall be 
using; rather that, in a field where many of the terms are potentially offensive and politically 
loaded, instead of problematically attempting to claim a term as ‘neutral’, it is preferable to 
engage in the politics of the language, and to define my intended meaning as clearly as 
possible. 
One difficulty in exploring the language of madness is the contestability of meaning and 
associated politics of many of the terms. Many of the terms are held to be offensive according 
to various positions. On the one hand, David Oats (2012), director of MindFreedom, views the 
term ‘mental illness’ as a stigmatising phrase that frames behaviour that society wishes to 
oppress as a ‘sickness’. On the other, in responding to Pat Bracken’s use of the word ‘madness’ 
in an article, Sue Collinson referred to herself as having a ‘mental illness for two years’ and 
claiming, ‘notions of mad and madness are highly stigmatising. It is sad to see these terms still 
being used in the psychiatric profession’ (Collinson 2001: 451). 
The terms mental illness and mental health emerge from the biomedical model. Under these 
terms, mental illness is an a-historical observation, a diagnosis to a scientifically verifiable 
condition. In this sense, the term mental illness partitions the present from the past, allows 
contemporary psychiatric practice to disavow itself from the abuses of the past and, in doing 
so, neglect the genealogies of power. Terms such as ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness’ are 
comparatively new, and suggest a rift or shift in psychiatry, a gulf between the ‘lunatics’ of the 
past and the ‘patients’ of the present. In contrast, ‘madness’ evokes the long history of 
oppression and the complex lineage of political structuration; to use madness reminds us that 
the persecution and oppression of the mad has not ceased in the advent of scientific advances 
and that it is possible to have an asylum without walls. 
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Moreover, madness also avoids the automatically negative connotations of the term ‘illness’. 
Mental illness suggests a purely negative experience, it implies something that undermines and 
diminishes our lives, as something desirable to be cured. However, this is to ignore the 
potential positive aspects of madness, that it can include the experience of both extreme 
mental distress and mental joy. Darian Leader (2011) notes that those undergoing a ‘manic’ 
phase experience acute joy; whilst many partake in shopping sprees, the purchases are 
commonly for others, the result of an immense feeling of altruism. This is not to romanticize 
madness, or to suggest mental distress does not exist. But rather, madness can encompass an 
expansive range of different experiences.  
Thereby, my use of ‘madness’ as a term follows from the following concerns: firstly, I wish to 
locate my thesis in an analysis of the political, social and cultural construction of madness, to 
situate contemporary developments within larger historical movements; secondly, to 
acknowledge that unlike the purely negative connotations of ‘illness’, madness can encompass 
also positive and pleasurable aspects for those deemed mad. By using madness as a term, I am 
anticipating madness as political ideology. I am concerned with madness as the socio-political 
structures by which we deem certain behaviours and persons as aberrant or abnormal, 
pathologize them underneath a diagnostic gaze, and exclude and contain them in a variety of 
institutional and cultural mechanisms. Rather than a simply monolithic operation, I am 
interested in a pluralistic apprehension of madness, looking at the multiple operations and 
logics (sometimes contradictory) through which the mad person is defined and silenced. 
This is not to make a particular aetiological claim for these behaviours, nor to denigrate 
particular modes of treatment per se. This thesis is not interested in either pill-pushing or pill-
shaming. Rather, it is to unearth the political ideologies which lie behind and reify these modes 
of treatment, that inevitably situate the doctor as able to define and contain the patient. An 
examination of some of the ideologies and concepts behind madness and mental illness, the 
relationship between political structures of madness, the personal experience of the mad 
person, and the aesthetic representation of both of these, will be more extensively examined 
within the conceptual overview and literature review. 
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Brief Outline of Research 
This thesis will explore the radical possibilities of theatre in representing madness. Yet, the 
relationship between performance and madness is not necessarily a progressive one. There is 
the potential problem of madness as an exploited, exoticized, or sensationalized spectacle, 
across the history of madness. The treatment of women in the Salpêtrière in the 19th century by 
Jean-Martin Charcot has been compared to a theatre: Carina Bartleet notes that, ‘if hysteria is 
performative in Judith Butler's sense of the term, Charcot's scientific emphasis on its symptoms 
and recognition through demonstration/repetition transforms hysterical display into 
performance’ (Bartleet 2003: 245-246). Yet this performance is a staging in which Charcot 
controlled, choreographed and manipulated the female hysterics. The mad person is framed as 
the passive, often unconscious, object of understanding; Charcot the authoritative expert 
standing above her, dispensing knowledge. In this spectacle, a division between the observer 
and observed becomes tantamount to that between the knower and the known. Far from a site 
of autonomy, the stage becomes another site of oppressive power relations, wherein the 
psychiatrist instructs, manipulates and defines the mad person. Likewise, within theatre itself, 
there is often the issue of madness as metaphor, as a standby or representation for something 
else, rather than madness within itself. This understanding takes both the forms of a mode of 
writing and a reading practice. Greek tragedies are often understood to see madness as divine 
moral punishment, Christopher Gill suggests in Greek drama, ‘tragic madness incorporates the 
two stages of Homeric até: it is both mental damage and disaster in events’ (Gill 1996: 252). 
Elsewhere, madness is seen as a metaphor for social struggle, for instance as female resistance 
in the plays of Henrik Ibsen. This can result in a positioning of madness as both intentional 
struggle and clinical consequence. In this vacillation between passive ‘illness’ and active 
‘metaphor’, we fail to apprehend madness within and of itself. Performance and theatre, 
thereby, can often act as hegemonic forces in the construction of madness. This is the 
background which informs this thesis: not the assumption that theatre and performance is 
inherently radical, but rather, with an awareness of the sometimes oppressive history of the 
relationship between performance and madness, an attempt to trace the potential of 
resistance. 
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This thesis will ask, through radical modes of representation, in what ways theatre can act as a 
site of resistance against hegemonic understandings of madness. It will look at British and Irish 
theatre across the past twenty-five years, to see how an engagement with theatre can provide 
new articulations and representations of madness. This is not a historical or material overview 
of the period, but rather a fundamentally conceptual question. Given the history of madness, 
the tendencies to silence the mad person, and considering how often articulations of madness 
are re-imagined into an articulation ‘upon’ madness, how can theatre represent madness in a 
manner that constitutes resistance? 
It will question how representation relates and interacts with questions of resistance. How does 
resistance occur through representation, how can representation take place without in some 
sense defining madness, or repeating acts of oppression? This thesis will constantly be 
interrogating this relationship between resistance and representation. 
Likewise, in regards to these interactions between representation and resistance, I want to look 
at how these modes of resistance are particular to the opportunities of the theatrical. This is 
not to suggest theatre is the only possible site of resistance, or to engage in a comparison of 
different forms. Rather, what particular opportunities does theatre and performance offer, that 
can capacitate resistance and radical representations? In this, I am not interested in how 
theatre spells out, or simply expresses, various theoretical constructs of madness. Rather than 
the fundamentally uninteresting (and unoriginal) conceit of theatre illustrating arguments 
previously expressed on the page, I want to look at modes of resistance specific to theatre, 
what resistance can be offered through performance. Methodologically, this will involve a 
close-reading of play-text and performance, with a key consideration of appropriate theory to 
help interrogate the various conceptualizations of resistance. My focus, on the text against the 
performance, has inevitably varied in accordance with the primary mode of reception of the 
play. 
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Conceptual Overview and Literary Review 
The concepts of this thesis are loaded and passionately contested, whilst the literature required 
to analyze is sprawling and varied. This is only appropriate, given the intersections and 
interconnections of madness as a concept. Given this, an overview of concepts and literature is 
necessary. Building upon my previous discussion of madness, the first part of this literature 
review will involve a more in-depth engagement with the question of the biomedical, the 
question of anti-psychiatry, and certain figures looking at madness and mad persons, before 
positioning my own stance with relationship to madness, the mad person, and aesthetic 
representations of madness. This will be followed by continuing this review of literature, into 
areas that lie outside this debate, including philosophical sources, texts from literary studies, 
and work through performance studies. Finally, I will consider existing work within performance 
and theatre studies concerning madness. 
Mental Illness and the Contemporary Biomedical Model 
The term ‘mental illness’ emerges from the contemporary biomedical model, an understanding 
of mental health premised upon the division of all ‘mental health’ into identifiable and 
diagnosable disorders. Whilst recent developments in neuroscience have consolidated views of 
mental illness as a neurochemical catastrophe, the genealogy of the bio-medical model can be 
traced prior to the establishment of neuroscience. The belief that madness was ‘written on the 
body’ was prevalent in Victorian ideas of phrenology, whereby the shape of the skull was 
indicative of internal character (Donaldson 2002). Whilst throughout the twentieth century 
there had been a conflict between the psychodynamic and biomedical approaches to the 
classification and understanding of ‘mental illness’, recent developments in neuroscience have 
resulted in the dominance of the biomedical model as the paradigm of modern psychiatry 
(Luhrmann 2000). 
The biomedical model holds ‘mental illness’ and physical disease as equivalent, and claims to 
engage in the same scientific practice as modern medicine. Whilst it is contested what 
fundamentally constitutes the biomedical paradigm, Nick Haslam (2000) identifies four core 
precepts common to most conceptions; firstly, the notion of mental illness as a neurological 
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aberration; secondly, a distinct aetiology for each, discernible disorder; thirdly, disorders are a-
priori discrete categories, rather than a pragmatic, loose grouping of behaviour; fourthly, these 
disorders are biological diseases, and are not bound to a particular cultural or social context. In 
terms of practice, this involves the reification of mental distress, behaviour and experience into 
objectively identifiable ‘symptoms’, in order to make a ‘diagnosis’ (Wilson and Beresford 2002). 
A diagnosis is made in terms of reference work, either the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) or the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (ICD). Treatment of the disorder is then made on a neurological basis, for 
example medication to manipulate the chemical balance of the brain1. 
The diverse features of the biomedical model consolidate in an essentialist argument, making 
an ontological claim for mental illness; in other words, it claims mental illnesses are objective 
phenomena that can be observed, categorized and treated. Haslam (2000) argues that the 
biomedical model is participating in an essentialist ‘natural kinds’ argument. This follows the 
philosophy of Saul Kripke, whereby certain words and classifications derive meaning from a 
result of their inherent properties (as opposed to superficial properties). For Kripke (1980), 
these properties have a causal relationship to the classification; under this theory, ‘mental 
illnesses’ are a priori categories, whereby neurological aberrations of the brain represent the 
causal properties of these categories. Therefore, the biomedical model is engaged, not only in 
an essentialist argument, but in an essentialism that is based upon a specific causal account of 
‘mental illness’. 
It should be noted, this is not a critique of all psychiatric services, or current research in 
neuroscience per se. This is not referring to a particular treatment model of the mad. Rather, it 
is about a particular ideology and idealization of psychiatric services. Rather than for or against 
the use of medication, I am referring to the ideological structures behind medication. It is about 
the political structures which place the doctor as knowing figure over the passive patient; 
                                                          
1 It should be noted it is the justification that delineates treatment as ascribing to the biomedical model; 
behavioural therapy can be justified on a neurological basis, for instance, the increase of serotonin following 
exercise. 
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whereby under existing legislation, the diagnostic control of the doctor takes the form of 
political control. 
The Hegemonic: Anti-Psychiatry and Critical Psychiatry 
The history of madness has not been the linear adaptation of the biomedical model. Across the 
latter half of the twentieth century, an attempt to rethink the psychiatric domination of the 
doctor over patient was re-cast by a variety of thinkers. Many of these thinkers worked as 
psychiatrists, including R.D. Laing, Thomas Szasz, Franco Basaglia and Giorgio Antonucci. These 
practitioners took intellectual sustenance from a variety of anti-institutional thinkers, in 
particular Erving Goffman, Michel Foucault and Jean-Paul Sartre. These practitioners and 
thinkers represented a vast constellation of ideas and ideologies, that David Cooper would 
famously attempt to group and contain at the 1967 Dialectics of Liberation conference under 
the name ‘anti-psychiatry’. This contentious term would famously be disavowed by nearly all 
the most famous figures placed underneath its umbrella. Whilst this thesis does not involve a 
sustained engagement with this period, and thinkers such as Goffman and Foucault will be 
regarded in their own right, I wish to briefly consider the work of Laing and Szasz, and how they 
form the intellectual and institutional backdrop to this thesis. 
Szasz (1974) has formed a critique of the biomedical model based upon the criteria of the 
sciences themselves. He has notoriously called mental illness a ‘myth’ and argues that the 
biomedical model constitutes bad scientific practice. He claims the biomedical model is 
premised upon a confusion of language, whereby the moral and metaphorical language of 
‘mental illness’ is confused with the literal, physiological language of science. He refers to 
phrases such as ‘dangerous to self and others’ and ‘psychiatric treatment’ as apotropaic terms, 
the equivalent of magical words such as ‘Abracadabra’ (Szasz 2003). Laing was a psychiatrist in 
the UK, attempting to form different forms of psychiatric institutions; this began from within at 
the Tavistock Institute, eventually migrating to a separate institution altogether, with his 
famous commune at Kingsley Hall. In The Divided Self (2010), Laing would draw upon Sartrean 
thought, to argue that schizophrenia, far from a delusion, was an understandable response to 
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existential divisions. Far from disconnected to reality, for Laing, schizophrenia was marked by 
an authentic response to our ontological insecurity. 
Both these perspectives, however radical at the time, nevertheless incorporate certain 
problematic attitudes with regard to madness. Szasz does not critique the application of the 
biomedical model in the case of physiologically manifested conditions; he is engaged in a 
critique of the applicability of the biomedical model in the case of ‘mental illness’, rather than 
the biological model itself. His political stance is fundamentally libertarian, constructing an easy 
divide between ‘real’ diseases of the brain and the ‘non-real’ metaphor of mental illness. In this 
easy division, his focus is persistently upon the aetiological, and does not interrogate the 
political construction behind diagnosis and these terms. Likewise, Laing indulges in a 
romanticization of madness; his aetiology of schizophrenia is framed around constructions of 
‘authentic’ existence. At its worst, this emerges in a pedagogical manner, whereby our 
encounter with madness is framed so as to educate the sane. 
Whilst this thesis does not propose to analyze from an avowedly Szaszian or Laingian 
perspective, with clear reservations about their contributions, Laing’s own influence recurs 
across the imagination of British Theatre; in terms of direct representation, both David Edgar’s 
Mary Barnes (1979) and Patrick Marmion’s The Divided Laing (2015) involve Laing’s project at 
Kingsley Hall. Two of the plays examined in this thesis – Joe Penhall’s Blue/Orange (2000) and 
John Hayne’s and David Wood’s The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland (2014) – 
reference and respond to Laing’s work. Likewise, it is important to consider how these 
perspectives have fed into mainstream, hegemonic attitudes to madness, and not always with 
an element of liberation. The processes of de-institutionalization in the 1980s were inspired 
and used the intellectual cues of these anti-psychiatric thinkers. This process, often inspired by 
the individualism and financial expediency of neoliberalism, was attracted to certain strains of 
anti-psychiatric thought. Without simply framing anti-psychiatry as hegemonic or resistant, we 
can begin to approach the complexities of psychiatric power.  
This thesis is not concerned with a systematic breakdown of the chronology and political 
situation of different anti-psychiatric positions. However, it is important to note the limitations 
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to an anti-psychiatric radicalism and the additional complexities of psychiatric power this 
presents. If the biomedical model is the pre-dominant hegemonic understanding of madness, it 
is hardly exclusionary. Rather, contemporary psychiatric power draws upon a series of different 
intellectual legacies, including the biomedical model and anti-psychiatric perspectives.  
Philosophical Approaches to Madness 
This thesis is concerned with the political structuration of behaviour deemed ‘mad’ by society, 
rather than the aetiology of those said behaviours. The term ‘madness’ has increasingly become 
contentious, an antiquated relic of past times, and seen as a pejorative or an insult. However, 
as is evident with queer theory or crip theory, there is a history in marginalized identities 
reclaiming and appropriating language for their own political ends; in particular, through the 
use of pejoratives to alert and highlight the long history of oppression.  
This notion of madness as a socio-political construct is exemplified in the work of Michel 
Foucault. In Madness and Civilization (1980), Foucault charts the development of madness 
across modern history, from the ship of fools to the birth of the asylum.2 Foucault emphasizes 
the extent to which these power structures influence and form the political subject. According 
to Joseph Melling and Bill Forsythe, ‘Foucault was interested in the ways which laws of nature, 
scientific rules or ‘games of truth’ were formed and in how the human subject was constituted 
and constituted himself or herself’ (Melling and Forsythe 2006: 2). Foucault argues that 
madness was silenced at the beginning of the Enlightenment; he cites René Descartes as the 
turning point, who in the Meditations excludes the possibility of madness from his argument for 
the Cogito, in so doing expels madness from philosophical consideration and language, renders 
it silent. The Cogito shuns madness, to think is not to be mad. This is quickly followed by the 
great confinement across the 17th and 18th centuries, as this exclusion takes form of the 
imprisonment of the mad into the asylum system. This form of silencing, however, is disrupted 
by the emergence of modern psychiatry at the end of the 18th century, typified by the 
                                                          
2 It should be noted that Foucault’s understanding of evidential analysis has been highly criticized by figures such 
as Andrew Scull and Roy Porter (Melling and Forsythe 2006: 205). Likewise, his periodization of the ‘Great 
Confinement’ works less neatly with British and Irish theatre. This thesis is less concerned with the historical 
acumen of Foucault, than the use of his reconceptualization of madness itself. 
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intellectual developments of Phillipe Pinel. Foucault argues that the language of modern 
psychiatry, ‘which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been established only on the 
basis of such a silence’ (Foucault 1988: xi, emphasis in original). Psychiatry, rather than simply 
confine the mad, seeks to define and speak over madness. In contrast, Foucault imagines his 
project as an ‘archaeology of that silence’ (Foucault 1988: xi). 
Jacques Derrida subsequently critiqued Foucault’s understanding of madness in ‘Cogito and the 
History of Madness’, an early essay collected in Writing and Difference. For Derrida, Foucault is, 
to some degree, complicit in the very structures he denounces; to write a thesis upon madness, 
is to write ‘upon’ the silence of madness:  
is not an archaeology, even of silence, a logic, that is, an organized language, a project, 
an order, a sentence, a syntax, a work? Would not the archaeology of silence be the 
most efficacious and subtle restoration, the repetition, in the most irreducibly 
ambiguous meaning of the word, of the act perpetrated against madness (Derrida 2001: 
41, italics in original). 
For Derrida, Foucault is conceptually bereft, making a critique of reason whilst subscribed and 
within reason itself. To perform not a denotation of silence, but an inscription upon silence, a 
violence upon the silence of the mad. Foucault perhaps anticipates some of these critiques; but 
for Foucault the difficulty is created by historical circumstance; for Derrida, it is the structure of 
language. How can we claim to restore the voice of madness, without engaging within reason, 
seeking on some level to comprehend, and how can comprehension occur without some level 
of violence? Can we chart a ‘history’ of madness without some a-historical template for what 
madness constitutes?  
Going further, Derrida countered Foucault’s interpretation of Descartes, arguing that Descartes’ 
use of the malin genie3 was precisely Descartes’ way of incorporating the possibility of 
madness; the Cogito is formed, despite the threat of madness. Derrida would later return to 
this in 1994, ‘”To Do Justice to Freud”: The History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis’, a 
                                                          
3 The malin genie is the evil spirit that Descartes uses as an imaginary tool, the suggestion that there may be a 
malignant entity seeking to deceive my every observation and thought, to facilitate his methodological skepticism. 
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lecture commemorating the 30th anniversary of the publication of Madness and Civilization. In 
this essay, Derrida expanded his idea of the malin genie, suggesting that the evil spirit spread 
across the history of madness, reoccurring. Far from simply an exclusion, of an untroubled 
silence, in Derrida’s logic of supplementarity, the attempt to silence madness guarantees its 
continued presence. Madness ghosts reason, even in its exclusion. 
Shoshana Felman would later use the central disagreement of Derrida and Foucault to propel 
her own placing of literature as ideally placed to expound and explore madness. In ‘Madness 
and Philosophy or Literature’s Reason’, she would attempt to reconcile the acrimonious debate 
between Foucault and Derrida. Felman argues that Foucault and Derrida represent 
complementary, if competing, ways to perceive madness. Felman suggest that, ‘the thoughts 
on both sides, although no doubt governed by different desires, in fact mutually enrich, re-
inforce and illuminate each other’ (Felman 1975: 218). For Felman, this debate reveals that, 
rather than the logos of philosophy, the pathos of the literary is the only means to speak 
madness without performing an act of violence. Literature acts as a mode between thought and 
madness. 
Mad Person’s History 
If there is a predominant critique of the theoretical elaboration of madness, by those such as 
Foucault, Derrida and Felman, it is that it focuses upon the ideological structures and 
institutions of madness, often to the neglect of those who are affected by it, or are deemed 
mad under its diagnostic gaze. The use of the term ‘madness’ implies madness is purely 
conceptual, that it is disembodied. Yet madness is not merely an abstract power structure, it is 
diagnostic in its gaze, operating through the infliction and naming of bodies as mad. An 
alternative approach emerges from psychiatric anthropology, which focuses upon the study of 
autobiographical accounts and the conception of madness as a ‘lived experience.’ The work of 
Roy Porter, in particular, has sought to emphasize that the structures of madness are inflicted 
upon mad bodies, and despite claiming the mad are silent, there is a vast archive of mad 
person’s testimony. 
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The use of ‘mad people’ and ‘mad person’ has recently emerged from the academic and 
psychiatric survivor Geoffrey Reaume. As well as creating a course to look specifically at Mad 
People’s History, with a focus on the testimony of those deemed mad, this has taken the form 
of his work Remembrance of Patients Past: Life at the Toronto Hospital for the Insane, 1870-
1940 (2009). From Reaume’s perspective, the discussion of ‘madness’ from an epidemiological 
perspective as an objective ‘disease’ has ignored the personal and experiential features of 
madness. Moreover, figures such as Foucault (1988) have been accused of regarding madness 
as an abstract social concept, whilst ignoring the voices of the mad people that compose 
madness. Notions of madness, as discrete from mad people, are accused of becoming ‘a history 
of ideas about madness, with little or no serious inclusion of the people whose stories make up 
this history’ (Reaume 2006: 171). According to this anthropological approach, it is not only 
addressing the academic failure to incorporate the voices of mad people (without whom there 
would be no madness), it is addressing an ethical obligation, giving a voice to those who have 
repetitively been rendered voiceless. Accompanying this, outside traditional academic 
structures, is an increased platform for groups and charities that orientate and focus upon mad 
voices. Groups such as the Hearing Voices Network, Mind Freedom and a variety of psychiatric 
survivor networks have worked to put the voices of those deemed mad into focus. 
It should be noted that the desired result of academic research emphasising autobiographical 
accounts of madness is not a singular, common narrative. Instead, this anthropological 
approach emphasizes diversity and heterogeneity of personal experience; academic courses in 
the history of mad people have included a diversity of perspectives, including psychiatric, anti-
psychiatric and undecided positions. Instead of an attempt to consolidate a singular narrative of 
madness from multiple accounts, it is the act of listening itself that constitutes the study of 
madness as a lived experience. Firstly, it establishes the lived experience of madness as 
fundamental, whereby the individual experience is regarded as the object of study, rather than 
the social abstract. Secondly, regarding mental distress as a lived experience is an attempt to 
reverse power-structures that privilege the scientist and the academic over the mad person; it 
attempts to regard personal accounts as something other than material to produce to 
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biomedical diagnosis or academic thesis, and allows the possibility of lived experience to resist 
and inform abstract theoretical structures. 
The Interplay Between Madness, Mad Experience, and the Representation of Madness 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the aesthetic representation of madness. These 
representations can, and should, be distinguished from the political construction of madness 
and the lived experience of mad persons. Yet, this thesis will continually revolve around a 
triangulation of these three core aspects, and the porous boundaries that lie between them. 
I understand madness as a series of institutional and cultural structures, that seek to control 
behaviour and expression, in an attempt to subdue and undermine the sovereignty of the 
person dubbed ‘mad’ to account or speak for themselves. Madness is imposed upon mad 
bodies, and is experienced by the mad person; its structures are not simply phantasms in the 
history of thought, but concrete and applied. Whilst metaphors and analogies may accompany 
this only too material operation, the material containment or measurement of mad bodies is in 
no way secondary to epistemological structures. Likewise, if we accept that the silencing of the 
mad is part of the construction of madness, then the nature of this silencing, or its efficacy, 
must be done in consideration with the voice of the mad. To simply ignore testimony and 
background of mad persons is to repeat the power structures of the psychiatric. 
Yet, despite the importance of listening to the voices of mad people, it does not in and of itself 
provide a fully encompassing methodology whereby we have direct access to the lived 
experience of madness-as-impairment. Firstly, the ‘voice’ of the patient cannot be understood 
in isolation from the socio-political environment in which they are placed; the ‘voice’ of the 
mad can only be expressed through semiotic structures which are necessarily social and 
politically situated. Secondly, factors such as treatment and stigma radically affect the 
experience of mental distress; for instance, the treatment of depression with medication and 
behavioural therapy cannot be separated from the experience of depression itself. Thirdly, not 
only is the mode of expression politically embedded, even the personal experience of madness 
is mediated through social structure. Therefore, the mad person understands their own mental 
distress through political structures of madness. John Larsen (2004) suggests that mad persons 
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rely upon a ‘cultural repertoire’ within which they attempt to understand and express their 
condition. To engage in this interplay between madness and the mad person, between the 
socio-political and the ethical, is essentially to engage with aporia. 
Aesthetic representations complicate these bridging areas yet further. The language of the 
aesthetic draws upon and is influenced by the power structures of madness. Yet, it also informs 
back. Plays, books, films, can influence attitudes, stigma, and practice. Likewise, whilst the mad 
person may draw upon the cultural repertoire of the aesthetic, they can also contribute, 
enlarge its vocabulary, invent new idioms. 
Attempts to systematize or universalize these structures and various configurations between 
these different elements are generally ill-fated. Madness itself contains multiplicities. The mad 
can be deprived through the rhetoric of pity (that their situation is a deeply sad one, that they 
require care), the rhetoric of blame (they cannot behave appropriately, so deserve punishment) 
or even a mixture of the two (that they require forced care, that they will be punished if they do 
not welcome the care). It runs from everyday language to the deployment of sectioning. Its 
constructions contain multiplicities and contradictions. Likewise, to be deemed a mad person is 
not simply a homogenous experience, experiences diverge considerably: from diagnosis, to 
culture, to gender, to race, to material wealth and class. Any study of aesthetic representations 
of madness will have to contend with the heterogeneity of both power structures and lived 
experience. 
Given the immensity of madness and mad experience, it is perhaps unsurprising that so many 
philosophical accounts for it have resulted in a conceptual grandeur that puts abstraction ahead 
of an engagement with the particular. This thesis makes no claim to ‘solve’ madness, in 
providing a definition that somehow elucidates without inflicting a form of violence. Rather, 
through interrogating how these representations have been made, with regards to particular 
forms of madness, I hope to elucidate certain ways of seeing madness, without laying claim to 
it. It is for this reason this thesis, rather than exploring madness as an abstract whole in each 
chapter, has focused upon four particular attributes or logics of madness, anticipating its 
multiplicities. 
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Intellectual Backgrounds to the Asylum, Hallucination, Suicide, and Mad Person’s Testimony 
In apprehending madness as containing multitudes, and isolating certain attributes and logics 
which it contains, I have the advantage of being able to draw upon a variety of intellectual 
traditions and areas, looking at their various literatures, and relating it to my wider concern 
with mad logics. 
In asylum studies, the most significant work remains Goffman’s Asylums: Essays on the Social 
Situation of Mental Patients (1961). This work, highly influential amongst the anti-psychiatric 
movement, Goffman suggests the asylum is an example of a total institution that attempts to 
exert a totalizing level of control over its inmates. This control even manifests into the 
performative, whereby certain behaviours and expressions are encouraged over others. 
Likewise, the historical studies of the asylum, and the social structures surrounding them, have 
provided a useful backdrop to my research. Roy Porter (1987 and 2002) and Andrew Scull (2007 
and 2015) provide useful histories of the asylum in Britain and the development of modern 
psychiatry; in observing the factual errors of Foucault, and the particularities of Britain’s 
relationship to madness, they have enrichened my understanding of how the asylum 
functioned across this period. Elaine Showalter (1987) has profoundly influenced my thinking, 
in her analysis of how patriarchy has worked alongside and within the history of psychiatry. The 
use of their work has been informative, though, concerning myself with performative 
representations of the asylum post-de-institutionalization, these works form a background, 
rather than a field with which to be directly contended. 
Interest in hallucination studies is a comparatively new field, comparatively undeveloped 
compared to the history of the asylum. Recent attempts at drafting from hallucination as simply 
symptom, into experience, has led to an attempt to draw out a phenomenology of 
hallucination. ‘Hearing the Voice’ at Durham University, a multi-disciplinary project covering 
neuroscientific, literary, and historical perspectives of hallucination, has provided various 
attempts to phenomenologically account for hearing voices and seeing visions. Angela Woods 
(2015) and Patricia Waugh (2015), both emerging from the ‘Hearing the Voice’ project, have 
worked to challenge the traditional models of hallucination as simply deception or obfuscation. 
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Again, my concern with the aesthetic, and with how we culturally imagine hallucination, has led 
to a limited engagement with voice-hearers themselves, but it has provided an important 
platform for my research. 
Suicide has a long and varied background in its intellectual development. The development of 
suicidology has paralleled the developments of sociology writ large, the most famous work 
being Emilé Durkheim’s Suicide (2002). This has been followed by descriptivist and various 
other sociological accounts of suicide. Likewise, there is a strong traditional of existential and 
moral treatise on suicide, from David Hume’s Of Suicide (1998) to Jean Amery’s On Suicide: A 
Disclosure on Voluntary Death (1999). These works, both sociological and moral, have been 
fundamental in constructing my thesis, if only in observing their limitations. 
Finally, as previously elaborated, there is a rich consideration towards the mad voice, most 
famously from figures such as Porter and Reaume. The influence of the testimony of psychiatric 
survivors, of the necessity to consider the persons under which madness is structurated, 
hopefully permeates throughout the thesis. However, whilst the final chapter considers such 
testimonies from the point of view of performance, the calm ethical engagement of these two 
thinkers has remained a core influence. 
Philosophical Articulations of Resistance 
Throughout this thesis, I will be relying up a variety of theoretical and philosophical material in 
order to expound upon and explore differing possibilities of resistance. My first chapter will in 
particular build upon the thought of Foucault. Rather than use the arguments elaborate in 
Madness and Civilization, however, I am more interested in the questions of resistance and his 
understandings of Power in his mid-to-later work. His collections of lectures (Psychiatric Power 
and Abnormal) in particular offer a critique of the simplifications of his first work on madness. I 
also extend beyond his direct writings on madness, particularly from his essay ‘What Is the 
Enlightenment?’ (1999). My second chapter will use space theory, drawing upon the thought 
and reconceptualizations of space presented by Henri Lefebvre and, to a lesser extent, David 
Harvey. I will be drawing upon Lefebvre’s Production of Space (1991), The Survival of 
Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production (1976) and David Harvey’s Spaces of 
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Global Capitalism (2005) and Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom (2009). In the 
third chapter, I will use a variety of theorists to explore different possibilities and articulations 
of witnessing. This will involve an engagement with Felman and Dori Laub’s seminal Testimony: 
Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (1992), Jean-François Lyotard’s 
The Differend (1988), and the various writings on witnessing by Derrida (2000a and 2000b). The 
final chapter has emerged from a long engagement with the work and thought of Emmanuel 
Levinas, and his particular consideration of the ethical encounter. His core works in this regard 
are Totality and Infinity (1994) and Otherwise Than Being (1991). I will draw upon the 
commentary of Derrida (1999 and 2001), Simon Critchley (1999 and 2004) and Howard Caygill 
(2002) in order to hone Levinas’s relationship to the political. 
My use of these theorists will not simply be one of adoption, to argue that the performances 
are reflective or pallid images of the theories in question. Rather, these chapters will 
interrogate and analyze these theories from the perspective of madness in order to ask 
particular questions of the plays in question. In my questioning of Foucault’s various 
understandings of resistance, I will claim it is only the practical critique which can offer an 
adequate model through which to critique the institution from within its own structures. Using 
Lefebvre’s notions of space as an instigation of analysis, I will nevertheless trouble his triad of 
space, and suggest his mapping of madness as external to a Marxist core proves problematic. I 
will suggest existing concepts of witnessing have been conceived around the semiotic and the 
Shoah, that an alternative mode of thinking is necessary to imagine witnessing in a 
performative sense about suicide. The theories of Levinas, if offering a springboard for analysis, 
are unclear in their relationship to the political. Whilst this is a highly simplistic overlay of my 
interrogation, my main emphasis is that these theories have been treated as planes of 
interrogation, rather than doxa to be reified. 
It should be added, throughout these theoretical discussions, this thesis will not be engaging 
with psychoanalysis, in any deep or significant manner. Outside of the lack of relevance in 
institutional logics, I am fundamentally concerned with the political construction of madness. 
Whether Freud or Lacan, psychoanalysis is fundamentally concerned with creating 
architectures of the mind. I, in contrast, am interested in the political-ideological construction 
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of madness, and its representation. If I am interested in psychanalysis, it is merely to note two 
continuations with modern psychiatry. Firstly, that the emergence of the Oedipal can only occur 
with the psychoanalyst speaking upon mad experience, and silencing the mad person in favour 
of essentialist mythological constructs. Secondly, that this silencing overwhelmingly occurs in a 
deeply misogynist fashion: in Freud’s case, the silencing of highly vulnerable women who were 
reporting experience of sexual abuse as children. I am, naturally, aware of the various 
intellectual lineages, and the influence of psychoanalytical thought on some of the thinkers I 
use. Likewise, I may use or interrogate a psychoanalytical thinker (such as Darian Leader), for 
the value of their thoughts despite their psychoanalytical moorings. In general, however, I see 
psychoanalysis as forming the same doctor-patient dialectic as psychiatry; I am fundamentally 
sceptical that shoots of resistance can rise from such barren ground. 
Theatre and Performance Studies and Literary Representations of Madness 
Outside of existing work directly responding to the political and theoretical structuration of 
madness, this thesis is primarily engaged in aesthetics of performance and the politics of 
representation. My use of theatre and performance studies has varied and spanned over wide 
thematic and dramaturgical arenas; the sprawling nature of madness, its intersections with a 
variety of genres and fields, require an adroit and pliable intellectual strategy. Broad strands to 
my own research have been the political potential of realism, ethical studies of theatre, and the 
study of autobiographical performance. Interrogations of realism, its political backdrop, its 
reactionary and radical potential, has assisted me in ascertaining the ability of realist plays to 
form institutional critiques. Elin Diamond’s Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on Feminism and Theatre 
(1997) has assisted thinking through the implications of realism, as has Stephen Lacey’s British 
Realist Theatre: A New Wave in its Context 1956-1965 (2002). Likewise, in terms of 
autobiographical performance, Deirdre Heddon (2008) and Jenn Stephenson (2013) both 
represent core figures in this field. Beyond these broad areas, my work is littered with 
engagement according to different structures and concerns of each play. My analysis of nut 
(2013) required an engagement with studies of Black British Theatre, in particular the work of 
Lynette Goddard (2007 and 2015). Looking at The Skriker (1999b), I had to engage in a degree 
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of environmental theatre criticism, by those such as Candice Amich (2007). These engagements 
have had to be decided upon a play-by-play basis. 
If I have consulted performance studies not engaged in studies of madness, I have also 
considered the long tradition of looking at madness within literary studies. Perhaps the most 
famous example of this Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s The Madwoman in the Attic: The 
Woman Writer and Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination (2000), the famous consideration 
of feminism and madness. Other core thinkers include: Felman (1975 and 2003), Alan Thither 
(2004), Sarah Wood Anderson (2012), and Marta Caminero-Santangelo (1998). If this thesis 
does not draw upon this thought to a large extent, it is because it is primarily invested in 
thinking through the performative mode. Whilst having a great respect for the literary tradition 
of mad studies, this thesis operates on the assumption that performance studies fundamentally 
requires a different set of conceptual tools to that of the literary. In doing so, I am not situating 
myself in the long tradition of looking at madness through literary studies, but firmly placing 
myself within theatre and performance studies. It must be noted, however, that studies of Early 
Modern drama have more consciously interrogated the performativity of madness. Concerns 
with the burgeoning asylum, or somehow applying a test for madness, are represented by a 
variety of Early Modern dramatists, including Thomas Middleton’s The Changeling and John 
Webster’s Duchess of Malfi. Questions of the asylum were often preoccupied with the question 
of charity as contrasted with the (often commercially dispensed) theatrical spectacle of the 
mad, as in John Fletcher’s The Pilgrim or Thomas Dekker and Middleton’s The Honest Whore, 
Part I. Carol Thomas Neely (2004) uses these plays to problematize Foucauldian understandings 
of the period, both through a challenge to the thesis of the ‘Great Confinement’ and a critique 
of his inattention to gender as a complicating force. Ken Jackson (2005) has provided an 
interesting examination of Bethlem as revealing the complexities of charity and madness during 
this period. Bridget Escolme (2013) has used the concept of emotional excess to further 
illuminate this period and its conception of madness. Whilst not directly linked to my own 
concerns with modern psychiatry, the residual permeations of Early Modern conceptions of 
madness remain resilient. 
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Theatrical Interpretation of Madness 
My own research is set as an analysis of representations of madness from the perspective of 
performance studies. In terms of specifically performance, there has been a surprising dearth of 
consideration of madness. It is partly this gap in sustained academic examination that has led 
me to this thesis. However, this is not to say there is no existing literature whatsoever. 
Therefore, I will briefly outline the current existing literature, the extent to which it will be used 
in this thesis, and how my own research is situated alongside previous work, whilst building 
upon their work. 
Derek Russell Davis forms one means of theatrical engagement with madness, through 
fundamentally a psychiatric gaze, in Scenes of Madness: Psychiatrist at the Theatre (1995). 
Continuing this, Femi Oyebole’s Madness at the Theatre (2012), provides a consideration of 
various canon pieces from a primarily literary and psychiatric perspective. Their position as 
psychiatrists dominate interpretation; they interpret through psychiatry, seeing theatre as a 
reflection of the psychiatric, rather than disturbing conceptual precepts through an 
engagement with the theatrical. Rather than a political examination of the ideological 
constructions of madness, these works situate theatre as a reflection of the psychiatric. 
Likewise, despite situating themselves within theatre studies, their analysis is frequently 
focused upon text-based analysis. For these reasons, their work will feature little in my thesis. 
Christina Wald’s Hysteria, Trauma and Melancholia: Performative Maladies in Contemporary 
Anglophone Theatre (2007) provides one of the few examples of a sustained engagement with 
performance with attentiveness to theory. Wald, drawing upon the theory of Judith Butler, 
claims that certain mental health difficulties are understood primarily as and through 
performance; they are inherently performative maladies. She then suggests that Hysteria, 
Trauma and Melancholia form their own ‘theatres’, into which various plays can be categorized. 
Wald’s concerns fundamentally diverge from my own in several senses. Firstly, the 
fundamentally psychoanalytical terminology she is drawing upon, secondly, the attempt to 
form genres and categories rather than modes, and thirdly, the notion that there is an inherent 
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radicalism in framing madness in purely performative terms. These differences, combined with 
my own concern with representation, mean that Wald’s work will feature in my thesis. 
Images of Mental Illness Through Text and Performance (2005), a collection of essays by Sarah 
J. Rudolph and Ellen W. Kaplan, represents one of the few direct engagements with madness in 
theatre and performance, across a book-length form. It covers a variety of representations of 
madness, from Tennessee Williams to David Auburn. This study reflects an interest in writers 
across the Western tradition, with a very broad temporal and geographical remit. The essays 
are less concerned with a concrete articulation of resistance, than a historical overview. 
Nevertheless, its thoughts about the possibilities of theatrical representation have remained 
influential. 
The work of Anna Harpin has provided continual stimulus for my own work4. Harpin has a long 
preoccupation with madness, and its politics. Yet, much of her published work has revolved 
around trauma and abuse, rather than madness per se. I look forward to Harpin’s forthcoming 
monograph, detailing representations of madness in film, performance and literature since 
1970; however, the breadth of her concerns contrasts with my strict concern with the theatrical 
and the performative. Harpin’s most relevant work with mad studies in performance is a 
project called Isolated Acts, co-ordinated with Juliet Foster, looking at theatre in the asylum. 
This project eventually led to the publication of Performance, Madness and Psychiatry: Isolated 
Acts (2014), a collection of essays dealing with questions of mental health and performance, 
from perspectives of both academics and practitioners. Many of these essays have different 
concerns to this thesis (the performance history within asylums, the use of Ophelia in 
performance history), however they have helped broaden my consideration of the relationship 
between performance and madness. The most relevant essay to my own work is Harpin’s own: 
‘Dislocated: Metaphors of Madness in Contemporary Theatre’. This essay has, particularly 
across the first two chapters, been a highly productive and useful work with which to compare 
and contrast my own ideas. 
                                                          
4 Harpin acted as my supervisor for the first year of this thesis. 
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I should acknowledge that several of the plays considered in this work have a long critical 
tradition, with extensive literature written on them. In as much as performance analysis has 
engaged with mad studies, it has often been through analysis of particular plays or playwrights. 
Elaine Aston (1995) has analyzed how the work of Sarah Daniels sits structures of madness and 
patriarchy alongside one another, Rachel Clements (2013) has adroitly observed the ‘mad’ 
politics of Blue/Orange in using realism as tool to interrogate the institution, whilst academia 
surrounding Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis (2001) has welcomed a flurry of interpretation with 
regards to madness, from Alicia Tycer (2008) to Graham Saunders (2002). These works provide 
a crucial backdrop to my own research, but are more engaged in relating madness to studies of 
the playwright or play in question, rather than trying to draw larger conclusions about the place 
of madness and resistance in these various representations. 
Building upon this work, this thesis will provide its own original contribution. Whilst some work 
has begun to expound upon the representation of madness in contemporary theatre, there has 
been a lack of conceptual engagement with what constitutes resistance. The little work existing 
that concerns mad studies has tended to focus on representation through the gaze of 
psychiatry, historical analysis, or the attempt to categorize and creates genres. I hope this thesis 
engages with and provides new alternatives in conceptualizing resistance to madness, and how 
theatre can offer resistance, and how this relates to the politics of representation. 
Consideration of Methodology and Selection 
Maria M. Delgado, in ‘Other’ Spanish Theatres: Erasure and Inscription on the Twentieth-
Century Spanish Stage, clarifies that her work, ‘does not set out to offer a historical coverage of 
the period’ (Delgado 2003: 6); if the work concentrates upon ‘beginning from the peripheries’ 
(Delgado 2003: 275) then this does not suggest other works and figures ‘have not similarly 
influenced the theatrical landscape in which they have worked’ (Delgado 2003: 275). Whilst this 
is framed within the context of Spanish theatre, in a similar spirit, this thesis will not be 
attempting to perform a historical overview of madness and theatre across British and Irish 
theatre of the past 25 years. I do not pretend the plays I have selected have had exclusive 
impact upon the wider representation of madness, or offered modes of resistance. Rather, I 
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have selected works I have found particularly pertinent and illuminating to understanding 
resistance against structures of madness. This thesis has not been drawn on the basis of 
historical overview, but rather based upon theoretical perspectives. Thus, the thesis has been 
divided and conceived upon conceptual lines: the modes of resistance themselves. 
My selection of plays has been picked from British and Irish theatre in the past 25 years. The 
concepts of this thesis are, necessarily, entangled with this period and area. However, I have 
not been led by historical periodisation, say since the Mental Health Act 1983 or the Irish 
Mental Health Act 2000. This has given me a period and area broad enough to consider a 
multitude of perspectives, but specific enough to not overly conflate cultural modes. The 
distribution puts a greater focus upon plays performed more recently. The stretch of time 
relates to the chapter concerned; if the first chapter benefits from including plays premiered 
across a longer stretch of time (for purposes of comparison), the final chapter responds to the 
recent rise of autobiographical performance concerning mental health. 
The plays vary, from work developed in well-established institutions, to more fringe work 
performed by performance artists in small or non-traditional venues. The concentration alters 
according to chapter and applicability; the first chapter, of realist plays engaging with 
institutions of the contemporary asylums, emerge from our own major theatrical institutions of 
the Royal Court and the National Theatre, the final chapter concerns comparatively lesser 
known performance work. Likewise, some of the plays have extensive academic literature 
written upon them (Blue/Orange, The Skriker, 4.48 Psychosis) whilst others are comparatively 
unexplored. If I hope to, in certain cases, draw attention to comparatively neglected work, I also 
hope to fully expound potential radicalism in more famous work that has been ignored. 
In order to contain and adequately survey different possibilities and modes of theatrical 
resistance, each chapter respectively looks at a different form of resistance. The first chapter 
looks at the possibility of theatre forming a practical critique of madness, and what this 
constitutes in theatrical terms. The second examines how we can anticipate different spatial 
logics of madness through theatre. In the third chapter, I regard what it means to witness 
madness through theatre. Finally, in the fourth, I consider how performance can re-establish 
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the ethical encounter with the mad person. Across these different configurations, we see a 
variety of considerations of resistance across political and ethical axes. This is, to be clear, in no 
way claiming to be an exhaustive account of resistance, nor that there are no intersections 
between these different possibilities. 
The difficulty in discussing madness is its breadth; madness contains multiplicities, multiple 
logics and institutions. In this spirit, the thesis incorporates the complexities of madness by 
looking at specific features and attributes in each chapter: the contemporary asylum, 
hallucination, suicide, and the testimony of the mad person. As with the selection of modes of 
resistance, I am in no way suggesting that these form some ‘complete whole’ of madness, or 
that these are the only attributes of madness I could look at. They are not categories of 
madness, but rather facets of its construction. Moreover, I am not making any claim that these 
form any sort of ‘genre,’ that their selection or division is an inherent categorization core to 
aesthetic representation of madness or madness itself. Rather, they are a selection, on a 
heuristic basis, of some of the interlocking logics which form the structuration of madness. 
By this pairing, I have situated each mode of resistance next to a specific attribute of madness. I 
examine what it means, in theatrical terms, to perform a practical critique of the contemporary 
asylum, to invent new spatial logics of hallucination, to witness suicide, and to re-establish the 
ethical encounter with the mad person. In doing so, I hope to add a specificity to the discussion 
of madness, avoiding generalized notions of madness, noting the complexity of its social 
construction, lending a thickness to an analysis and consideration of representation and 
resistance. This is not however, to suggest that each particular mode can only be applied to the 
attribute of madness in question. One can conceive of new spatialities of the asylum. One can 
perform a practical critique of suicide. Rather, I have used specific modes of resistance that I 
think best engage and reveal way of re-imagining particular attributes of madness, and in 
parallel, have picked attributes of madness that I hope most reveal the efficacy and possibility 
of the mode of resistance in question. 
This selection, the process of connecting mode, to attribute, to selection of plays, has been 
thoroughly unsystematic, variable to each chapter, contingent to each chapter’s intellectual 
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evolution. There has been no primacy given to mode, attribute, or selection of plays. In the 
second chapter, I discovered spatial theory as a way to think about the existing restrictions, and 
potential new directions, of hallucinatory logics. In the case of the third chapter, having looked 
at a series of plays that variously played upon witnessing, I realized they were concerned with 
suicide. In the fourth chapter, my concern with Levinas and ethics directed me towards 
autobiographical performance. It is my hope that these varying approaches have allowed for a 
more productive and reflexive thesis than the unadaptable application of various theoretical 
schemata. 
This thesis is about looking at how theatre can act as a site of ‘resistance’ through its 
representations. I am less concerned with the banal thematic or categorical claim, as a play 
‘about madness’, than if the play in question, in touching upon and representing madness, 
offers a radical or resistant account of its articulation. If this question ripples throughout the 
thesis, it is one with which I have continually had to engage. To what extent is The Skriker a play 
that is concerned with hallucination, and to what extent does it evade such simplistic 
associations? Bush Moukarzel and Mark O Halloran’s Lippy (2014) is a play that does not 
mention modern psychiatric services whatsoever, to what extent can their representations be 
taken to be radical? These various justifications have had to be made alongside analysis, 
embedded in the critique itself, rather than justified prior to their consideration. 
The first chapter relates to the structures of the contemporary asylum, the realist 
representations of the institutions, and an interrogation of what Michel Foucault’s concept of 
the practical critique means in a context of realist theatre and for its representations of a de-
centralized series of power networks. There is a wide arena of plays dealing with this in a 
historical sense, particularly concerning hysteria (Anna Furse’s Augustine: Big Hysteria, Terry 
Johnson’s Hysteria), however I wanted to examine plays that reflected upon the legislative, 
institutional and cultural structures of the asylum contemporaneous to the original production 
of the play. In order to examine a variety of contexts, this chapter represents the largest 
breadth of time period, with plays from 1992, 2000 and 2013 (Sarah Daniels’s Head-Rot 
Holiday, Joe Penhall’s Blue/Orange, and Lucy Prebble’s The Effect). However, the plays selected 
not only demonstrate a variety of different context and institutional structures of madness, the 
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plays are nearly entirely set within psychiatric institutions; the gaze is perennially upon and 
within the institution itself. 
In order to consider representations of hallucination in my second chapter, and the de-
politicising cultural tropes, I questioned how theatre could trouble the traditional spatial logics 
of madness and hallucination. I was less interested in plays that more strongly adopt the inside-
outside dialectics of hallucination, such as Alan Ayckbourn’s Woman in Mind or Anthony 
Neilson’s The Wonderful World of Dissocia, than plays than problematize this easy substitution 
and re-invigorate a political understanding of madness. All three plays, Ridiculusmus’s The 
Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, Caryl Churchill’s The Skriker, and debbie 
tucker green’s nut, all play with space (in its various understandings) and with genre; in doing 
so, they fertilise their conceptions of hallucination with the political. 
For my third chapter, I wanted to look at suicide, and what it means to witness, in a theatrical 
context, when looking at the suicidal act. Suicide is a common feature in much drama, often 
represented in the plot in connection to mental health; plays such as Daniels’ Ripen Her 
Darkness and Penhall’s Some Voices both demonstrate suicide as the possible outcome of 
mistreatment. However, beyond simply looking at plays representing suicide, or using suicide as 
regrettable outcome of madness, I needed to look at play that interrogated and questioned our 
response and interpretation of suicide. For this, I chose the plays Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis, 
David Grieg’s Fragile and Dead Centre’s Lippy, all of which complicate responses to suicide 
beyond.  
In my fourth chapter, following what it meant for theatre to re-establish an ethical encounter, I 
was drawn to the recent rise of autobiographical performance concerning madness. Whilst 
work by artists such as Bobby Baker have preceded this recent rise, and Kim Noble’s Kim Noble 
Must Die remains influential, I focused upon the past five years, and given the nature of the 
argument, focus upon plays I had seen (ideally live, in one case recorded). In this spirit, I chose 
James Leadbitter’s Mental in 2014, Dylan Tighe’s RECORD, and Bryony Kimming’s and Tim 
Grayburn’s Fake It ‘Til You Make It in 2015. I also use Byron Vincent’s Talk About Something You 
Like to compliment my analysis of Mental.  
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This decision to include a selection of Irish plays (Lippy and RECORD) alongside British theatre 
has been a difficult one. It emerged organically, from noting certain thematic and aesthetic 
similarities. Certainly, Irish and British contexts provide different social circumstances, a 
different background. However, as I worked across the various examples, I realized the 
limitations of an analysis entirely forged around a single nation-state. Firstly, the argument of 
this thesis, far from a cultural materialist analysis of a particular state, is a conceptual 
exploration of how theatre and performance provides us with alternative modes of conceiving 
madness. Whilst acknowledging the variance of different countries and genealogies, to simply 
isolate is to ignore the potent pollination of core figures and concepts of madness. Goffman’s 
sociology, Foucauldian thought and Laingian practice were highly influential to the work of 
Basaglia and the anti-psychiatric forces in Italy. Following from this, the Basaglia Law eventually 
became a core influence to the deinstitutionalization reforms across the 1980s in the United 
States and Britain. Likewise, Irish and British Law with regards to mental health have marked 
connections; there are evident parallels between the Mental Health Act 1983 of the United 
Kingdom and the Health (Mental Services) Act 1981 of the Republic of Ireland, both responding 
to the wave of deinstitutionalization. Beyond madness, to simply rely upon a billiard ball 
apprehension of nation-states and their cultures is to deny the important cross-fertilization of 
theatre and practitioners. Both Ben Kidd and Bush Moukarzel, the founders of Dead Centre, 
were raised and trained in Britain. Dylan Tighe, the creator of RECORD, has acted in their work, 
and tours his own music globally. They will have influenced, and be influenced by, British 
practitioners. The delineations of aesthetic culture, particularly between these two countries, 
are far from neat. 
This is not to erase the importance of difference. This thesis is one which works alongside and 
anticipates difference. Situating these plays in an Irish context is crucial to understanding the 
operations and functions of each play. Notably, each play revolves around silence, about 
putting words into the mouths of others. In the context of Ireland, the centuries of colonial rule 
coupled with the attempted eradication of Gaelic, such imagery with voice and silence takes on 
a particular significance. Certainly, the context of Ireland will alter structures of madness. 
However, so will questions of race, of gender, of disability. This thesis takes intersectionality as 
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a serious concern, but does not prioritize the nation-state as an unassailable division. Rather, I 
hope that by attending to difference within the analysis, this thesis will highlight the difference 
and heterogeneity of madness. 
I am aware that this is not an exhaustive list of plays which I could have selected. Other work 
engaged in madness in British and Irish theatre in the past 25 years includes Martin 
McDonagh’s The Beauty Queen of Leenane (1996), The Lonesome West (1997) and The 
Lieutenant of Inishmore (2001); Bryony Lavery’s Frozen (2004); Chole Moss’s This Wide Night 
(2009); Simon Stephen’s Motortown (2009), Punk Rock (2011) and Three Kingdoms (2012); 
Dennis Kelly’s Taking Care of Baby (2007); Nick Payne’s Incognito (2014); Tom Stoppard’s The 
Hard Problem (2015); Martin Crimp’s Attempts on Her Life (2007); Enda Walsh’s The New 
Electric Ballroom (2008) and The Walworth Farce (2007). Of the playwrights I have chosen, 
numerous other plays could have been chosen, including: Sarah Daniels’s Ripen Her Darkness 
(1991), Beside Herself (1994a) and The Madness of Esme and Shaz (1994c); Joe Penhall’s Some 
Voices (1998); Caryl Churchill’s A Mouthful of Birds (1998a). Sarah Kane’s work has provided a 
sustained engagement with questions of madness. These plays have not been selected simply 
because other plays were more pertinent to my research. 
I have attempted to pair textual critique and performative analysis across this thesis, to varying 
degrees according to the circumstances in which I have encountered the plays. I have neither 
seen professional performances nor watched recordings of Head-Rot Holiday (1994b), 4.48 
Psychosis and Fragile (2011). I have based my analysis of Blue/Orange, The Effect (2012), nut 
and RECORD upon recordings of productions. My live experience has acted as platform of 
analysis for The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, The Skriker, Lippy, Mental and 
Fake It ‘Til You Make It. Across this thesis, I have engaged in a close reading, with a conceptual 
framework in mind, to explore the mechanisms by which these plays radically represent 
madness and forge resistances. 
The plays examined are in no-way perfect objects of resistance, and this thesis is not interested 
in naively claiming or arguing for their conceptual or political perfection. In any case, I am 
suspicious of the notion of ‘perfect’ resistance. Rather, I suggest that in the interrogation of 
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them, from particular conceptual viewpoints, we see certain radical ways of conceiving and 
representing madness. It is in this sense that this thesis is fundamentally optimistic, not from a 
naïve assumption of theatre’s untainted radicalism. Emerging from this, I hope the following 
chapters demonstrate and explore new manners in which theatre can imagine the 
representation of madness, triangulating this against the political structuration of madness and 
the lived experience of mad persons, and how these representations offer possibilities of what 
it means to resist. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PSYCHIATRIC POWER, REALISM, AND REPRESENTATION OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY ASYLUM 
The Asylum, The Madhouse, The Sanatorium: these terms all surround the concomitant fear 
and mockery that engulf the asylum, madness and our treatment of the mad. The asylum 
stands as a theatrical object and site; the practice of exhibiting the mad at Bethlem seeps into 
our dramatic imagination. Carol Rosen perceives a connection between the displays at the 
madhouses and drama’s conventional use of madness, that it, ‘has traditionally emphasized the 
sensational aspects of the mental asylums and exploited madness for its shock value onstage’ 
(Rosen 1983: 85). Anna Harpin (2012) suggests even contemporary horror’s use of the asylum 
represents both an anxiety about our historical treatment of the mad, and an attempt to 
partition it off to a disconnected past. We are drawn to the asylum as spectacle, even as we 
attempt to avoid its political implications. As Rosen remarks, ‘We do not want to enter the 
madhouse; we merely want to see it’ (Rosen 1983: 85) 
The asylum has changed and the spectacle adjusted. The nineteenth century marks ‘the 
emergence of a self-conscious and organized group of professionals laying claim to jurisdiction 
over mental disturbance, and obtaining a measure of social warrant for their claims’ (Scull 
2015: 1066). Following the birth of modern psychiatry, the gaze of the sane alters. It is no 
longer a viewing gallery, an opportunity of exoticisation or eroticisation, a carnival of Goya’s 
grotesques. The gaze has become clinical, a mode of continual classification and observation. 
No longer simply the physical containment (and subsequent display) of mad bodies, psychiatric 
power now seeks to measure madness itself. The theatrical spectatorship of the mad has 
remained, but sensationalist voyeurism has transmogrified into a diagnostic gaze. 
The singular asylum of the Enlightenment has dissolved, replaced by psychiatric wards, 
adjudicated by judicial hearings, domesticated into the medication taken at home. The 
contemporary asylum is not a single building, but dispersed across a series of institutions 
(sometimes allied, sometimes conflicting). Whatever the complexities, its various comprising 
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institutions all seek to measure mad experience, and to calcify it into the definable. Doubt is 
supplanted by scientific certainty, sanity reified by insanity, a clear, singular social reality 
consolidated by the rejection of the more heterogeneous, diffuse realities of mad experience. 
The plays of this chapter all seek to wrestle with the contemporary asylum, and the psychiatric 
power embedded in its constituting institutions. However, rather than attempt to scrutinize 
from ‘outside’ the asylum (representing alternative treatments, possibilities, realities), they 
interrogate the asylum from within. There is not a single setting in Head-Rot Holiday (1994b), 
Blue/Orange (2000) or The Effect (2012) that is not of a medical establishment: whether 
psychiatric ward, testing facility, abandoned asylum, or hospital bed. These are plays for which 
the asylum is the persistent object of their attention. 
This extends to their dramaturgy; all the plays adopt a primarily realist mode. The occasions 
when representation exceeds a singular, uncontested ‘real’ are few and sporadic. When they do 
occur (the visitation of the Angel in Head-Rot Holiday, Tristan’s unstable conception of time in 
The Effect) they are presented as manifestations of the character’s instability, rather than a 
challenge to the realist framework itself. In adopting realism as mimetic apparatus, these plays 
are, seemingly, participating in the notion of a singular ‘true’ real that the contemporary asylum 
seeks to manufacture. 
Discussion of realism as politically conservative, as failing to interrogate its ideological 
underpinnings, is hardly limited to studies of madness. It is a genre that is marked by, in the 
terms of Raymond Williams, ‘an injection of new content into an orthodox dramatic form’ 
(Williams 1977: 68). Following Williams, Stephen Lacey (2002) distinguishes between this 
understanding of realism as this ‘particular attitude towards what is called reality’ (Williams 
1977: 61) against realism as a ‘method’ that is preoccupied with mimesis as a mode of 
representation. However, this elides the connections between the artistic ‘genre’ and ‘method’. 
The project of realism is involved in an attempt to extend the terms of a singular (if historically 
mutable) reality; reality is taken as singular, the challenge being to articulate experiences within 
that social reality that have been neglected. The ‘realism’ as political genre is rooted in ‘realism’ 
as project of verisimilitude; if reality is untroubled, then political radicalism is a matter of un-
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problematically representing ignored cultural identities from within that social reality. Rather 
than question or destabilize the precepts behind our reality, ‘realist representations tend to 
leave unchallenged the vision of reality cherished by recipients and producers alike’ (Hauthal 
2013:146). This is not merely passive but generative, ‘realism is more than an interpretation of 
reality passing as reality; it produces ‘reality’ by positioning its spectator to recognize and verify 
its truths’ (Diamond 1997: 4). 
The structures of realism and modern psychiatry are both historically and ideologically 
intertwined. The rise of realism coincides with the ascent of modern psychiatry; early realism 
continually returns to the most emblematic of late nineteenth-century psychiatry: the hysteric. 
Contemporary critic Elin Diamond suggests that, ‘Ibsenite realism guarantees its legitimacy by 
endowing the fallen woman of popular melodrama with the symptoms and etiology of the 
hysteric’ (Diamond 1997: 4). Realism substantiates itself through an adoption of the diagnostic 
gaze. Anna Harpin suggests, ‘a realist framework readily invites a diagnostic gaze in so far as it 
replicates normal and abnormal behaviour’ (Harpin 2014: 189). The untroubled ‘reality’ which 
realism engages within has no space for the mad person, it tends to ‘remainder the contents of 
“mad” experience in some ways outside the dramatic frame’ (Harpin 2014: 189). As a result, 
madness becomes external spectacle for the internal and sane logic of the play. It remains only 
in traces, as inscrutable objects, such as the terrors of Blanche du Bois. 
The temptation is to denounce realism as a project, to suggest that realist plays perpetuate the 
diagnostic gaze, remainder mad experience in the pursuit of the spectacle. However, I suggest 
that (whilst acknowledging the realist mode participates in a form of structural violence) it is 
precisely this adoption of realism (an aesthetic perpetuating the ideology of psychiatric power) 
that allows certain plays to examine the contemporary asylum upon its own terms, scrutinising 
from within, from the inside-out, adopting a self-reflexive position. The adherence to realism 
can be strategic, as Rachel Clements suggests of Blue/Orange, in that it ‘commits very 
deliberately to a rather traditional use of structure and setting as part of its interest and the 
exploration of liberalism, and as a way of effecting a shift from clear idealism to confused 
realism’ (Clements 2013: xxxi). This is not to universalize, to claim all works of realism are 
engaged in surreptitiously radical politics; many, if not most, realist works regurgitate the 
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hegemonic. But, rather, the adoption of realism can, in certain cases, be a strategic route 
towards critique.  
It is possible for realism to shift from mimetic re-production to an embedded resistant gesture, 
from exercising the diagnostic gaze into an examination (and thereby resistance) of the gaze 
itself. In this way, performance can provide a space of reflexivity that critiques what it 
simultaneously perpetuates. However, this requires a more sustained conception of what the 
contemporary asylum constitutes, what the nature of its power is, and to what extent we can 
account for resistance (and the manner of resistance) emerging from within its production of 
power, sundered from mad experience. 
Between Fatalism and Essentialism: Foucault and The Practical Critique 
The difficulties of the representation of the contemporary asylum, and how to account for it, 
emerge from a tendency towards fatalism. Erving Goffman (1961) argues that the asylum offers 
a complete and totalising control of the mad body, that this control even indoctrinates the mad 
person into certain behavioural and sociological gestures and performances. The asylum is 
presented as a pervasive, complete institution that is totalizing in its control of the mad person. 
Yet how can resistance take place in such an institution? As Michel Foucault notes in Abnormal, 
to merely state that something is grotesque, to abhor its abhorrence, does not constitute 
resistance; indeed, many structures thrive upon, and justify themselves, precisely through their 
evidently invidious discourse. There are power structures that, ‘find their source, in a place that 
is manifestly, explicitly, and readily discredited as odious, despicable or ridiculous’ (Foucault 
2003b: 12). Such modes of the asylum recall Jacques Rancière’s notion of the ‘melancholic left’, 
whereby the critic moralizes whist simultaneously claiming all resistance plays into prevailing 
powers, feeding upon 'the dual denunciation of the power of the beast and the illusions of 
those who serve it when they think they are fighting it' (Rancière 2009: 35-36).  
However, the portrayal of the ‘mad person’ as an autonomous agent is similarly problematic. 
To suggest that the mad person is in no way structured, or altered, by the institutions and 
power structures to which they are exposed, lends itself to a regressive essentialism, that can 
ignore the reality of how the asylum attempts to structurate and form the mad person. This 
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naïve form of liberalism can result in an inattendance to the particularities of psychiatric power 
and victim-blaming. 
We are faced with a dilemma between undesirable outcomes, of pessimistic structuralism and 
substanceless liberalism. This bifurcation sits alongside Foucault’s own difficulties for 
simultaneously attempting to acknowledge the power structure of the asylum (that it not only 
contains mad bodies, but seeks to define them) whilst accounting for the possibility of 
resistance. Foucault’s work in Madness and Civilization (in a similar vein to realist plays 
exploring the contemporary asylum) has been criticized by the critics such as Roy Porter for 
ignoring the presence and testimony of the mad person. Yet despite this, Foucault’s thought on 
madness, its political structuration and varying manifestations throughout historical periods - 
from the confinement of the mad through the enlightened to the inscription upon the mad in 
the modern era – is rightly regarded as crucial for any political or structural apprehension of 
madness. 
Yet, Foucault’s thoughts on madness should not be limited to this early work. In 2003 the 
publication of Psychiatric Power and Abnormal, a series of lectures he gave at the College de 
France, revealed further subtleties of his thought on madness, as he critiques Madness and 
Civilization (1988) as indulging in various methodological ‘rusty locks’. Foucault displays his 
adaptability of thought, linking the treatment of George III of Great Britain to the emergence of 
disciplinary power that he would proceed to investigate in Discipline and Punish (1999), and 
claiming the sexual confession of hysteria offers a path of resistance, echoing his later 
arguments in the History of Sexuality (1978). Far from merely an early topic of interest, 
Foucault’s engagement with madness snakes throughout his career. 
The most important contribution of Foucault in his later work to the conception of madness is 
the new notion of psychiatric power. This idea presents power not as singular or monolithic, 
but rather as multi-faceted and pluralistic. Foucault refers throughout Psychiatric Power to the 
‘capillaries of Power,’ the notion of power not as a straight line, but as branching out, occurring 
at several places. Power is even contradictory, it is not apprehended by a single line of 
argument, but rather principles and modes that underlie even seemingly contradictory 
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positions. It is this conception of power, and the contemporary asylum, that offers an 
alternative to the twinned simplifications of structural functionalism and liberal essentialism. It 
is a particular mode of pluralism, which notes how power is multi-faceted and cannot be simply 
understood by a singular or totalizing position. However, this offers a new problem: in this 
pluralistic understanding of psychiatric power, how can resistance occur? 
As Gilles Deleuze famously and paradoxically claims in Foucault, ‘Resistance comes first’ 
(Deleuze 1988: 89). Foucault struggled with the problem of resistance throughout his work, and 
far from failing to account for it, the difficulty is navigating through his various solutions. Slavoj 
Žižek, in The Ticklish Subject (2009), succeeds in establishing two core modes of resistance in 
Foucault’s work. Firstly, in Madness and Civilization, there is the exhortation for the mad to 
speak for themselves, a suggestion madness had a ‘voice’ prior to its silencing by modern 
psychiatry. This is closely connected to his understanding of pleasure and the body as a mode 
of resistance in the History of Sexuality. However, this recourse to an unveiled, essential mad 
voice is unconvincing if we follow Foucauldian notions of structurated identity5. The second 
model of resistance Žižek identifies involves resistance concomitant with the power it opposes; 
it emerges out of, automatically, power. Power is visible precisely because resistance 
accompanies it. Yet, Foucault’s second notion of resistance also fails to provide a mode that 
escape the notion of power that Foucault has described. We resist within power, and are 
incapable of reaching outside it. 
However, I wish to suggest that Žižek ignores a third notion of resistance running throughout 
Foucault’s work, the notion that the ‘critique’ itself can shift from observation into resistance, 
the notion of the practical critique. Foucault articulates this possibility in his late essay What is 
the Enlightenment?, seeking to, ‘transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary 
limitation into a practical critique that lakes the form of a possible transgression.’ (Foucault 
1991: 45) This critique does not reify universal structures, but rather seeks to interrogate and 
critique them.  It raises contingencies and seeks change, not by suggesting an alternative ideal, 
                                                          
5 Moreover, in his attempt to herald hysteria as a mode of resistance, he fails to acknowledge how sexual history 
(particularly that of women, and often of abuse) has been manipulated and adapted, for both psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis, and that this violence upon female sexual narrative has formed a founding ‘myth’ for both 
disciplines. 
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but rather by raising and highlighting the arbitrations of power: ‘it will separate out, from the 
contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking 
what we are, do, or think’ (Foucault 1991: 46). It rejects utopic politics, noting ‘the claim to 
escape from the system of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of 
another society … has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions.’ (Foucault 1991: 
46). It is attempting to forge a dispersed, multifaceted response to dispersed, multifaceted 
power structures. 
This is not to suggest a complete adoption of Foucauldian thought. Foucault had, throughout 
his career, attempted to render theory a tool of resistance, the object as well as the subject of 
his work. In his early work, Madness and Civilization, Foucault expresses the desire to form a 
critique, not about madness, but through madness, hearing the voice of madness. Shoshana 
Felman describes the aim of Foucault as the, ‘philosophical search for a new status of discourse 
… which would obliterate the line of demarcation and the opposition between Subject and 
Object, Inside and Outside, Reason and Madness’ (Felman 1975: 214). Yet, the reason and 
theory of philosophy is inherently a monolithic one; philosophy can anticipate multiplicities, but 
cannot account or represent them without recourse to an organizational structure, to a new 
monolith. Jacques Derrida would follow this criticism, using Foucault’s definition of madness as 
‘the absence of a work’ against him: ‘is not an archaeology, even of silence, a logic, that is, an 
organized language, a project, an order, a sentence, a syntax, a work’ (Derrida 2001: 41). 
Rather, I suggest that Foucault succeeds in expounding and shaping out the limitations of 
philosophy. His work explores the necessity of pluralism, alongside the impossibility of theory 
to express it. In this, Foucault is mapping out the space in which philosophy is incapable of 
acting. I would suggest, that it is in this space that performance can offer an alternative mode 
of apprehension, representation and resistance. Most significantly, as Foucault is articulating a 
mode of resistance that emerges from the inside-out, that does not attempt to forge an 
external or utopic image, it provides us with a means of conceiving how realism can participate 
in resistance against psychiatric power. 
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The Roadmap to Resistance and Pluralism 
What constitutes and makes possible this ‘practical critique’ in theatrical terms? Part of the 
difficulty in explaining how resistance can occur in realist drama concerns our expectations. 
Performance is expected to provide a ‘roadmap to resistance’; the act of performance being 
resistant is concomitant with an explanation or guide of how to resist. However, if the power 
structures of the contemporary asylum are pluralistic, then the mode of resistance must be 
likewise divergent and anticipate multiplicities. Rather than a ‘roadmap’, resistance must be 
more anxious, fragmentary.  
Foucault envisioned the practical critique as primarily genealogical, as a historical project 
exposing naturalized concepts as socio-historical constructs. Relating the present in historical 
terms can potentially form a radical critique: firstly, by exposing connections between current 
practice and previous faulty assumptions (for instance, similarities between Victorian attitudes 
to phrenology and our own reification of neuroscience) and secondly, by defying a teleological 
narrative (namely, that the study of madness has been one of continuous progression and 
increasing humanism).  As Harpin (2012) has suggested, drama that interrogates the past is 
engaged in the interstices between past, present and future; to engage with the historical, to 
enquire of the past, is to establish new meanings, and contains an embedded radical sentiment: 
that things could be different from how they are. 
The plays of this chapter are, in contrast, directly engaged with contemporary developments; 
they have been selected, in part, to demonstrate the historical breadth. Head-Rot Holiday was 
developed by Sarah Daniels after extensive research on ‘special hospitals’ and the 
contemporary culture of sectioning following the Mental Health Act 1983. Blue/Orange was a 
response to conflicting impulses between the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Care in 
Community Act 1991. The Effect is in dialogue with recent developments of neuroscience and 
the vast increase in the use of medication as treatment. These are plays engaged with and 
within emergent, contemporary debates, they cannot rely upon the juxtaposition of past and 
present to reveal contingencies in presumed naturalized truths; rather, they have to expose 
contingencies from within the ideology they critique.  I suggest that this self-reflexive gaze is 
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achieved by various means: the representation of pluralistic psychiatric power and the 
contradictions that emerge from inconsistencies, the setting and situating of the palpable mad 
body as the object of these competing semiotic structures, and offering the possibility of 
navigating through pluralism by means of a form of non-universalist politics. 
Theatre, by its dialogic nature, can expose different voices and ideologies, in contradiction and 
discussion, without adjudicating between them. It is this equivocality that capacitates theatre’s 
ability to stage a pluralistic notion of Power. Likewise, from shifting from one ideology to the 
other, theatre can demonstrate the contradictions, lacks, and flaws of the contemporary 
asylum. Through a continual wavering between ideological positions, and an examination of 
their interstices from varying perspectives, theatre can expose power and its contingencies to 
the audience. It can ‘de-naturalize’ given assumptions in the vacillations between different 
branches of psychiatric power. 
Moreover, aware of the contingent and plastic nature of power, performance can situate the 
struggles of power in the context of the mad body. Whilst realism may be incapable of 
expressing mad experience, and necessarily remainder it, nevertheless, it can emphasize how 
the mad body is treated, structured and exposed to the diagnostic gaze. The palpability of the 
performer re-centres the body of the mad person as the object of psychiatric power. If we are 
able to perceive contingencies and conflicts within psychiatric power, we can perceive how they 
circumambulate the mad body.  
Finally, whilst not presenting an ‘idealistic’ mode, theatre can give demonstrations of how to 
navigate through pluralism. Both Head-Rot Holiday and The Effect show possible means of 
attempting to negotiate through and against Power: whether through the bystanders in Head-
Rot Holiday attempting (and failing) to make sense, or the emergence of gestures that do not 
seek to follow psychiatric or anti-psychiatric lines in The Effect. Through these examples we 
encounter a non-universalized politics; namely action or speech (of varying ‘effectiveness’), that 
rather than seeking to universalize a principle behind it, acknowledges its own particularities 
and limitations. 
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Seeing Patriarchy and Seeing Psychiatry in Sarah Daniel’s Head-Rot Holiday 
The interstices between gender and madness are prevalent, the operations of patriarchal and 
psychiatric power deeply intertwined; Elaine Showalter (1987) famously referred to madness as 
‘The Female Malady’. Female resistance has often been dismissed, or contained, by patriarchal 
power through bracketing it as ‘mad’, ‘irrational’, ‘hysterical’. Showalter suggests that the 
government’s treatment of the suffrage campaigners, in particular the deliberate starvation in 
Holloway gaol, was ‘by treating these women as hysterical’ and adopting forced feeding, ‘a 
technique which had been employed with lunatics in the old madhouses’ (Showalter 1987: 
162). 
The founding myths and figures of modern psychiatry revolve around hysteria and its violent 
treatments. For Jean-Martin Charcot, the positioning of the hysterical woman as passive 
spectacle capacitates the hierarchy of doctor over patient (no longer is madness sealed away, 
unknown and unfathomed, but the doctor is the knowing man even as the patient is the 
unknowing woman). For Sigmund Freud, the denial of the reality of sexual abuse and violation 
of his female patients, the silencing of victims of rape and domestic abuse, is the prerequisite 
for the emergence of the Oedipal and psychoanalysis. These figures, and their abuse of women, 
provide acute examples of how psychiatric power has legitimized itself with the behavioural 
expectations of women, whilst patriarchal power has used psychiatry as a means to partition 
and contain deviance. However, this is not to advocate a teleological or essentialist argument 
that reveals a buried ‘truth’ hidden within psychiatry; rather, Charcot and Freud highlight the 
importance of an intersectional apprehension of modern psychiatry, even as they are 
insufficient to provide a model of this intersectionality. 
The work of Sarah Daniels represents one of the most consistent engagements with feminism in 
contemporary British and Irish theatre; for Gabrielle Griffin, in the plays of Daniels, 
‘representations of the abuse of and violence against women are central’ (Griffin 2000: 1994). 
This has extended, throughout her career, to an engagement with psychiatry, and its 
problematic treatment of women, representing an attempt to depict patriarchal and psychiatric 
power alongside one another, to parse differences whilst acknowledging connections. If Ripen 
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Her Darkness (1991), an earlier play, reflected, ‘a scream of outrage that was also screaming 
that the world had to change’, her later trilogy of Beside Herself (1994a), Head-Rot Holiday, and 
The Madness of Esme and Shaz (1994c), ‘concentrates less on revealing the (man-made) 
enormity of what women are up against, and more on women striving to help each other 
despite the odds stacked against them’ (Aston 2003: 46). There is an increased concern with 
sexual abuse (as a consequence of patriarchy and cause of mental distress), the possibility of 
female solidarity (and how female-on-female violence, precluding solidarity, emerges from 
male-on-female violence), and an anxious and multivalent approach to the interstices between 
psychiatric and patriarchal power. 
The subject of gender and madness is well-explored in contemporary drama. However, much of 
the reflections upon their inter-relation have occupied a genealogical or historical perspective 
including Terry Johnson’s Hysteria or Fragments of an Analysis of Obsessional Neurosis (1994), 
Kim Morrisey’s Dora: A Case in Hysteria (1994), Anna Furse’s Augustine (Big Hysteria) (1997), 
Christopher Hampton’s The Talking Cure (2002). Christina Wald (2007) suggests that such a 
prevalence represents a genre, a ‘Drama of Hysteria’, utilising the stage as a means to expose 
the politics of performance embedded in the hysterical body. But all these plays utilize the 
historical mode: attempting to expose contingencies through an unveiling and examination of 
previous orthodoxies. Daniels, in contrast, is preoccupied with the politics of the contemporary, 
in Head-Rot Holiday, she negotiates the social, political and legal landscape of British psychiatry 
contemporaneous to its original production. This is not to suggest an unawareness or 
disinterest in the past - Carina Bartleet (2003) notes how Daniels plays upon hysterical 
structures – but rather to suggest in Head-Rot Holiday we see the long history and complexity 
of gender and psychiatry accounted for in its latest manifestation: the particular connections 
developed between psychiatric and penal institutions as developed following the Mental Health 
Act 1983. 
Of her work, Head-Rot Holiday represents Daniels’ most consistent engagement with and 
within the institutions which distribute psychiatric power. If Daniels’ work is, following Aston, 
‘centrally concerned with the family as an oppressive heteropatriarchal site’ (Aston 1995: 394), 
Head-Rot Holiday represents a shift, as the gaze is singularly set upon a bureaucratic institution 
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of psychiatric power: the special hospital. Head-Rot Holiday is set in ‘Penwell Special Hospital’, a 
fictional stand-in for the high-security psychiatric hospitals such as Broadmoor, Ashworth and 
Rampton. The patients of the play have been sectioned following a court order, having 
committed acts of violence (of varying severity). Accordingly, the question of disciplinary power 
emerges alongside the patriarchal and psychiatric.  
Head-Rot Holiday maintains a realist aesthetic, providing little variance from the singular reality 
promoted by the ‘special hospital’ in which the play is set. It appears equivocal about the 
relationship between women and madness, and provides no ‘roadmap’ towards a revolutionary 
alternative. Its circular narratology and pessimistic ending (in contrast to the possibility of 
solidarity and escape established in Beside Herself and The Madness of Esme and Shaz) could 
suggest a fatalism, or ‘melancholic Leftism’. However, resistance is achieved through a 
revealing of the multiple intersections of differing power structures, how these place around 
the mad body and a state of exception, and the use of various devices (both dramaturgic and 
textual) to reconceive female solidarity as incorporating (rather than ameliorating) difference. 
Head-Rot Holiday, as with the wider oeuvre of Sarah Daniels, has received less attention since 
the 1980s and 1990s. Since the Battersea Arts Centre production in 1992, the only other 
professional production in the UK appears to be 2013 at the Cockpit Theatre in London, in an 
event for the Arts of Wellbeing. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s, at the height of Daniels’ 
success, her work was often marginalized or mocked by the critical establishment; Aston (1983) 
carefully notes the patriarchal abuse and patronizing opprobrium Daniels received for work that 
unapologetically deployed a feminist perspective. In any event, this analysis will consider the 
1992 production, principally drawing upon the play text, using reviews and personal accounts of 
the production to satisfactorily analyze its relationship to the structures of psychiatric power at 
the time. This 1992 production emerged from Daniels’ work and collaboration with Clean Break, 
a company established in the late 1970s, dedicated to working with women in prisons. Whilst 
this thesis will not be looking at other work by the company, it should be noted that the 
company’s concern with prison and women has often emerged through an excavation of 
mental health, such as Chloe Moss’s This Wide Night and Vivienne Franzmann’s Pests. 
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The Multiplicity of Interstices 
The evident existence of the relationship between gender and madness belies the difficulty of 
its conception. For Phyllis Chesler, madness is created through, ‘the acting out of the devalued 
female role or the total or partial rejection of one’s sex-role stereotype’ (Chesler 2005: 116); 
both those who deviate from expected gender performance and women who over-perform, 
‘who fully act out the conditioned female role’ (Chesler 2005: 116) are dubbed as mad. Slightly 
differing, Cixous conceives ‘madness’ as a mode of female protest, hysteria as a challenge to 
patriarchal expectation. Showalter, anxious not to romanticize madness, nor to place it as 
synonymous with feminist struggle, occupies a doubled position, wishing to create 
simultaneously ‘a feminist history of psychiatry and a cultural history of madness as a feminist 
malady’ (Showalter 1987: 5). If the intersectionality of madness and gender is easily observed, 
these variances and debates reveal the difficulties of its apprehension. 
The difficulty is the attempt to conceive the relationship as monolithic, as attempting to 
systematize the interaction between madness and gender. Rather than singular in its 
formulation, the relationship between gender and madness is multivalent. Far from establishing 
a singular logic of how patriarchal and psychiatric powers re-enforce one another, Daniels 
insists upon a diversity and heterological conception of their relationship. The three main 
patients of Head-Rot Holiday – Dee, Claudia, and Ruth – far from uniform in their response to 
psychiatric power, diverge in their epistemologies.  
Dee, a young lesbian, is at odds with a heteronormative world. She is has lashed out against a 
society that wishes to deny her sexuality, has sought infractions against a policeman, and in 
response has been sectioned. Her aggression, an understandable response to a world that 
attempts to silence and punish lesbian identities, has been rendered a pathology. Despite her 
visitation by an ‘angel’, Dee appears to have no delusions or voice-hearing, stating, ‘I’m a 
psychopath not a schizoid. I can’t see things what aren’t there. It’s not in my diagnosis’ (Daniels 
1994b: 229). She is, however, a self-harmer, a response to her abuses by a homophobic society. 
Dee’s response is not simply an internalization: ‘Every other fucker’s done things to me. I’m 
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going to do things to myself for a change … I’m creating order’ (Daniels 1994b: 231). Her self-
harm is a ratiocination, an attempt to take control in a society determined to deprive her of it. 
Claudia, whilst diagnosed and suffering from depression, is clearly functioning; she doesn’t 
suffer from any form of psychosis throughout the play. Claudia has been sectioned because of a 
burst of anger, when she attacked a social worker who refused to return her children with a 
potato peeler6. Both Claudia and the Social Worker who she attacked, declare that Claudia was 
simply angry. Moreover, Claudia’s pre-existing mental health problems had been exacerbated 
by bad treatment and use of medication. The state of this anger, has been dubbed as ‘mental 
illness’, because of her previous history of depression. This unveils the stigma of madness, 
whereby following classification, all action is comprehended through a diagnostic gaze. Despite 
her legitimate anger and grievances, according to Claudia, ‘I had a history of mental illness as 
far as they were concerned’ (Daniels 1994b: 217). 
Ruth suffers from intermittent psychosis, the result of sexual abuse when she was a child by her 
father. Throughout her trilogy, Daniels brings to the forefront the prevalent reality of sexual 
abuse, its psychological consequences, and the mistreatment of victims by psychiatric power. 
The extent to which sexual-abuse survivors represent mental health users is difficult to 
establish, however, according to Marian Barnes and Ric Bowl, ‘a number of studies in the UK, 
USA, and Canada and elsewhere have revealed that 50 per cent or more women in receipt of 
hospital based psychiatric services have histories of abuse’ (Barnes and Bowl 2001: 74) For 
Ruth, madness is not a phantasm of social relations; she is dissociated from her own body, 
attempts suicide, and suffers from palpable mental distress. Her mental distress is, rather than 
contained female resistance, a consequence of violent abuse of female bodies. Moreover, the 
‘special hospital’ (insensitive or wilfully ignorant of her history) compounds these problems; her 
dislocation from her body exacerbated by her treatment: ‘I’ve been forcibly stripped by six men 
in here and left naked without a tampon. I’ve been watched in the bath by men’ (Daniels 
1994b: 233).  
                                                          
6 As with Mary’s suicide note in Ripen Our Darkness, ‘Dear David, your dinner and my head are in the oven’ 
(Daniels 1991: 64), female violence (as resistance) in Daniels’ plays is often paired comically with stereotypical 
domestic objects; underlying this, is a doubled suggestion that peaceful domesticity is a front for female suffering 
and that this domesticity can be weaponized. 
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Bartleet notes that through, ‘the foregrounding or contextualization of the characters' mental 
illnesses, through material conditions which inform their actions’ (Bartleet 2003: 251), the 
patients become normalized, or at least, accounted for. Rather than the violent act remaining 
an inexplicable object, an exotic remaindering of mad experience, Daniels situates them in the 
context of a heteronormative patriarchy. Whilst this is certainly the case, it is notable that this 
‘normalization’ varies from patient to patient. Dee’s madness is a social construction of 
heteronormativity and the notion of homosexuality as somehow ‘deviant’ or ‘abnormal’ 
behaviour, leading to a rationalized self-harm. Claudia’s legitimate anger (exacerbated by 
medication) against a bureaucratic system is interpreted as madness, due to the stigma and 
history of depression. Ruth’s madness is a palpable mental distress caused by the trauma of 
sexual abuse as a child, and is exacerbated by institutional structures. Daniels’ dramaturgy is 
premised upon divergence rather than repetition. Each of their positions and relations offer 
different variations and interstices within the nexus of patriarchal, psychiatric and disciplinary 
power. Accompanied by a multivalent notion of psychiatric power is an obligation to note 
intersectionality functions on a similarly pluralistic basis. 
The Failure of Tactics 
Daniels establishes the political ‘reality’ of the special hospital as divergent, shifting, and 
pluralistic. This leads to the question of resistance. If her dramaturgy is focused upon 
multiplicities rather than the theoretical consolidation of psychiatric power into a monolith, in 
what way does she open up a possible resistance, and moreover, how does the contemporary 
asylum attempts to manage and pacify this resistance? 
Daniels, far from politically static, demonstrates on the one hand how the inmates attempt to 
deploy various tactics in order to circumvent psychiatric power, alongside how the various 
power structures of the hospital seek to structurate the nurses. In this, I am broadly following 
Michel De Certeau’s terminology of ‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’ as put forward in The Practice of 
Everyday Life (1988). De Certeau claims ‘strategies’ are movements and shifts of power that 
seek to control the practices, behaviour, and identity of the individual. In contrast, ‘tactics’ 
demonstrate the individual dispositions and methods of navigating structures whilst 
54 
 
undermining them, avoiding and evading structural intent. Yet, far from equivocal, Head-Rot 
Holiday exhibits the limitations of the individual tactic and the insidious reach of structural 
strategy. 
Ruth, clearly affected by both the high levels of medication and psychosis, lacks the ability to 
interpret the reality of the Asylum, and is incapable of deploying individual tactics. She 
conforms from expectation to expectation, patriarchal and psychiatric, typified by her 
behaviour at the disco, accepting un-wanted sexual advances. Even in this acceptance of social 
norms, she fails to be accepted, described by the nurses as ‘a right slag’ (Daniels 1994b: 227), 
caught between the simultaneous demand and punishment of sexual availability. In Ruth’s own 
terms, observing this contradiction, ‘Isn’t that what they call natural, men exploring your body, 
doing sexual thing to you? Isn’t that what we’re all supposed to aim for? Why do you get called 
all these names when it happens? (Daniels 1994b: 233). Ruth exposes a fundamental flaw of 
liberal and individualistic conceptions of resistance to psychiatric power: the expectation that 
those in society who have potentially suffered extreme abuse (both physical and mental), are 
acutely psychologically vulnerable, are dosed with medication that severely inhibits mental 
functioning, are capable of performing tactics that subvert the complicated bureaucracies and 
hypocrisies that form the contemporary asylum.  
Dee, capable of adopting tactics, attempts to exploit the fault-lines of the institution, trying to 
‘pass’ as heterosexual for the Disco. To the mockery of her fellow patients, she performs the 
various rituals of hegemonic female heterosexuality: putting on lipstick, shaving legs, wearing 
high-heels. The Disco, acting as a catastrophic event between the two acts of the play, is a 
fundamentally heteronormative event, where heterosexual desire is expected to be performed. 
Yet, the Disco is populated with male sex-offenders. At the disco, she is confronted with a man 
who boasts of his exploits whilst, ‘he was getting off on it’, whilst another man is ‘mauling Ruth’ 
(Daniels 1994b: 237). Unable to endure the varying male violence that is intended to be 
‘enjoyed’ by the female patients, she can no longer maintain the act of ‘passing’. 
Claudia is the patient who displays the most evident examples of tactics, of undermining the 
institution from within. These modes are various, from the attempt to play the ‘good patient’, 
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to the stealing of the fuse for the plug of the nurses’ television, or the final decision to reveal 
Barbara’s physical abuse of the patients. If Ruth is incapable of tactics, and Dee attempts but 
fails, Claudia is the consummate tactician, playing games with and against the institution. Yet, 
at the end of the play, Claudia’s tactics have only achieved the dismissal of Barbara7 (notably, 
not the punishment of Barbara’s abusive husband). Even the dismissal of Barbara is not the 
harbinger of change, but a palliative for structural oppression, a sop to the chattering classes: 
‘Now they’ve been seen to do one they can sit back’ (Daniels 1994b: 261). Claudia’s tactics 
result, not in revolution, but a hiccup against larger structural forces, and her re-entry into the 
institution as punishment for her tactical deviance. 
The set design for the original production was dominated by a blown up legal document, a 
court-based sectioning, engulfing the stage. This legal document, the legal situation of 
sectioning, exemplifies the state of exception8. The notion of tactics fails against the challenge 
of the state of exception. All divergence, avoidance, difference from the structure becomes re-
incorporated into the narrative of the abnormal and deviant. Claudia’s vandalism of the nurse’s 
television, as, ‘you know how slow they are to escort us back if there’s anything good on the 
telly’ (Daniels 1994b: 224), whilst disruptive, is quickly inculcated into a narrative surrounding 
her deviancy. In other words, how can one disrupt a narrative that is formed around potential 
disruption? The choice is either full compliance (an almost impossible demand) or a defiance 
that is predicted, apprehended, and contained.  A resistance that instigates meaningful or 
radical change is precluded from the state of exception. There can be no resistance ‘within’ the 
state of exception itself. 
The seeming fatalism of Head-Rot Holiday could seem a surprise to those familiar with the 
other two plays that consisted of Daniels’ ‘Women and Madness’ trilogy. In Beside Herself, the 
                                                          
7 Even then, her impact is limited, as Jackie later explains, ‘Even then they wouldn’t have done nothing if it was just 
Claudia. But then Ruth’s Aunt wrote on that headed notepaper and Doctor broken Reed thought he’d chime in 
with his eavesdropping evidence’ (Daniels 1994b: 261) 
8 The concept of the state of exception was developed by Carl Schmitt (1985) and further developed by Giorgio 
Agamben (2005). Whilst the precise definition and understanding of the concept has attracted debate, for the 
purposes of this thesis, I understand the state of exception as not simply an exclusion, but a doubled movement of 
exclusion and internalization. Excluded and deprived of legal and sovereign rights as an individual, yet a series of 
alternative structure and legal systems emerge, creating an alternative legal status as citizen. 
56 
 
possibility of challenging abusers and of the importance of believing the abused are both 
highlighted. At the end of the play, mother and daughter Lil and Nicola stand looking at one 
another outside Lil’s house, as Lil ‘steps over the threshold shutting the door behind her’ 
(Daniels 1994a: 188), she metaphorically chooses female solidarity over her husband. Female 
solidarity, in this case, is a matter of determination and rejection of orthodox domesticity. In 
The Madness of Esme and Shaz, female solidarity is possible (across differences of sexuality, 
religion, and age), not by revolution, nor subversion of bureaucratic regimes, but by escape. 
Head-Rot Holiday is therefore singular in its circular (the same, but worse) ending, evocation of 
hell, and reluctance to provide a clear alternative to a patriarchal-psychiatric paradigm. 
However, this is in part due to its singular focus upon (and within) the institution. Beside Herself 
and The Madness of Esme and Shaz maintain the psychiatric institutions in their peripheral 
vision; as plays, they include a half-way house and psychiatric hospital, but are primarily 
concerned with those who have recently left institutional treatment. Head-Rot Holiday focused 
upon the singular, circular logic of the contemporary asylum, unblinking in its focus upon how 
the asylum functions. 
However, to simply label it as pessimistic, as a passive declaration of horror, would be to ignore 
the various strategies and possibilities that Daniels provides through the play. In part, the 
establishment of the pluralistic notions of power provides within itself a mode of resistance. 
We are brought to understand power, not merely perpetuate it, by veering between different 
perspectives and angles. This ability to comprehend its variances and complexities, this 
wavering between different interstices, allows us to perceive power and its contingency. 
Likewise, it allows us to perceive how it inflicts itself on the mad body, inculcates self-harm or 
mental distress, whilst framing all deviations from power as ‘mental illness’. Whilst providing a 
‘solution’, the revelation of the structures of power, the exposure of their contingencies, within 
itself provides a mode of resistance. 
The Failure and Necessity of Female Solidarity  
Daniels’ trilogy on women and madness maintains a pre-occupation with the possibility (and 
difficulty) of ‘female solidarity’ in the face of patriarchal and psychiatric power. If her earlier 
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plays concerned the exposure of male-on-female violence, Head-Rot Holiday concerns the 
subsequent female-on-female violence. There are no male actors or characters; the gaze is 
firmly on the response of women. Male violence remains, but as a trace, rather than spectacle: 
the bruises on Barbara’s face, the reported remarks of a male doctor, the stories of Dee’s 
conflicts with the police, and Ruth’s sexual abuse. However, the response to this violence is a 
failure of female solidarity, and female-on-female violence. 
The primary cause is male violence and patriarchal power. As Heather Debling notes, ‘male 
authority continues to destroy and prevent relationship between women’ (Debling 2008: 266). 
However, beyond this, it is the heterogeneity of experience that lends itself to the difficulty of 
solidarity. The nurses and patients, positioned in a hierarchical position, continually conflict 
against one another. The ‘strategy’ of the hierarchy leads to the structuration of Sharon, a new 
nurse with initially compassionate instincts, to slowly distance herself from the patients, as her 
compassion distorts into high-minded self-regard: ‘It’s very hard to continue to feel 
compassionate when you are constantly being told you are full of shit’ (Daniels 1994b: 247). 
Even the patients fail to establish any notion of community, more interested about their 
individual release from the hospital. The divergence of their experiences hinders 
communication and connection. 
Head-Rot Holiday contains a series of strategies by which to rethink and reconceive solidarity in 
the face of a multifaceted and divergent series of power structures. In the original production, 
the nine roles were played by three women, as patient became nurse became bystander. It 
opened up questions of connections between bodies and experiences; Ruth and Barbara, both 
victims of physical male abuse, are played by the same actor. Yet, similarities of character are 
drawn by sharing the same actor’s body, their different social positioning as ‘sane’ or ‘mad’ 
becomes more marked. Ruth and Barbara both commit acts of violence onto other women, but 
whereas Ruth’s attack on her stepmother results in her sectioning, Barbara’s act of physical 
abuse on the patients leads simply to her dismissal. If multiple casting uses the body as a mode 
to draw out connections, it also highlights contrast and divergence. 
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In another mode of reconceiving female solidarity, Bartleet (2003) notes how Daniels plays 
upon Marian imagery through all three patients, in order to relate their subversions of 
traditional gender roles, to gesture towards their solidarity. Dee is visited by an angel, a parodic 
Annunciation, in one of the few scenes to disturb the realism of the play. The reference is 
undercut, as the Angel exclaims, ‘Brown Owls have been struck dead for comparing themselves 
to the Virgin Mary never mind smack-head, bar-dykes’ (Daniels 1994b: 230); Dee’s sexuality is 
incompatible with the heteronormative myth of the divine Incarnation.  Claudia’s relates the 
deprival of her children prior to the Christmas party, offering to, ‘be read as a near-reversal of 
the nativity’ (Barleet 2003: 252). Ruth’s Marian reference emerges through polysemy; she has 
an obsession with the singer Madonna, shouts out lines from songs such ‘Borderline’, she 
notes, ‘Just as well my name isn’t Donna or they’d call me Mad Donna’ (Daniels 1994b: 193). 
Dee’s following insult to Ruth, that she’d be called ‘mad slag’, is explained as a reference to 
‘Whore and Madonna and that’ (Daniels 1994b: 193). The repetition of the image draws 
connections, but clarifies and emphasizes difference. All represent deviation from the Marian 
ideal, but rotate around differing images, incorporate difference amongst their similarities.  
Head-Rot Holiday is providing us with a different means to conceive solidarity. It provides 
connections and connotations through differences, without neglecting those differences. The 
double-casting does not simply engender similarity, but highlights differences between our 
treatment of the ‘mad’ and the ‘sane’. The patients all have subverted traditional Marian 
images of gender, but their roles vary, and are forged upon different acts of gender subversion. 
Daniels, far from dramaturgically pointing towards indistinguishable homogeneity, is mapping 
out possible connection even whilst acknowledgment exceptional difference. It is only through 
this acceptance of difference, rather than through its amelioration, that solidarity can be made 
conceivable. 
Diagnosis Through Language and Race in Joe Penhall’s Blue/Orange 
If the Mental Health Act 1983 was an attempt to codify the State’s relationship to the mad 
person, ‘Care in the Community’ had increasingly represented the Conservatives’ ideological 
stance towards the preferable direction of treatment. The aim was ‘deinstitutionalization’, for 
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patients to be treated within their own community. This was justified both ideologically (the 
right of the individual not to be imprisoned) and practically (it shifted the costs of care away 
from the State). This attitude would eventually consolidate into legislation: The National Health 
Service and Community Care Act 1990. 
For many, this ostensible ‘deinstitutionalization’ was merely a cover for the government’s 
responsibility of care. Inspired by his own experiences with schizophrenics9, in Some Voices 
(1989), Joe Penhall responded to this neglect, presenting a lacerating critique of the 
presumptions and consequences of this attitude. The play involves pressures that Pete endures 
after his brother Ray, a schizophrenic, returns after being discharged from a psychiatric 
hospital. Ray refuses to take his medication, is volatile, at the climax of the play covers himself 
in petrol and threatens to commit suicide. The ‘community’ to which he returns is broken, at 
odds with itself, and violent. How is such a community capable of care? Penhall’s denunciation 
of ‘Care in Community’ was unequivocal, viewing it as a renunciation of the ethics of care, as 
economic and bureaucratic expediency dressed up as the emancipation of those with mental 
health problems. He would later describe the policy in a Platform talk in 2000 at the National 
Theatre as, ‘flinging people out and letting them fend for themselves’ (Penhall in Boles 2011: 
42). 
‘Care in the community has failed’ (Dobson 1998: np). With this short, stark pronouncement, 
the Health Secretary of the new Labour government, Frank Dobson, denounced the 
Conservative orthodoxy on how to approach mental health. Frank Dobson’s renunciation of the 
principle of ‘community care’ was framed in the traditional rhetoric of New Labour: ‘What we 
propose is a third way’ (Dobson 1998: np). A third way: that neither inflicts the archaic 
confinement into the asylum, nor neglects patient care by a deferral of responsibility to an 
amorphous ‘community’. Yet, despite this promise of a synthesis that diminishes the faults of 
the two extremes, Dobson’s language and suggestions seem to merely suggest a return to a 
more authoritarian model. Despite his suggestion that he does not wish to return ‘to locking up 
                                                          
9 Boles (2011) outlines how Penhall’s experience with Jeremy Oxley, lead singer of the Australian band The 
Sunnyboys and schizophrenic, alongside his experience as a reporter in Shepherd’s Bush for the Hammersmith 
Guardian, impacted and influenced his opinions concerning schizophrenia. 
60 
 
mentally ill patients in long-stay institutions so they are out of sight and out of mind’ (Dobson 
1998: np), his proposals press continually towards surveillance and control. Dobson outlines the 
necessity of, ‘such possible measures as compliance orders and community treatment orders to 
provide a prompt and effective legal basis to ensure that patients get supervised care if they do 
not take their medication or if their condition deteriorates’ (Dobson 1998: np). Moreover, his 
rhetoric frames mental health users as a societal problem, as an issue that needs to be dealt, 
they have ‘been left to become a danger to themselves and a nuisance to others’ (Dobson 
1998: np). There is a continual focus on the needs of the public (distinct from mental health 
users) to be ‘protected’, on attending to a ‘small but significant minority have become a danger 
to the public as well as themselves’ (Dobson 1998: np). 
Far from providing a ‘Third Way’ for psychiatry, New Labour’s political imagination was 
premised upon a return to authoritarianism, and continued conception of the mad as a 
menace. Whilst these attitudes would not cohere into legislation until 2007, the debate 
between the Conservative past and Labour’s future was clearly structured. The relinquishing of 
the responsibilities (and cost) of care set against the draconian emphasis on the monitoring and 
control of mental health users would become the framed struggle. Despite their differences, in 
this dialogue, a common conception of the mad person emerges, as a hindrance, either as a 
drain on public finances, or as a potential threat to the ‘public’. 
Blue/Orange, produced in the Cottesloe in the National Theatre in 2000, was written and set at 
a time of these conflicting perspectives, and seeks to weave between them, to stage them 
against one another. In the play, a young doctor, Bruce and the older, senior doctor, Robert, 
argue and manoeuvre around one another; they debate about the diagnosis and treatment of 
Christopher, a young black man. Bruce wishes to extend Christopher’s stay, institutionalize him, 
whilst Bruce wants to release him. Whilst returning to the same field of ‘madness’ as Some 
Voices, Penhall’s concerns are re-aligned and adjusted. If Some Voices was a visceral, theatrical 
dispute with a singular government policy (Care in the Community), Blue/Orange is, in its 
equivocality, concerned with the premises of the debate itself. Unlike the domestic, urban 
setting of Some Voices, Blue/Orange is set in a single room of a psychiatric ward. Its concern is 
less with situating the ‘mad person’ in an urban community, and more with the bureaucratic 
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operations and legal frameworks which constitute contemporary psychiatry. The ‘community’ 
still exists in Blue/Orange, but as an ‘issue’ explored, noted, and incorporated into debate; even 
bleaker than Some Voices, Christopher in Blue/Orange, has no family, no friends, no 
connections. Christopher is being returned to a community that does not exist. 
Yet it is through weaving one perspective against the other, by posing Care in the Community 
against institutionalization, that Penhall achieves a practical critique, and exposes mutual 
assumptions. Namely, by revealing psychiatric power as multivalent, as the structuration of the 
mad person through conflict (as opposed to the interpolation of hegemony), it reveals the 
diagnosis process as inseparable from the bureaucratic power structures of modern psychiatry. 
Since its premiere, Blue/Orange has clearly established itself as a part of the contemporary 
canon; a work that coupled with Some Voices established Penhall (sometimes to his distaste) as 
a playwright of the psychiatric. Beyond the 2000 production at the National Theatre, other 
productions have included an all-female production at the Arcola Theatre in 2010 and a 
production at the Young Vic in 2016. Certainly, there is potential fruitful analysis in how the 
play has evolved across this period. We have seen a rising concern and dialogue concerning 
madness, but this rise has overwhelmingly emphasized more common diagnoses in their 
neurotic rather than psychotic manifestations: depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, bipolar disorder. However, in this chapter, I am primarily concerned with how 
emerging performance engaged with the contemporaneous structures of psychiatric power. 
Therefore, despite seeing the most recent 2016 production, my analysis of the play will focus 
upon the original 2000 production (from a recording in the National Theatre archives reviews, 
and various accounts of the production), with occasional comparison to the 2008 BBC filmed 
adaptation.  
The Multivalence of Hegemony in Blue/Orange 
The power-dynamic in modern psychiatry has sometimes been portrayed as the conflict 
between the doctor and patient, a struggle between doctor as all-knowing structuring force of 
power and authority and patient as eccentric, passionate and resistant to subjugation. This is 
typified by One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (2012), Ken Kesey’s novel that was successfully 
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adapted for stage and film. This frames psychiatric power as a fable, as a war between 
hegemony and the individual. 
The dramatic argument and struggle of Blue/Orange is not between the doctor and patient, but 
rather between two doctors, Bruce and Robert, and their differing approaches to medicine. 
Bruce and Robert declaim, respectively, psychiatric and anti-psychiatric positions. Bruce broadly 
supports the biomedical model, rejects the notion of latent racism in diagnosis, and believes 
the patient would best be treated within the institution. Robert, in contrast, subscribes to the 
theory of R. D. Laing, sees schizophrenia as socially manufactured, and claims Christopher 
would be best served within ‘the community’. As such, we see the positions of 
institutionalization and care in the community pitted against one another in a medical context. 
The voice of anti-psychiatric opinion is given the more senior position, and makes greater 
claims to represent the institutional structures of the psychiatric ward. Indeed, Robert relishes 
the position. Despite Robert’s citations of Laing and Allen Ginsberg, his primary motivation 
appears to be the frugal economics with lack of beds. His anti-psychiatric arguments are used to 
justify financial expediency and the renunciation of the state’s obligation of care. The 
theoretical positions of R. D. Laing are revealed to be open for appropriation for the power 
structures of modern psychiatry. Penhall illustrates the mechanism of containment, wherein 
previously ‘revolutionary’ ideas are appropriated to justify regressive policies, in particular, the 
notion of Care in the Community. 
Bruce could, initially, appear to be more concerned with the treatment of Christopher than 
Robert. However, this feigned concern masks a high self-regard and self-interest. His treatment 
of Christopher in the opening scene is highly controlling, and frequently patronizing; as William 
Boles observes ‘Christopher is treated like a child in terms of how his requests are received and 
the comments from Bruce about his behaviour’ (Boles 2011: 123). Towards the end of the play, 
as Bruce has been undermined by the report, he exclaims, ‘This isn’t a game! My career is on 
the line!’ (Penhall 2000: 109); Bruce’s professional interests supersede the liberty and 
classification of Christopher. 
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Bruce and Robert, far from depicting the concerned individual actor against the uncaring 
institutional bureaucrat, instead both represent different, competing forces in modern 
psychiatry. In both Robert and Bruce, Penhall dramatizes the shift from the ethics of care to 
bureaucratic positioning and careerist opportunism. It could appear that Robert is 
representative of the institutional structures, even stating that, ‘I am the Authority. (Just 
between you and me)’ (Penhall 2000: 52). Yet, this is merely expressive of Robert’s middle-class 
insecurities, a statement of grandiosity and hubris attempting to compensate for his lack of a 
professorship. 
The equivocation between Bruce and Robert is crucial in revealing two institutional voices, 
rather than merely a critique of Robert’s institutionalized anti-psychiatric stance. Rather than 
suggest the medical establishment is ideologically monolithic, Blue/Orange exposes the debate 
and competing discourses that exists within these institutions. Hegemony is pluralistic, divided, 
at conflict with itself. 
Language and Power in Blue/Orange 
Across Blue/Orange, language cannot be divorced from the power structures of psychiatry. 
Various reviewers and critics compare it to the work of David Mamet; Penhall himself 
acknowledges his inspiration from Mamet’s Speed the Plow (Boles 2011: 116). It shares with 
Mamet a concern with language, how it is intertwined with power structures and modes of 
domination. It is interested in the varying ways that use of language can shape discourse, and 
invest in power structures. In a sense the conflict between Bruce and Robert is both concerning 
and fought through language, as Robert says to Bruce, ‘It’s semantics. And right now, Doctor, 
my semantics are better than yours so I win’ (Penhall 2000: 28). 
Bruce’s attention to language, and the importance of labelling ‘correctly’, revolves around the 
pursuit of a correct language, ‘because if people get the wrong word – if people just get the 
meaning of the wrong word, how can they get the person right?’ (Penhall 2000: 13). For Bruce, 
psychiatry is the practice of finding the correct ‘label’, avoiding the term ‘crazy’ not because of 
its offensive connotations, but because, ‘It’s just unhelpful. Woolly.’ (Penhall 2000: 12) The 
pursuit of the diagnosis of Christopher’s schizophrenia follows this, an attempt to find the 
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‘correct’ signifier, ignoring Robert’s observation about the political construction of such 
terminology. 
For Bruce the only language regime is a psychiatric one, in which he has the power to control 
what words denote. Refusing Christopher’s request for a drink of Coke, Bruce patronizingly 
compels Christopher to explain why he isn’t allowed it; Christopher responds ‘it rots your teeth’ 
and ‘makes my head explode’ (Penhall 2000: 6), but Bruce disallows these answers, despite the 
second answer’s connotations of mental wellbeing. Bruce’s reliance upon language as an 
absolute, rather than culturally variant, reveals his ethnocentric mode of analysis. This is made 
apparent in the first act when Christopher uses the phrase ‘Sorted for Es and whiz’ (Penhall 
2000: 8). Bruce’s expertise has been undermined, he is responding to a language regime with 
which he is unfamiliar and has no control. Despite his ignorance of the terms, following a pause, 
Bruce attempts to feign knowledge; in the original production, this pause becomes prolonged, 
Andrew Lincoln’s eventual delivery of the lines desperate, the shift of power relations (for a 
very brief period) is marked, caused by a control of what constitutes language. 
As the play continues, Bruce’s inability to recognize metaphor, and alternative modes of 
speech, leads to a direct misinterpretation of what Christopher is saying. In an insulting rage, 
Bruce takes Christopher’s use of ‘neighbour’ to mean those who live next-door, as opposed to 
the rhetorical sense, of ‘neighbour’ as denoting everyone other than ourselves. Most 
condemningly, it is Bruce’s own slippery use of metaphor that marks his ethnocentricity and 
latent racism, describing Robert’s research as ‘R.D. Laing in a gorilla suit’ (Penhall 2000: 92), 
using a highly offensive pejorative in reference to Robert’s concern with ethnocentricity. 
In contrast to Bruce’s approach, Robert highlights metaphor, allusion and diverse meaning. 
Tellingly, the Paul Éluard poem he suggests Christopher’s delusion may be in reference to 
(provided in the programme for the original production), contains the second line ‘Jamais une 
erreur les mots ne mentent pas’ (Éluard in Shaw 2003: 164), emphasising language is never 
incorrect or deceitful, that it continually distributes meaning. This is not to suggest that 
Blue/Orange suggests that, in contrast to a ‘direct’ approach language, ‘metaphor’ is a mode of 
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liberation. Robert’s use of metaphor, of suggestive cultural references, are similarly loaded with 
power structures. He uses metaphor, not to ‘understand’ Christopher, but to write upon him. 
Robert’s lack of attention to the direct mode of speech at points is actively damaging to 
Christopher. Robert suggests that Bruce has manipulated Christopher into not believing he’s 
ready to leave: ‘I think that you think you are scared. And that’s all it is, a thought. And I think 
that it’s not your thought (Penhall 2000: 71). Whilst his description of Bruce’s manipulation and 
constructive force upon Christopher is correct, he is also participating in this diminution of 
Christopher self-coherent identity. Indeed, using such language to Christopher, a person with 
an unstable psychological state, whose notion of self is under attack by institutional and 
psychological forces, is potentially damaging. This is shown in the third act, where Christopher 
appears to have taken Robert’s words quite literally, as direct ‘thoughts’ put into his head. 
However, just as Bruce is inattentive to metaphor and culturally diverse meanings, Robert 
neglects direct meanings in favour of his personal prejudice. For example, in his quotation of 
the Éluard poem, he misquotes, replacing ‘terre’ with ‘monde’. In a parallel to Bruce, Robert’s 
inattention to the non-metaphorical implications of his language reveal his latent racist 
assumptions. At the end of the play, saying goodbye to Christopher, he instructs Christopher to, 
‘Go home and listen to some reggae music’ (Penhall 2000: 115). In the original performance, 
speaking this line, Bill Nighy stretches his arms out and performs a small dance, suggestive of an 
ageing hippie, attempting to feign political radicalism, ignorant to his own bigotry. Whilst alert 
to the heterogeneity of language and its meanings, Robert is also inclined towards stereotype 
and exoticization of different cultures.  
Both Bruce’s and Robert’s ideological assumptions are embedded in racist assumption, 
intellectually flawed, and motivated by personal interest. Clements (2013) claims that the faults 
of Robert are more egregious, made clear by his grandiose claims at the end, where he (half-
jokingly) compares himself to the Pope. However, I would suggest that, in particular in the 
original production, there is more equivocation between their two positions; Robert gloats in 
his position of the victor, but both psychiatrists are guilty of personal hubris supplanting the 
obligation of care.  
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Kaplan suggests that by positioning psychiatry against anti-psychiatry, and resisting any solution 
of the questions raised in their context, the play suggests these ‘problems’ are impossible to 
solve (Rudolph and Kaplan 2005: 10). Following this, does the definition of a problem as 
‘unsolvable’ result in political fatalism, in a relativism between all positions? In a review of the 
2012 production in the Theatre Royal, Brighton, Neil Norman suggests that as Penhall fails to 
suggest which doctor is preferable for treating Christopher, ‘the inference is that he might be 
better off with a witchdoctor’ (Norman 2012: np). However, Penhall provides no alternative 
modes of thought with which to conceive the mad person. It is telling that Norman, in his 
search for a ‘solution’ to these problems, uses similarly stereotypical and latently racist 
language, as the psychiatrists of the play. 
Norman mistakes Penhall's pluralism and anxiety concerning any easy 'solution' with a vacuous 
relativism. Penhall does not provide us with a utopic language regime, one wherein madness 
can be denoted without causing violence onto the mad person, or the flaws of both psychiatry 
and anti-psychiatry can be seen simultaneously. But if Blue/Orange frames the question of 
mental health care as 'impossible' to simply answer, it does not represent an abandoning of 
interrogation. Instead, the wavering between positions, between psychiatric and anti-
psychiatric perspectives, is itself advocated as a position.  It is precisely this wavering, and 
equivocation, that prevents the repetition of a singular hegemonic orthodoxy, and allows the 
audience to participate in an examination of prevailing institutions, rather than re-enforce 
them. 
It is notable that pluralism is not merely a ‘textual’ creation. The depiction of pluralism (without 
resorting into a monolithic statement) is dependent upon equivocality, upon the ability to 
present seemingly different ideological stances in a dialogic position. This is sustained through 
the performative alongside the textual. Notably, compared to the original production by the 
National theatre, the BBC adaptation of Blue/Orange (2008) undermines this complexity. It 
removes dialogue between Bruce and Robert concerning watching the rugby game together, 
that establishes them both as middle-class, members of the same institution, and demonstrates 
Bruce’s careerism.  In contrast to Bill Nighy’s interpretation of Robert in the original production, 
an actor who, ‘has made a career of making utterly detestable scamps lovable’ (Boles 2011: 
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119), Brian Cox’s performance in the BBC adaptation is humourless, a bureaucrat glancing over 
his glasses. Towards the end of the play, when Robert instructs Christopher to ‘be brave’, Nighy 
invests the instruction with sincerity, stands in front of Christopher, looking straight in the eye; 
in contrast, Cox is aloof, sitting down, avoids eye contact, it is evidently an offhand platitude. 
Cox becomes emblematic of the bureaucracy, rather than a competing aspect. 
By raising the contradictions and contingency of ideological structures (by demonstrating it is 
far from homogenous), Blue/Orange shifts from a participation in the ideological structure of 
realism, into a critique. It is through an ability to shift between ideological positions that we can 
see the failings of both, and their common ground. Most notably, it is what allows us to 
perceive the treatment of Christopher, the substitution of personal experience for diagnostic 
evaluation (and thereby bureaucratic manoeuvring), and how the mad body is subjected to 
psychiatric power. 
The Spectacle of the Body of the Mad Person 
The wavering mode of Blue/Orange capacitates us to see the treatment of Christopher, not to 
comprehend him, but rather see how he is exposed and used by the structures of psychiatric 
power. However, this is dependent upon how the mad body is presented, to what extent it 
occupies a palpable presence. The danger is presenting the mad body as a vessel of 'internal' 
meaning, as a 'naturalist' expression, that the 'natural and clinical body' is a conduit for lived 
experience. This opens up the 'diagnostic gaze' as the mode of aesthetic engagement. 
The diagnostic gaze suggests that the audience attempt to diagnose the mad character, that 
mad experience is marked as readable, as written upon the body, as insane spectacle for our 
sane diagnostic minds. Certainly, Christopher is diminished in his capacity for dramatic action 
throughout the play. The play initially seems to revolve around the question of Christopher’s 
mental health: is he schizophrenic or not? The audience itself are encouraged to ask this 
question, to compare Robert’s and Bruce’s varying diagnoses. They are encouraged to 
‘diagnose’ Christopher, to solve the ‘problem’ of his schizophrenia. However, the performance 
can resist an answer, even as it encourages the question. 
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It is crucial to locate the mad body in terms of discourse concerning madness. The wavering of 
Penhall allows us to see how semiotic structures of psychiatry surround the mad body, but how 
is the palpable mad body presented? However, in order to resist the ‘diagnostic gaze’, it is 
necessary that the siting of the mad body does not denote or reflect ‘mad experience’. Rather, 
the mad body is the nexus of the variegated social and political influences. However, this 
requires the production to resist the simplistic notion of ‘playing’ or ‘performing’ schizophrenia. 
Chiwetel Ejiofor’s performance of Christopher resists the act of ‘playing’ schizophrenia, or 
representing mad experience as somehow readable upon the body. Ejiofor (as opposed to 
enacting tropes of ‘schizophrenia’ or Borderline Personality Disorder) focused upon the 
physiological effects of the medication given to patients. In the education pack for the 
production, the director Roger Mitchell describes how they, ‘worked on making the physical 
characteristics of anti-psychotic drugs performable – we wanted to avoid stereotypical 
representations of ‘madness’ and not be reliant on slavish realism’ (National Theatre 2000: 4). 
Rather than a means of ‘speaking’ madness, his body become a site upon which psychiatry is 
inscribed.10 
As well as Ejiofor’s performance, the staging of the original production highlights the diagnostic 
framework; in the original production, the stage was set in the round, a small square in the 
middle, from which the seating for the audience on each side rose with each row. Watson sees 
it as reflective of the spectatorial architecture of older medical buildings, noting that, ‘the 
audience looked down on the claustrophobic space of the examining room from vertiginously 
raked seating that surrounded the stage on all sides like an old-fashioned operating or 
anatomical theatre’ (Watson 2008: 201). Similarly, reviewers compared it to a ‘boxing ring’, 
highlighting both the gladiatorial and spectatorial aspect of the performance. 
This emphasis upon the spectatorial in the staging allows for a subtler consideration of 
Christopher than exhibiting ‘mad behaviour’. Christopher’s ‘paranoia’ continually manifests 
itself as a fear that people are staring at him. Yet, this ‘paranoia’ is perfectly accurate; he is 
                                                          
10 Again, in contrast to Ejiofor, the performance of Shaun Parkes of the BBC production attempts to act as a 
'schizophrenic', he is presented in extreme overhead camera angles, looking suspiciously through window blinds. 
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being stared at, judged, and diagnosed by the psychiatrists. Moreover, this staging suggests to 
the audience that they are complicit in this gaze. As a result, his paranoia is not simply a 
performance of paranoid ‘madness’, but a cultivated response to the institution in which he is 
situated.  
The Political Structuration of Christopher 
Blue/Orange resists the notion of the body as spectacle of mad experience, so that instead tha 
dueince can see Christopher as constituted by the ideological structures surrounding him. 
However, given that Blue/Orange reveals institutions of psychiatry as a battleground of varying 
ideological structures, how does the process of interpellation or structuration take place? 
Despite opening up the contradictions and non-monolithic nature of hegemony, this is not to 
suggest that Christopher is given the opportunity to exploit this conflict, to exercise what De 
Certeau (1988) would term ‘tactics’. Christopher is too vulnerable, both psychologically and 
legalistically, to play upon this conflict. Far from playing the two psychiatrists against one 
another, Christopher is used as a ball between them. Indeed, Christopher is precisely 
structurated between Robert and Bruce, he is constituted by the conflict, rather than any 
singular monolithic force. 
Neither Bruce nor Robert show any interest in the experience or ‘inner life’ of Christopher. 
Bruce’s treatment of Christopher is systematic, uninterested in Christopher’s own account of 
himself, his continual questioning is not an interest in Christopher, but rather, ‘a pedagogical 
tool, and will be repeated continually until the right answer is given, the scripts are followed, 
the roles taken up’ (Watson 2008: 200). When he encourages Christopher to speak rather than 
recite, it is to demonstrate his schizophrenia, to create a spectacle in order to justify Robert’s 
argument. Likewise, Robert shows little interest in Christopher’s own thoughts, other than to 
justify Robert’s own interpretations, showing disappointment when Christopher has never 
heard of Éluard or Tintin. Tellingly, at the beginning of Act Two, Robert repeatedly asks 
Christopher to ‘listen’. In the original production, Robert even controls the space of the stage, 
moving a chair to block of the only exit from stage, forcing Christopher to remain under his and 
the audience’s gaze. 
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Aspects of his identity are transmogrified into strategies and tactics for Robert and Bruce to 
exploit, as both his experience of madness and race are disembodied from him. In a play 
concerned with the politics of language, Christopher has no language of his own with which to 
express himself. Even the language regimes granted to him through race, such as the ability to 
use the term ‘uppity nigger’, are appropriated and used for Robert’s own careerist interests. 
As Boles remarks, ‘everything about Christopher is refracted, dissected and understood through 
the lens of these two white doctors’ (Boles 2011: 123). He is fragmented, and constituted by 
the competing voices of Robert and Bruce. He is used as a football in a battle ground of 
thoughts and language regimes; at the climax of this, at a moment of crisis, he claims, ‘When I 
do think, it’s not my thoughts, it’s not my voice when I talk. You tell me who I am. Who I’m not. 
I don’t know anymore! I don’t know who I am’ (Penhall 2000: 104). Vivacious and lively in the 
first act, by the final act he is mostly silent, it is not even necessary to consult him. They talk 
above him, about him, at him, rather than ever talking with him. Bounced between Robert and 
Bruce’s bureaucratic wrangling and wrestling egos, Christopher is silenced. 
The play demonstrates that the power-structures of psychiatric institutions are far from 
monolithic, and instead are a battle-ground of competing ideologies. The audience, able to shift 
between the two prevailing logics, are encouraged to discern the contradictions and 
contingencies of both. Moreover, the play emphasizes that the mad person is structurated 
between these competing forces. Through the combination of exposing these two aspects, the 
multivalence of hegemony, and how the mad person is structurated through this conflict, we 
can perceive how the ethics of care quickly shifts into the power structures of bureaucratic 
management. It reveals the reality of a state of exception. In the politics of sectioning, the mad 
person is excluded from society, deprived of the legalistic structures and rights of a sovereign 
citizen. Simultaneously, in order to incorporate this exclusion, a whole new legalistic framework 
is put in place. Blue/Orange shows how modern psychiatry is invested in this legalistic 
framework, how it distributes it, how concerns of doctors become the navigation and 
management of these bureaucratic and legalistic frameworks, rather than the ethical obligation 
and attentive responsiveness to the patient. 
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The Dispersed Mad Body in Lucy Prebble’s The Effect 
Twelve years following Blue/Orange, another play regarding mental health was produced at the 
Cottesloe Theatre. The 2012 production of The Effect, Lucy Prebble’s follow-up to ENRON, 
shared many similarities with Penhall’s play; it was produced in the round, it reaped the 
epistemological uncertainties of modern psychiatry for dramatic potential, and it placed these 
epistemological questions in political terms. Yet, whereas Blue/Orange maintained an image of 
the exoticized mad Other, The Effect responded to the widening of anti-depressants, the 
extension of the contemporary asylum through the pharmaceutical industry. 
In 2007, the Labour government’s proposed Mental Health Bill was abandoned, rejected in the 
House of Lords three times, following concerns that it represented a draconian and illiberal 
response to mental health. Instead, revamped as reforms to the Mental Health Act 1983, whilst 
giving increasing safeguards to those who had been sectioned, the legislation simultaneously 
gave additional powers to enforce medication in Community Treatment Orders (CTOs) and 
extended the candidacy for ‘mental health professional’. Labour’s previously authoritarian 
rhetoric had been codified into legislation. In a 2012/13 report scrutinising developments since 
the 2007 reforms noted developments such as a substantial increase in the population of 
detainees, cases where, ‘voluntary admissions to psychiatric wards are now so difficult to 
access that patients are being sectioned to secure treatment in hospital’ (The Health 
Committee 2013: 3), and that the disproportionate numbers for ethnic minority groups 
subjected to Community Treatment Orders was even greater than in psychiatric wards. 
These developments, of increasing legal powers of the State over the mad person coupled with 
a lack of funding, should be set against other sociological trends in mental health. In 1994, 
Elizabeth Wurtzel outlined the trend towards, ‘the mainstreaming of mental illness in general, 
and depression in particular’ (Wurtzel 1994: 336). Since then, in the UK we have seen a sharp 
expansion in the application and diagnosis of ‘mental health problems’, particularly depression, 
and an increasing acceptance of medication11 as the primary mode of treatment. The number 
                                                          
11 Even accounting for Chronic Behavioural Therapy (CBT), this is often positioned alongside medication, rather 
than a replacement. 
72 
 
of those diagnosed with depression doubled between 2002 and 2014. Regardless of 
interpretation, what can be confidently claimed is that the category of mental health has 
expanded, incorporating one in four of the population. Society’s notion of madness has become 
increasingly diffused, the contemporary ‘Prozac-Nation’ having an uncomfortable and 
complicated relationship with those physically confined and sectioned by the State. 
This increase in diagnosis has been accompanied by a sharp increase in the use of medication. 
The Nuffield Trust and Health Foundation’s QualityWatch Programme reports an increase in 
annual prescription of anti-depressants from 15 million in 1998 to 40 million in 2014 (Spence et 
al 2014: 4). This trend, even greater than the rise in diagnosis of depression, represents a 
significant shift in the practice of diagnosis. This increase has been further complicated by the 
suspicion of multi-national pharmaceutical companies, the lack of evidence for the efficacy of 
anti-depressants, and the motivation of profit underlying the rise in anti-depressant 
medication. Alongside this has been the question of the scientific validity of drug trials run or 
sponsored by pharmaceutical companies, who have a vested interest in a successful result. 
If Head-Rot Holiday and Blue/Orange are located in an individual facility (a psychiatric hospital 
for criminal offenders and a NHS psychiatric ward respectively) where the ‘problem’ of madness 
is concentrated, The Effect by Lucy Prebble engages with a power structure that has dispersed, 
and become insidious. Many reviews noted Prebble’s engagement with both the 
epistemological debates surrounding mental health and the potential exploitation by 
pharmaceutical companies. However, this is no way unique; there have been a variety of plays 
and performance that have been interested in the questions of neuroscience, such as The Man 
Who (2002) by Peter Brook and Marie-Elénè Estienne, The Hard Problem (2015) by Tom 
Stoppard and Incognito (2014) by Nick Payne. However, The Effect differs from these other 
plays by directly framing these debates in terms of the institution. The testing facility is 
presented as a state of exception, a legalistic nadir, where those subjected to the diagnostic 
gaze are simultaneously dispossessed of individual sovereignty. In contrast to other plays 
concerning neuroscience, it is this political urgency, placing modern neuroscience and the 
diversification of mental health in the context of the political and legalistic state of exception 
that reveals The Effect as intimately concerned with the contemporary asylum. 
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At the time, The Effect was received by warm critical attention, but nevertheless contrasted 
with the quick success of Prebble’s previous play: ENRON. The shift from the carnival of 
capitalism to the personal politics of medication, alongside a move from an ensemble cast to a 
four-hander, was deemed a retreat of ambition and intent. However, since its première in 2012, 
The Effect has quietly gained attention as one of the core plays interrogating neuroscience and 
the modern pharmaceutical industry, attracting new productions in 2015 at both The Sheffield 
Crucible and The Heart of Hawick, Kirkstile. If this analysis primarily stems from the playtext and 
a recording of the original production (and has drawn upon commentaries of the first 
production to garner a sense of the production), it should nevertheless be noted that the 
impact of The Effect has subsequently spread, quietly becoming part of the repertoire within 
which theatre engages with the contemporary asylum. 
The Mad Person in the White Coat: Uncertainties in Psychiatric Power 
The Effect presents a love story in a clinical setting. Connie and Tristan are two subjects in a trial 
for a new drug, an anti-depressant that is designed to ‘avoid the emotional dampening we 
normally see with anti-depressants.’ (Prebble 2012: 45) They quickly become attracted to one 
another and begin a relationship. However, both the researchers and the triallists are unsure if 
their high levels of dopamine and positive behaviour, is caused by a ‘natural’ attraction, or the 
agent ‘artificially’ instigating the emotion.  
Similar to Head-Rot Holiday and Blue/Orange, far from presenting a singular solution, The Effect 
destablizes stable or monolithic accounts of madness, and reveals the debates and multiple 
positions that exist within psychiatric power. The opening dialogue of the play concerns Connie 
and Dr James debating the difference between sadness and depression. Connie’s insistence 
upon a difference relies upon a neurological argument, ‘I just mean I haven’t got an abnormal 
amount of chemical – in the brain or anything’ (Prebble 2012: 5). Later, in an exchange with 
Toby, Dr James rebukes this notion, stating there is no evidence existing that suggests 
depression is caused by a chemical imbalance. Yet, whilst observing that the difference 
between the mad and sane is an un-scientific, nebulous category, Prebble is not denying the 
existence of ‘extreme’ mental states and experience, of mental joy and distress. Dr James’s fall 
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into a severe depressive episode towards the end of the play rebukes any diminution of the 
experience of depression; Dr James’s depression is palpable, crippling, and painfully real. 
Rather, the reality of depression is not neatly cut off from ‘ordinary’ human behaviour (indeed, 
it is mentioned at several points of the play that those with moderate and mild depression have 
a more ‘realistic’ worldview), nor contingent upon its neurological basis. 
Much like Blue/Orange, The Effect uses discussion and debate between medical professionals 
to reveal the contradictions and competing aspects within psychiatric power, as well as how 
intellectual positioning cannot be divorced from personal and professional interest. Dr James 
and Toby disagree about the interpretation of the experiment and its results. Dr James ascribes 
the high dopamine levels in Tristan and Connie’s brains to the romantic feelings they have 
developed for one another. In contrast, Toby claims the romantic feelings are the result of the 
high dopamine levels caused by the test-drug. Regardless of their differing opinions, however, 
both Toby and Dr James are concerned with the aetiology of action and feeling. Namely, both 
doctors attempt to substantiate and validate their opinions in an appeal to causation, to the 
aetiology of behaviour. Moreover, both arguments hinge upon the notion that the aetiology of 
behaviour is what substantiates and validates it. The search for an aetiology of action is a 
twinned desire of both science and Realism. Following Diamond, Realism engages in continual 
revelation and unveiling, so that, ‘realism progresses by going backward … through confessions 
and self-exploration, woven into dialogue and action, an etiology emerges’ (Diamond 1997: 18). 
Whilst using the data concerning Tristan and Connie, they both interpret the data to reach 
opposite conclusions. Through selectivity and interpretation, they use empirical data to support 
their previously held conclusions: 
Dr James You were happy to attribute it all to drugs when you thought the effects were 
positive. 
Toby And you’re only prepared to accept it’s the drug if the effects are negative! (Prebble 
2012: 78) 
Despite the vast quantities of surveillance and measurement, the scientific method is 
susceptible to uncertain confusion of causation and correlation, demonstrating the malleability 
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of empirical data through analysis. Both Dr James and Toby manipulate information in order to 
support their personal agendas. Furthermore, even established causal links are manipulated 
and rebranded, as Dr James remarks in regard to undesirable responses to the drug: ‘They’re 
not side effects, Toby, they’re just effects you can’t sell’ (Prebble 2012: 78). This even occurs on 
more minor assessments of causation; when bickering about whether a cigarette burn on Dr 
James was caused by Toby, he responds, ‘Well, to be fair we can’t know for certain what caused 
that’ (Prebble 2012: 27). The search for the ‘first cause’, for an aetiological account, is always 
susceptible to doubt. 
The motivation for this difference in perspectives between Dr James and Toby is exemplified in 
the two ‘lectures’ performed for the audience. Toby and Dr James respectively address a brain, 
they hold it up in their hand, imitative of the memento-mori trope of the individual addressing 
a skull. But rather than death, these scenes involve an encounter with the physical account of 
our sense of self and identity. For Toby, the brain he addresses in his father. His relationship 
with his father is used as a metaphor for the progress of neuroscience, the child which has 
finally grown up, or in his own words, the Cinderella who finally got to go to the ball. It reveals a 
teleological bent to his approach to neuroscience, what was once immature, now the fully 
grown discipline. It also suggests an anxiety, an insecurity, and need to control and contain his 
father, to literally hold Toby’s father in his hands. In contrast, Dr James appears to address her 
own brain. The brain acts as metaphor for her depression, as something beyond her control. 
Yet, simultaneously, it stands as a metonym for herself. In the scene, which marks the 
beginning of Dr James descent into her depressive episode, Dr James struggles with depression, 
her brain which she cannot control, as something that is both separate to her and a part of 
herself. She begins to rip up the brain into shreds. The dissonance between externalisation and 
self-identification has become unbearable. 
Moreover, The Effect manipulates and encourages the audience to perform the same 
interpretive act as Dr James and Toby; this is achieved through the restriction and release of 
information throughout the play. The audience is informed that one of the triallists in on a 
placebo, but the stage directions clearly state that, ‘which scan belongs to which volunteer is 
unknown.’ (Prebble 2012: 42) By revealing that one triallist is on a placebo, Prebble encourages 
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the audience to deduce which one it is, and interpret the characters’ aetiology of action. The 
audience, by performing the same examination and interpretation, is involved and complicit 
with Dr James and Toby. The audience is informed Tristan is on the placebo, only to be 
informed later he was not. Through this narrative ‘twist,’ the audience is led to one 
understanding of the characters’ actions, only to be informed that it was wrong. The play 
encourages the audience to read, interpret and guess the aetiology of the characters’ 
behaviour, whilst simultaneously destabilising their understanding. It plays upon the disjunction 
between what Peggy Phelan terms as ‘the inexact mismatch between vision and knowledge’ 
(Phelan 1993: 114). The restriction of information encourages the audience to perform the 
same interpretation of action as the scientists, whilst the twists serve to encourage a self-
reflexive response to the play, to look back upon their own looking. It emphasizes what 
Diamond notes it is a fundamental feature of realism, whereby ‘the spectator tales on the role 
of seeker/knower, is assured of completing the narrative, of discovering the secret, of judging 
its truth’ (Diamond 1997: 19).  
It is notable that eventually Dr James discovers that she too was being tested by Toby, for 
evidence of practitioner bias. She acts outraged, expressing feelings of betrayal. Not only a 
practitioner of the biomedical gaze, she is exposed to it as well. The biomedical gaze, and its 
pursuit for the aetiology of behaviour, is not singularly applied to the test subjects, but has 
become far more dispersed, through what Foucault would term as the capillaries of power. 
Beyond merely demonstrating existing ambiguities through dialogue and discussion, The Effect 
troubles the position of the mad person as necessarily the ‘patient’, and positions the 
diagnostic gaze as fundamentally the desire for an aetiological account. Through the device of 
the drug trial, Prebble is able to demonstrate how the diagnostic gaze of the biomedical model 
is not solely the exclusion of mad bodies from society, but works as a more dispersed form of 
disciplinary power. Connie and Tristan are not understood as ‘mad’ by society, but rather, their 
ingestion of the new drug automatically qualifies and labels them as ‘mad’, as Other than 
themselves. It is precisely through this juxtaposition of sane bodies being subjected to the 
diagnostic gaze (and thereby all behaviour, all action, is called into question as abnormal) that 
the contemporary form of psychiatric power is revealed. Likewise, Dr James is the mad person 
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of the play, the person with the closest to ‘extreme’ mental behaviour, yet is also the chief 
executor of psychiatric power, the chief perpetrator of the diagnostic gaze. The traditional 
Doctor-patient power relationship has been complicated, as the mad doctor monitors the sane. 
The Effect positions the ‘sane’ under the psychiatric power applied to the mad, yet establishes 
Dr James, one of the chief figures of the drug trial, as a ‘mad person’. Through these playful 
confusions, I would suggest that Prebble opens up some of the interstices and gaps presented 
in the inner-conflicting psychiatric hegemony. The dissipation of the power structures of the 
psychiatry are revealed, into a broader tendency to define by means of aetiology, within which 
the ‘sane’ are increasingly inveigled. Moreover, through subjecting the ‘sane’ person to the 
structures of the asylum, normally reserved for the designated ‘mad person’, the oppression 
and aporia inherent to psychiatric power is unveiled, our treatment of the mad person more 
pronounced. This is not to suggest that the play is acting as a ‘metaphor’ for larger social 
trends, following Rosen’s idea of the ‘asylum play’, ‘takes a societal model of an asylum and 
treats it as a microcosm’ (Rosen 1983: 85). The use of madness, and its institutions, as 
metaphor, can quickly lead to abuse and stereotype. Rather, The Effect is a realist 
representation of an institution which distributes and participates in this dispersion of power. 
The Sane in the Asylum, the Subjected Body of the Mad Person 
Beyond representing the multiplicities contained within psychiatric power, The Effect is 
concerned with how these various competing semiotic structures impose themselves upon the 
palpable body of the mad person. The revelation of competing structures within psychiatric 
power allow the audience to perceive how these structures compete around and enforce 
themselves upon the mad body. 
Connie and Tristan are subjected to the diagnostic gaze, as their behaviour and bodies are 
weighed up, examined and judged. The clinic is a site of totalizing surveillance. The triallists are 
subjugated to continual tests: for blood pressure, alcohol levels, weight and height. They are 
given various psychological tests. They are required to wear telemetry boxes to measure their 
heart rates. Dr James claims, ‘I monitor everything’ (Prebble 2012: 23). This extends beyond 
simply physiological control, into a patrolling of emotions and the self: 
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Connie I understand that there is a leasing of bodies here, but you can’t expect to police  
 how we feel. 
Dr James That is exactly my role. (Prebble 2012: 60) 
The control over the body has, following a biopolitical structure, led to an attempt to control 
the self; or rather, the body is impinged and subjected to Power by control of the ‘soul’. Connie 
and Tristan (though, it should be noted, of their own volition) find themselves in a legalistic 
situation similar to those sectioned. Dr James seeks to control their bodies and behaviour; 
they’re told they are forbidden from embarking upon a relationship, from smoking, from 
leaving the premises. Dr James attempts to frame disciplinary control as necessary for 
observation. They are in a state of exception, simultaneously included as Dr James regards 
herself as ‘responsible’ and protective of them, and excluded from their individual sovereignty.  
The drug has stimulated, beyond physiological effects, a political reconfiguration. They are no 
longer ‘sane’, in taking the drug they have imbibed madness. Whatever the neurological or 
behavioural consequences, the one ‘effect’ of the drug that seems unquestionable is the 
dilapidation of political sovereignty. Dr James, attempting to justify her authoritarian policies, 
states that they are not in control of themselves, not aware of the danger they pose to 
themselves. As Shoshana Felman has stated, madness is regarded as a ‘blindness blind to itself’ 
(Felman 1975: 206). In this, Dr James represents the doubled instinct of modern psychiatry, 
from a Hippocratic claim to care whilst simultaneously being concerned with observation and 
control. Moreover, that observation necessitates control (and perhaps, rather than a causal 
relationship, control is justified and achieved through this observation, both are concurrent), 
she needs to able to see wherever they are, control whatever they do. 
This mode of control is not just the control of space, but an attempt to inscribe upon bodies 
through the search for the aetiology of behaviour. In sequences where by Connie and Tristan 
are being examined, computer images of scans are projected upon their bodies. Far from 
passive observation, the examination is, in a metonym, inscribing upon their bodies. Moreover, 
their own body language suggests their own transformation and alienation from their 
behaviour. Their arms, stretched out, make staccato, robotic shifts downwards as they are 
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scanned, imitative of the Vitruvian Man, as bodies reduced to purely physical features. All their 
behaviour is viewed in order to assess the causation of the action, rather than the action within 
and of itself. This is the diagnostic gaze, the attempt to discern the causation beyond the act or 
emotion within and of itself.  
In the mode of what Foucault identifies as the apotheosis of disciplinary power, Bentham’s 
Panopticon, under the influence of absolute surveillance, Connie begins to internalize the doubt 
and search for cause. Her relationship with Tristan becomes disturbed, and broken apart. The 
madness of love cannot withstand the search for its aetiology. This suspicion of others, setting 
mad person against mad person, reveals the diagnostic gaze is not merely a hierarchal social 
mechanism, but something ingested and inculcated within the mad person themselves.  It is a 
mechanism preventing even the possibility of solidarity. In Foucault’s analysis of psychiatric 
power, he notes the justification of the asylum, the deliberate concentration of those deemed 
mad, against the risk of potential contagion, is, ‘it is very good to see the madness of others, 
provided that each patient perceives the other madmen around him in the same way that the 
doctor sees them’ (Foucault 2003a: 103). 
A Visit to the Madhouse 
Similar to Head-Rot Holiday, The Effect is not only interested in marking out the multivalent 
aspects of psychiatric power, but attempts to demonstrate various means of navigating through 
pluralistic power. But whereas Head-Rot Holiday uses the struggling testimony of bystanders, 
The Effect attempts to convey means of negotiating pluralisms by situating its characters in 
alternative geographies and spaces of madness.  
In order to briefly escape from the medical testing facility, Tristan takes Connie to an 
abandoned building that used to be an asylum. The lighting becomes less stark, the stage 
decluttered of the props and furniture of the trial facility. The characters physically enjoy and 
test the space; Connie performs a cartwheel, Tristan performs a tap dance around the edges of 
the stage. It is the site of their first kiss, of the beginning of their relationship. 
Prebble is directly situating her play in the lineage of asylum plays, The Effect as concerning the 
modern asylum. She frames modern neuroscience as being the latest shift in the history of 
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madness, a new movement in its genealogy, rather than the isolated emergence of a new field. 
It puts the audience in a dynamic conflict with psychiatric history. Anna Harpin has suggested 
that the tendency to engage with asylums within Gothic horror, placing madness between the 
dual-pins of pity and terror, allows us to partition off our anxieties concerning psychiatric 
history, into the ‘long-distant past’ (Harpin 2012: np). In contrast, The Effect, rather than 
engaging in a cordoning off of psychiatric history, is inviting us to re-integrate it into our 
understanding of contemporary psychiatry. 
Bizarrely, the asylum, usually presented as the archetypical institution of oppressive psychiatry, 
is now framed as a site of freedom, of liberation. However, this is not an act of revisionism, a 
naïve or nostalgic suggestion that the old asylum system was in any sense preferable to 
contemporary systems. Rather, they are liberated by its distinction from the drug trial’s facility; 
ironically, the asylum provides a respite from the bio-medical gaze and its concern with the 
pursuit of the aetiology of behaviour. What follows is a subversion of the concepts of the 
testing facility: of space serving the gaze of the mad person, rather than an organized gaze 
upon mad bodies; of bodies as active and capable of performing, rather than passive entities 
for observation. 
The asylum provides an environment where the gaze and perspective of the mad person is 
prioritized, rather than the diagnostic gaze upon mad bodies. Tristan and Connie wonder at the 
beauty of mosaic floor, Connie suggesting it was a response to the perspective of their patients, 
‘maybe they thought mental patients spend a lot of time looking down’ (Prebble 2012: 39). The 
drug testing facility was modelled after a panopticon, its architecture is one of continual 
observation, organized space presented as a gaze ‘onto’ mad bodies. In contrast, through the 
image of the mosaic, the possibility of space as object of pleasure, is attendant upon the gaze of 
the mad person. 
When Tristan and Connie enter the asylum, they enjoy and relish the physicality and palpability 
of space. In part this is enjoying a momentary freedom from the clinical trial, but this reflects in 
a particular use and embrace of the physicality of their bodies. Connie performs a cartwheel. 
Tristan performs a tap dance for Connie. He dances around the edges of the stage, testing out 
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the boundaries and limitations of the space, enjoying the ability of his body to use and shape 
space. We are presented with two different conceptions of corporeality. The corporeality of the 
testing facility treats bodies as passive, objects to be analyzed, as comprehended rather than 
comprehending. This is the body as reduced to its constituent parts. On the other hand, in the 
dilapidated asylum, Tristan and Connie explore a different corporeality: the body as active, 
capable of action, of performance. 
This could present itself as a utopic image, a monolithic, preferable alternative to the drug 
testing facility: space as attendant, bodies as capable. Yet, all of this is undercut by the irony of 
the setting: the archetypical, stereotypical image of the oppressive potential of psychiatry, the 
Victorian asylum. This is not a permanent alternative, nor a longing look at the past; the scene 
occurs within the weight of psychiatry’s history. The reference to the past exposes the 
contingencies of the present system of psychiatric power (it is only, briefly, liberatory, because 
the institution of the Victorian Asylum is over; they can only dance because it is dead), but it 
does not provide a stable alternative. An alternative mode of apprehending madness is 
bracketed in an ironic setting: the classical site of psychiatric oppression transmogrified into 
accidental site of liberation. This is an irony that subverts any notion of permanent alternative, 
it is an accidental resistance, a contingent liberation. 
The Hospital Bed and the Question of Care 
Towards the end of the play, when Tristan and Dr James are both in recovery, the sleek 
moveable couches of the testing facility are replaced by a large bed of a hospital ward. If the 
Asylum provides a moment of Utopia, undercut by an ironic setting, the final scenes 
surrounding a hospital bed represent a more sustained and non-ironic attempt to model a 
pluralistic response to psychiatry. These final sequences situate The Effect as more willingly 
optimistic, and in claim of a ‘solution’, than either Head-Rot Holiday or Blue/Orange. This is an 
attempt by Prebble to move beyond a ‘practical critique’ into offering possible directions ad 
modes of navigating through the pluralistic Power structures of the contemporary asylum.  
Dr James and Tristan both lie in the bed, the doctor and patient now joined by their mutual 
need to recover, and the treatment that they receive. The doctor-patient divide has been 
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ameliorated by the experience of mental distress, one from transient global amnesia, the other 
from severe depression. However, notably, the medical professionals that treat them are not 
shown; rather, their recovery is defined by their interactions with Toby and Connie respectively. 
In both cases, notions of care, of treatment, are framed in terms of ‘love’. This notion of love, as 
inexplicable and from one human to another, haunts throughout the play. In his monologue, 
Toby recollects that, ‘my father used to say that it’s only love makes it anything except the art 
of two madmen’ (Prebble 2012: 30). Love is presented alongside madness, as similarly 
inscrutable. The Effect seems to suggest that ‘love’ can only be apprehended, or successful, in 
the absence if an aetiological account. Connie, treating and tending a Tristan who cannot 
recollect her, states that, ‘I don’t care what it was I see that now’ (Prebble 2012: 97); she has 
abandoned her search for the cause of their relationship. Toby, in his declaration of love to Dr 
James, still frames it in neurological terms, but rejects the ratiocination of cause: ‘I love you, 
Lorn. And it’s not romantic cos that’s when lies start and it’s not family, because that’s this 
wonderful genetic trick. It’s just. I’ve built a bit of my brain around you’ (Prebble 2012: 98).  
Love is not contained within the biomedical model, yet is necessary for the practice of ethical 
medical care. Yet, in terms of political resistance, as an alternative means of negotiating 
through psychiatric power, this is not to provide a singular solution, or a utopic stance. Rather, 
it is an attempt to view neuroscience, not what (in the programme) Steven Poole terms as the 
‘arbiter of human activity’ (Poole in Billington 2013), but a reconfiguration of the purpose of 
neuroscience, that ‘if the goals are understanding and ultimately, the alleviation of suffering … 
then labelling illness is valuable only to the extent that it deepens empathy and advances 
treatment’ (Rudolph and Kaplan 2005: 10) Whilst the discussion of ‘love’ may seem ostensibly 
utopic, it has no systematic political content, it is a rejection of any singular, monolithic 
response. The hospital bed, and its re-adoption of the ethics of care, is marked by variance and 
difference, rather than Utopia. Connie’s response to psychiatric power is to deny any concern 
with the aetiological, to be unconcerned with the neurological. In contrast, Dr James abandons 
her refusal to take medication, despite her previous arguments for their inefficacy; this is 
presented as a renunciation of the self-destruction spurred on by her depression. Set alone, this 
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could suggest Prebble is endorsing a singular position, however, through their divergence, The 
Effect resists any singular solution or treatment. 
This is not to say that this gesture of optimism, that nevertheless resists formulation, cannot be 
misconstrued, or even vulnerable to more regressive or monolithic political stances. In the play-
text, Prebble writes the following ending stage directions: 
Dr James, alone looks at the door, looks at the cup/pills beside her, decides, and takes them. 
Underneath this we hear the sound of an EEG: electrical activity in the brain produced by 
neurons firing. Underpinning this is the bass of a heart beat from an ECG. (Prebble 2012: 
101) 
Underlying Dr James’s decision is a deliberate direction to the soundscape, a final confrontation 
with the physicality, and its relation to the self. The traditional organ of love, the heart, is 
crossed over against this neurological centre of the self, the brain. This is a reformed 
confrontation with the audience, of how to account for the sovereign self and its relation to the 
physical, and frames Dr. James’s decision in this context.  
In contrast, in the original production at the National Theatre, this scene was underscored by 
the song ‘Keep Breathing’ by Ingrid Michaelson. Rather than a confrontation with the 
ambiguities and complexities of the relationship, this song frames Dr James’s decision 
uncomplicatedly as an act of liberation and survival. In his review for The Independent, Paul 
Taylor noted that, ‘as someone who has long had cause to be grateful for breakthroughs in 
medication, it ends in a gesture of good sense that makes me feel like cheering’ (Taylor 2012: 
np). Rather than an ambiguous interrogation of how we are unable to reconcile the physical 
and the behavioural (with embedded issues of individual sovereignty and political agency), the 
ending is an unhindered acknowledgement, acceptance, and embrace of contemporary 
psychiatry. 
The Effect ties together contemporary debates in neuroscience with the political subjugation 
and state of exception formed by psychiatric power. It interrogates this connection by providing 
a series of differing modes and sites by which to conceive psychiatry: of present abuses, of brief 
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escapes in the past, to a potential optimistic future. The drug testing facility serves as a means 
to reveal present debates and contradictions surrounding psychiatric power, medication and 
the pharmaceutical industry, whilst demonstrating how these debates attempt the surround 
and lay claim to the mad body. The dilapidated asylum links recent neuro-scientific 
developments to past psychiatric institutions, providing an ironic and brief escape from the 
diagnostic gaze. With the hospital bed, Prebble attempts to forge a more optimistic approach, 
not providing an alternative ‘treatment’, but rather an attitudinal shift; however, this can easily 
lead into Utopianism, a destruction of equivocality, and become interpretable as an 
unproblematic endorsement of psychiatry. 
Conclusion 
The plays of the contemporary asylum are confronted with a dilemma. As established earlier, 
critics such as Harpin have noted realism involves a remaindering of mad experience, the 
implicit ideology underneath its aesthetic sunders madness from our conception of the real. 
But, in order to understand the internal logic of the asylum, these plays engage within realism, 
as an aesthetic strategy. The challenge becomes how to overcome embedded ideological 
implications, how to shift from a play that merely perpetuates psychiatric power into one that 
interrogates it. Foucault’s notion of the ‘practical critique’ can partly assist us, outlining the 
space where theory can no longer participate or denote, and a response to a pluralistic and 
multi-faceted nature of psychiatric power. What constitutes this ‘critique’ in dramatic terms, 
how plays can articulate resistance to a pluralistic power structure, can vary. However, certain 
core aspects reoccur. Firstly, situating and representing the pluralism of the asylum, rather than 
as a monolith, allows an act of ‘wavering’ between ideological positions, to view the 
contingencies and contradictions of the contemporary asylum; it allows us to perceive the 
workings of power. Following this, the act of wavering makes visible the various contingent 
operations of power that attempt to surround, inflict and even define the palpable mad body. 
In certain cases, these plays have tried to ‘dramatize’ this wavering and its possible modes, to 
represent it through either characters or setting; however, this can result in an alternative 
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monolith, a utopic image, and thereby a distortion or even destruction of the pluralistic 
response. 
The conflicts or contradictions of psychiatric power will vary, according to emphasis and 
historical context. In Head-Rot Holiday, Daniels engages in an intersectional approach; rather 
than through debates between doctors, Daniels exposes the variety of interstices between 
patriarchal and psychiatric power, how the variety can obstruct solidarity. In Blue/Orange, 
pitting the Care in the Community against Institutionalization, Penhall frames doctor against 
doctor, psychiatrist against anti-psychiatrist, to expose the priority of bureaucratic positioning 
over the ethics of care. Prebble in The Effect similarly positions two medical experts against one 
another, but in the context of pharmaceutical treatments of mental health and the sharp 
increase in use of anti-depressants. In all of these cases, rather than relying upon a historical 
perspective, these plays respond to recent developments in psychiatric power, and expose 
ongoing internal debates and contradictions. Through an equivocality, rather than an adoption 
of one of the positions, these plays avoid participating in psychiatric power, and rather produce 
a critique. Through a wavering between different positions, power becomes visible. We can see 
its contradictions, its conflicts, its biases. Most notably, we see its abuse of the mad body. 
Psychiatric power is formed around the control of the mad person. It seeks to control, and it 
seeks to measure the mad body. However, these plays diverge in the mode of control, and 
likewise what constitutes the ‘mad body’. Head-Rot Holiday demonstrates the divergence of 
this mode of control. For Ruth and Dee, social stigma has (to some extent) been internalized, 
leading in both cases to self-harm; Claudia, in contrast has attempted to adopt ‘tactics’ against 
social structures, but has been punished accordingly. This suggests that psychiatric power does 
not require obedience, as deviance can immediately be contained into the narrative and state 
of exception. The original production of Blue/Orange worked carefully to show how the mad 
body, exposed to the diagnostic gaze (of both the doctors and the audience) becomes infringed 
upon, is manipulated for personal and bureaucratic interest. In Ejiofor’s performance, 
Christopher’s body was not the site of diagnostic ‘knowledge’, containing a true ‘diagnosis’, but 
rather was constituted by medication. The Effect situates the mad body as something 
dispersed, and complicated by recent developments in neuroscience. The ‘drug trial’ creates a 
86 
 
situation whereby categories are confused, the doctor is a depressive, whilst the patients are 
‘sane’ participants. The ingestion of the drug leads to a manufactured ‘mad person’, and to a 
legalistic ‘state of exception’. The test facility becomes a panopticon, by complete observation 
is concomitant with an attempt to control behaviour. 
Some of these plays attempt various methods to not only ‘critique’, but to offer modes, and 
possible directions, of change. In Head-Rot Holiday, both textual and dramatic devices are used 
to suggest means of establishing female solidarity in the face of divergent experiences. 
Similarly, The Effect provides alternative spaces to bracket psychiatry, the dilapidated asylum 
and the hospital bed. This evidently is an attempt to resist a fatalism, to dramatize the 
‘wavering’ between ideologies within power, to suggest a particular direction or form. At their 
best, these devices offer potential actions of resistance that make no universal claim for 
themselves. This however, can run the risk of, instead, providing a monolith, and thereby 
distorting the equivocation between positions of power that render it visible. Notably, 
Blue/Orange takes care to avoid any affirmative position. The Effect’s final image suggested to 
some an adoption of a pro-medication stance. 
The refusal to provide a ‘roadmap-to-resistance’, or a utopic image, could be read as fatalistic. 
Alone, a passive observation of abuses is unhelpful. However, these plays, in their equivocality 
and complexity, are offering something more complicated: a self-reflexivity. A self-reflexivity 
that allows us to perceive contingencies and arbitrary claims on the mad body. To perceive 
contingency is the basis of all resistance, the precondition behind the radical notion that ‘things 
could be different’. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
HEARING VOICES, SEEING VISIONS: HALLUCINATION, SPACE, AND 
MAD EXPERIENCE 
What does it mean to find a space for madness outside of the asylum? Plays such as Alan 
Ayckbourn’s Woman in Mind (1986) and Anthony Neilson’s The Wonderful World of Dissocia 
(2008) shift away from realism, attempt to find a space for mad experience itself. The stage 
becomes mindscape, as a physical and theatrical manifestation of mad experience. The internal 
landscape of the mad is made explicit and clear for the audience. The real world is expelled, and 
we can finally peer into (and through) the eyes of the mad. The ‘unreal’ experiences of madness 
and psychosis are exposed through the material stage and palpable bodies. The audience can 
‘see’ madness with new eyes. This is a procedure intensely engaged with space: the internal 
translated into the external. The exposure of mad experience could seem to be a progressive 
gesture, an articulation of madness in defiance of its silencing. But, this is to ignore the 
complicated political structures that surround our cultural conceptions of mad experience. 
Madness is often culturally conceived as a personal delusion, as an internal and secret place, 
secluded from reality. Anna Harpin notes how our cultural idioms place the experience of 
madness as ‘an inherently geographical encounter’ (Harpin 2014: 187). Teasing out the spatial 
politics of this encounter, Harpin suggests that madness, ‘is figured as site. Or, perhaps more 
accurately, as simultaneously site and non-site. To be mad is to be both somewhere and yet 
nowhere, or at least not here, that is to say “reality”’ (Harpin 2014: 187). In other words, in our 
cultural representations of madness, the act of giving madness its own space is concomitant 
with our attempt to exclude madness from the political construction of ‘reality’. In another 
articulation of this, Petra Kuppers observes, ‘a general problem with working towards an 
aesthetic that tries to find spaces for the unknowable is that the ‘other’ too quickly becomes 
fixed in otherness’ (Kuppers 2003: 130). 
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The representational logic of ‘hallucination’ exemplifies the notion of madness as a site defined 
by its exclusion from communal reality. The cultural logic of hallucination is one of private space 
sundered from external reality. Madness is hearing what should not be heard, seeing things 
that are not there; it is an unstable subjectivity overriding the senses. To hallucinate defines the 
experience in conflict with an established reality, as pathology and aberrance. In hallucination, 
madness is ushered in only to be contained and controlled. In popular culture, films such as A 
Beautiful Mind (2001) have drawn upon hallucination as a narrative twist, a psychiatric 
equivalent of ‘it was only a dream’, as the action of the film is revealed to have been the main 
character’s various delusions. Throughout, these intellectual structures imagine hallucination as 
obstacle to knowledge, as something to be overcome.  
The very term ‘hallucination’ involves a political construction, a particular view of the lived 
experience of those who hear voices or see visions. Groups such as the Hearing Voices Network 
have resisted this terminology, noting in their charter that hearing a voice or seeing a vision is a 
‘real experience’, that responses to such phenomena vary widely, and forcing a pathology can 
be harmful to the individual. They prefer the terms, ‘hearing voices’ or ‘seeing visions’. For 
some voice-hearers, their experience becomes religiously-loaded, a means to share a space 
with the divine. There are many alternative conceptions and spatial logics through which to 
conceive this experience. I use the term ‘hallucination,’ less to denote the distinct experience, 
than to refer to the particular hegemonic construction that seeks to contain and control this 
phenomenon. 
The problematic aspects of the logic of hallucination quickly becomes apparent. For instance, 
the hierarchical power-relations play in our representations of this inner-outer logic. This is a 
space of madness that exoticizes the experience even as it renders it knowable. It places the 
audience in a position to ‘see’ hallucination, and discern it from reality. In doing so, it reifies the 
partition between reality and madness. If madness is something that troubles our 
presumptions, then these apprehensions of hallucination seek to contain this instability. We 
‘taste’ madness from the superior position of the sane. Madness is commodified and 
controlled. 
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Concomitant with this exoticization of madness is a de-politicization of mad experience. Mad 
experience is clearly defined as against the ‘real’. Society isolates and partitions off mad 
experience, examines it in isolation to its socio-political context, divides it from other spaces 
and social praxis. In this, our logics of hallucination fail to regard and engage with the complex 
fabric with which madness manifests through and alongside other socio-political constructs. 
Likewise, it ignores how madness has a political impact, that it effects political structures such 
as family, economy, race and gender. Madness, and mad experience, is regarded as having no 
political stakes.  
The purpose of this chapter will be to examine these concomitant operations of exoticization 
and de-politicization in more detail, whilst look for theatre’s potential to resist and undermine 
these processes. The spatial complexities of theatre lend it potential to negotiate the 
relationships between the internal and external, between the real and the perceived. I will be 
looking at John Hayne’s and David Woods’ The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland 
(2014), Caryl Churchill’s The Skriker (1998b), and debbie tucker green’s nut (2013), all plays 
variously engaged with the spatial logic of mad experience (more specifically, schizophrenia and 
psychosis) and the creation of ‘mindscapes’. I will be questioning to what extent they 
perpetuate the spatial logic of hallucination, and whether (and if so, the modes by which) they 
puncture the exoticized private space of madness, and re-politicize our conceptions of mad 
experience. 
Mad Experience, Hallucination, Theatre, and Space 
Whilst madness is frequently discussed in spatial terms, of inside and outside, the modes 
through which we understand the relationship of space and hallucination resists easy 
interpretation. Part of this is simply the difficulty of theorizing space. Conceptions of space 
prove difficult to force into neat epistemologies, as knowledge is manufactured through space. 
We think through space; meanings are created in spatial arrangements. Following Henri 
Lefebvre, we create representations and through space, knowledge unfolds through space, and 
our mistake has been to ignore the spatial politics of our intellectual endeavours, whereby, ‘the 
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philosophical-epistemological notions of space is fetishized and the mental realm comes to 
envelop the social and physical ones’ (Lefebvre 1991: 5). 
Space requires a nuanced and multivalent apprehension of its construction. Lefebvre offers one 
of the most consistent and thorough examination of what we mean by ‘space’. For Lefebvre, 
space is not singular, it is multifaceted, playful, complicated. Lefebvre (1991: 33) creates the 
famous triad of spatial modes, denoting how it is variously experienced and accounted for: as 
perceived (through Absolute Space), as conceived (through Spaces of Representation), as lived 
(through Representational Space). David Harvey pushes this further, noting the importance of 
the relationship between time and space. History and geography are not neatly divided. Harvey 
(2006: 121) offers a more febrile understanding of space; space can be divided into absolute 
space, relative space, and relational space. Absolute space is palpable, Cartesian space, a 
matter of geometry separated from time. Relative space is understood through motions and 
processes, Einsteinian time, space experienced against time. In Relational space, memory and 
emotion precede space, time and space have collapsed into one another. 
It should be noted, these politics of space face similar difficulties as that of historicism, of 
making a universal claim against universalism. These politics of space are in danger of 
universalizing these claims, of attempting to perform an absolute philosophical account for 
space, or even create a ‘space’ for space. In doing so, they risk creating a ‘philosophical 
account’ for themselves even as they reject the possibility. They are, regardless of intention, to 
some degree creating an overarching ‘map’ for these various forms. However, an awareness of 
the spatial politics of madness opens new possibilities for interrogating the politics of 
representation. We should approach Lefebvre and Harvey’s divisions and topologies as 
fundamentally heuristic, as pragmatic configurations of space, that open up new ways of 
looking (even as we note their limitations). 
Where does hallucination fit within these abstract varieties of space? Harvey pits his axis of 
space and time against Lefebvre’s triad, so that different modes of apprehending space are put 
alongside its temporal qualities. In this chart of nine different categories, Harvey situates, 
‘visions, fantasies and phantasms’ (Harvey 2005: 135) in the most abstracted set, as 
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‘representational’ and ‘relational’. But this situating of ‘visions’ quickly emerges as limited and 
problematic. For instance, many of those who hear voices or see visions can understand their 
experience in terms of absolute space, of emerging from inside or outside the head. Likewise, 
the visions of those who hallucinate frequently exhibit as conceptions, as ‘spaces of 
representation’. Far from easy to position, hallucination skirts across easy distinctions and 
topologies of space. 
Emerging from this is the impossibility of pigeonholing madness into a particular spatial 
category. Madness is not a static object, to be analyzed in a stable environment. There is no 
‘correct’ space for madness that needs to be unveiled or revealed. In this sense, it promotes 
Lefebvre’s own suspicion of providing confined spaces, as he notes witheringly that, ‘even 
illness and madness are supposed by some specialists to have their own peculiar space’ 
(Lefebvre 1991: 8). We should resist the notion of an ideal space of madness. In this sense, 
madness is a process, a mode, that overrides traditional borders of spatial arrangement. 
Theatre offers a particular challenge in terms of conceiving space. It has become a truism that 
theatre is a spatial medium, as Gay McAuley has observed, ‘while theatre can indeed take place 
anywhere (outdoors, in the street, on the bare earth), the point is that it must take place 
somewhere’ (McAuley 2000: 3). Yet, this argument risks falling into the trap of which Lefebvre 
and Harvey caution; all things occur within space, there is no ‘outside space’, a play is no more 
in space than a book, than music, than sleep. Rather, I suggest theatre quickly demonstrates 
the limitations and difficulties of constructing topologies of space. Theatre offers a particular 
challenge to Lefebvre. Noting the complexity of the interplay between actor and audience, 
performance and text, the real and the fictional, Lefebvre suggests, 
By such means of such theatrical interplay bodies are able to pass from a ‘real’, 
immediately experienced space (the pit, the stage) to a perceived space – a third space 
which is neither scenic or public. At once fictitious and real, this third space is classical 
theatrical space … To the question of whether such a space is a representation of space 
or a representational space, the answer must be neither – and both. (Lefebvre 1991: 
188) 
92 
 
Lefebvre is alert to the adaptability of theatre as a whole, and the limitations of his triad in 
approaching it. Beyond this, however, he fails to account for the diversity of theatre: that 
different productions will deploy differing spatial arrangements. Theatre reveals these various 
separations and delineations as contingent, and tests their rigidity. It is precisely this challenge 
to conventional borders that allows theatre to challenge existing spaces of madness, and to 
create new spatial arrangements entirely. 
As a medium engaged with space, theatre can manipulate and alter palpable, intellectual and 
emotional spaces. In terms of madness, it can move beyond a simplistic representational space 
(whereby physical manifestation is direct substitution for mental experience) into a radical 
space, capable of creating new meanings, new ways of looking through madness. Theatre is 
engaged in creating new ways of seeing. Following Joanne Tompkins, I want to look at how 
theatre explores unknown territories, ‘how theatre might continue to offer the necessary 
venue to “try things out for size”’ (Tompkins 2014: 14). 
The potential of hallucination in a theatrical setting is, therefore, not to provide a distinct space 
or setting. It is the malleability of the spatial politics of theatre that offers particular 
opportunities in its approach to the structures of hallucination. Rather than look for how 
theatre can produce an ideal ‘space’ of madness, I intend to observe the specific processes and 
particularities through which theatre conceptualizes (and potentially radicalizes) our 
understandings of madness. Rather than attempt to create a particular ‘space’ (whether utopia 
or heterotopia), I will examine the various strategies deployed by theatre to imagine new 
spatialities of madness. 
Radical Spatialities and Radical Spaces 
If we follow the spatial politics of theatre and hallucination as various processes and strategies, 
rather than the search for an ideal and singular space, how best to understand these shifts and 
workings? The question relates to where we engage with marginality. Do we maintain the 
significance and position of the marginal or seek to integrate it within the whole? I want to 
consider the means of challenging the exoticization and de-politicization of madness through 
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hallucinatory logics. This involves understanding what a meaningful re-politicization constitutes 
in spatial terms. 
Lefebvre’s own comments upon madness demonstrate a frustration with fetishizing the fringe. 
Attacking the work of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, he suggests these theorists produced 
an argument where what was conceived on the periphery remains peripheral. He depicts their 
theoretical writings as a calling to: ‘enjoy yourselves! Don’t work! We are all delinquents, 
sexually obsessed, schizophrenics’ (Lefebvre 1976: 116). This results in a failure to attack the 
‘centre’ (for Lefebvre, the structures of normalized everyday life) and central presumptions 
from which exploitation arises. An attack upon the centre is necessary for Lefebvre, or else 
critique, ‘simply ends up with a lot of pin-prick operations which are separated from each other 
in time and space’ (Lefebvre 1976: 116). 
Lefebvre does not deny the importance of marginal concerns, but rather, wishes to tie them 
into questions of the centre. Understanding madness through its conceptual links (with the 
familial, socio-economic order, other identities) avoids the danger of perpetuating the 
marginalization of madness. But, Lefebvre’s Marxism leads him into other difficulties, namely 
subsuming ‘peripheral’ concerns into a ‘central’ economic, capitalist system. Rather than regard 
the particular genealogies surrounding madness itself, madness is sublimated into another 
political concept. In this conceptual collapse, madness is reduced into illustrative metaphor. 
Emerging from this is the necessity of a complicated spatiality, one that neither places madness 
on the periphery, nor submerges it underneath a prioritized political centre.  Rather, I want to 
consider a porous relationship, that neither essentializes madness into its own discreet space 
nor ameliorates it under the weight of another concept. Rather, madness is both effected and 
effecting, it occurs along socio-political lines and likewise has an impact upon and alters these 
other political concerns. This includes structures of the family, of the economy, and other 
identities. Rather than see madness isolated – as either defined or ignored – we can see it 
situated amongst a wider political net. 
How can theatre approach this difficult spatiality, to puncture hallucination as a model without 
rendering madness a political metaphor? The spatial mechanisms that theatre can use to 
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achieve this are various. In part, through manipulating the audiences’ experiences of material 
and palpable space, theatre can variously divide and fracture the stage, obscure the spectators’ 
vision, play with the position of the audience. Theatre can destabilize our architectures of 
hallucination, where madness is on the slide and elusive. It is unsure who is imagining what, the 
hallucination spreads from one ‘mad’ character to another who is ‘sane’, psychosis is revealed 
to be engaged within (and indistinguishable from) gritty ‘social reality’. 
All three of these plays also engage with genre – the traditional family drama, the mythological 
and fantastical fairy-tale, the gritty Royal-Court council-estate play – and interrogate their 
presumptions on the path to rethinking madness. Genre is itself a kind of space, theories of 
genre often place themselves upon and within space, as Desirée Henderson notes, ‘from 
Bakhtin’s “chronotope” to Moretti’s map of the novel to Dimock’s description of genres as 
“recursive landscapes,” the study of genre has long been influenced by the methodologies for 
representing and categorizing space’ (Henderson 2011: 12). Through the implosion of these 
calcified spaces, these plays are able to conceive new ones. 
Obviously, not all plays that engage with hallucination are inherently radical, progressive, or 
provide a site of resistance. The particular plays examined in this chapter are not crystalline in 
their radicalism, they do not provide perfect examples of resistance. I do not claim that the 
creators of these works were necessarily consciously engaged in creating new spatiality of 
resistance. Rather, in order to understand how a radical politics of space and madness can be 
developed through theatre, I am questioning how particular plays have negotiated with 
hallucination (in both regressive and progressive aspects), and how this might lead us to 
imagine alternative spatialities. Our cultural idioms, our off-hand phrases, our political 
imaginations all seek to confine madness into its own private space. Society imposes a logic of 
hallucination, madness is defined as an obstruction and obfuscation of reality. Theatre’s own 
deep engagement with space, offers particular possibilities (and dangers) in its entanglement 
with the spatiality of mad experience. This chapter will concern how these particular plays 
account for mad experience, to what extent they destabilize the logic of hallucination, and how 
they account for the intersections of madness with questions of family, globalization, and 
intersectionality.
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Uncertain Meanings and the Family in The Eradication of Schizophrenia in 
Western Lapland 
If theatre wishes to create new spaces, one of the most obvious tools at its disposal is the 
manipulation of material space and the stage itself. The spatial configurations and ambitions of 
The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland by Ridiculusmus are quickly made evident. 
Having entered through one of the two allocated entrances, I can see the stage (and the 
audience) has been divided into two, by a long paper partition. This architectural shift leads to 
an unconventional theatrical experience. I watch an ordinary domestic scene between a mother 
and her two sons, Rupert and Richard, squabbling quietly about what to eat for dinner. The 
mother appears to be on medication. They occasionally refer to an absent father. At the same 
time, however, I hear another scene occurring that I cannot see. I hear another audience, a 
different audience that nevertheless exists in the same material space, laughing at jokes I only 
partially hear. Actors from the scene I watch leave my stage, only to be heard in the other. Lines 
overheard from the other scene at different points appear to compliment or interrupt the 
domestic drama. At one point, a completely unknown actor from the other scene wanders into 
the one I am watching, the characters are confused, interpretation jagged. 
After the interval, the same scenes are played again, but with the audiences having swapped 
their positions. I am now watching a psychiatrist. He treats Richard from the domestic scene (in 
the domestic scene he had been irritable but not demonstrating signs of psychosis, here he has 
visions of grandeur, claims to be the writer of Nabokov’s novels, the child of Adolf Hitler). At 
points he directly addresses the audience. The domestic scene, being replayed on the other 
side of the screen distracts me. But the distraction is different from before, it is one of 
familiarity, a recollection of experiences immediately past. It compels me to combine the 
meaning of both scenes, what I see with what I’ve seen before. 
Eventually, as the scenes both finish their repeat, the mother strips away the partition. Many 
members of the audience stare at one another, an audience that sees itself. The cast begin to 
play a new scene. The psychiatrist has become the absent father. The mother is now the 
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stepmother. The scene ends with the offstage death of Rupert, a car accident after a small 
squabble. But, in no way is an easy and complete meaning finally established. 
This description of the Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland reflects some of the 
difficulties in addressing the play. Short plot descriptions seem impossible; the play deliberately 
plays upon uncertainties. Likewise, the order of experience fundamentally adjusts your 
response to each scene. The domestic scene provides us with a sequence of banalities and 
bickering that resist any major significance or meaning. The psychiatric scene more eagerly and 
overtly raises the intellectual stimuli of the play, quoting R.D. Laing, and mentioning the Open 
Dialogue treatment used in Finland, and its effect of ‘eradicating’ schizophrenia. The order with 
which we understand and receive these aspects fundamentally changes our intellectual and 
emotional response. 
Moreover, different performances of the production had different layouts according to where 
they were sited. In a performance at the Dissection Room in Summerhall, the audience are 
positioned opposite one another, the performers sandwiched between the two sides. In 
contrast, the performance I saw at the Battersea Arts Centre (BAC) placed the divided audience 
alongside one another, a single block of seating cut across by the screen. Such simple deviations 
lead to differing effects and affects. At the BAC, the distraction of noise came from the side, 
rather than ‘behind’ the scene being watched; the soundscape of the production did not 
prioritize one scene over the other, laughter from the ‘other’ audience distracted and 
obstructed my reception. The tearing down of the partition in Summerhall leads to an 
appreciation of a further, literal ‘depth’, the audience are compelled to look at one another 
past the performers, but they remain divided. In contrast, removing the partition at the BAC 
restored the divided audience into a relatively traditional, single block. 
Despite these variations, of experience and architecture, we can still unravel some of the 
consequences of this adjustment of space. Ridiculusmus has structured and divided material 
space, in a manner that fundamentally shifts how the audience experiences the drama and 
engages in meaning making. The action I see at any single point is necessarily entangled with 
the action I cannot see, but can hear. This is partly though engineered moments, when the 
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action across the two spaces becomes blurred; the psychiatrist and the mother ask the same 
question simultaneously, and Richard answers both. But also, it is accidental, when an 
audience’s laughter on one side impinges upon the impressions of the other. 
Whilst the space may begin to change our mode of reception, the political consequences are 
not immediately obvious. The unconventional arrangement does not necessitate radicalism. 
That it has innovated in terms of palpable, material space does not guarantee it has provided a 
new space in representational, social or emotive senses. It could be a ‘gimmick’, an innovation 
purely calculated for market appeal, a material space primarily concerned with itself, rather 
than any political purpose. Without looking more carefully at the other spatial politics occurring 
within the piece, how they encourage to use this material space, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether the production offer a new mode of apprehending madness, or it is merely a 
sensationalized staging covering a perpetuation of hegemony. 
Open Dialogue, Therapy, Representation 
The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland emerges from a recent rise of Open 
Dialogue as an alternative mode of treatment for schizophrenia. The work stemmed from 
various workshops and character exercises performed with practitioners of Open Dialogue. 
They took the characters developed for the show and took them through Open Dialogue 
therapy, creating the piece alongside this therapeutic process. In situating the show as 
emerging from Open Dialogue, the show is centred around one of the recent attempts to 
challenge and break-apart the dominance of medication treatment model. Even if some of the 
claims of Open Dialogue have sometimes been excessive of the reality of its application (many 
of its users still also use medication, for example), nevertheless it has been hailed as an 
alternative to traditional psychiatric models, as a more ‘humane’ mode of treatment of 
psychosis. The production was made at a time of increased intellectual interest in Open 
Dialogue, since then the model has begun to spread; notably, in Britain, pilot schemes have 
begun working through the NHS, guided by Finnish practitioners. Whilst this chapter is not 
concerned in the varying efficacies of treatment per se, concerned rather with spatial logics 
surrounding representations of hallucination and mad experience, in this case, the play’s 
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emergence from a mode of treatment regarded by many as unorthodox and sometimes 
celebrated by those positioning themselves as mental health activists, lends a context to the 
piece. 
It is positioned as the first part of a trilogy by Ridiculusmus concerned with mental health. For 
the second part of this trilogy, they have developed Give Me Your Love, exploring the 
therapeutic effects of MDMA in treating Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; the next play will 
involve the inclusion of grief into psychiatric discourse, and the implications of this for the 
expansion of the pharmaceutical industry. As a small company, Ridiculusmus often tour their 
works across the country, their projects will naturally alter and shift over time and according to 
the particularities of the stage. Whilst I shall consider the variety of staging through pictures, 
reviews and short videos of other versions, this analysis emerges from the version of The 
Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland I watched at the Battersea Arts Centre in 2015. 
Ridiculusmus have themselves spoken and written at length about the genesis of the play and 
what they have sought to achieve. Crucially, they relate the play’s relationship to Open 
Dialogue. Open Dialogue is a technique developed in Finland by Jaako Seikkula, inspired by the 
work of Tom Anderson and the dialogism of Mikael Bakhtin. The theory adopts seven core 
principles as: immediate response, social networks, flexibility and mobility, guaranteeing 
responsibility, psychological continuity, tolerance of uncertainty and dialogism (Seikulla et al 
2003: 165-166). Dialogism is premised upon the notion that, ‘all human life is inherently 
relational and thus dialogical’ (Brown 2012: 270). Open Dialogue emphasizes the patient as 
existing in a context or network; rather than attempt to isolate the patient and rely upon the 
identification of symptoms, this technique involves group therapy, including large numbers of 
family members, creating a self-reflective cacophony of voices, in which, ‘everyone has the 
chance to speak, to listen to others in the meeting and to listen to their own utterances’ (Brown 
2012: 271). The therapy attempts to be non-hierarchical, the therapist avoids prescribing 
solutions or meanings. Open Dialogue emphasizes that meaning-making, regardless of content, 
should be encouraged and not policed. 
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The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland was formed in the company’s response to 
Open Dialogue. The company agreed to take part in an improvised, in-character Open Dialogue 
session at a conference; David Woods would later note the exposure, ‘had a profound, 
transformative influence on the play and our practice in general’ (Woods 2015: 36). However, 
this is not to suggest the play was intended to be an expression or demonstration of the Open 
Dialogue approach. Indeed, Woods explicitly rejects this possibility, noting that, ‘Such “info 
theatre” is not to our tastes. For us, it encourages a lazy consumerism on the part of the 
audience that won’t lead to genuine learning’ (Woods 2015: 138). 
Though not an expression or representation of Open Dialogue, Ridiculusmus nevertheless 
conceive of their play in parallel terms. Woods suggests that their play offers a different notion 
of the therapeutic, that they, through a, ‘minimalist articulation of therapeutic breakthrough, 
attempt to allow the audience to come to the work with their own narratives, perhaps with 
traumas that are unresolved’ (Woods 2015: 38). The hermeneutics of the play, coupled with its 
underwriting, allows for the audience to undergo a psychological revelation, a therapeutic 
process, a curing. Our process of ‘reading’ becomes entangled with our own psychological 
profiles. 
These ambitious therapeutic claims for the production are leaden with certain dangerous 
assumptions. Whilst we may follow Bobby Baker’s claim that ‘all art is therapy isn’t it?’ (Baker 
2013: ix), that creation is always a form of process, Woods appears to take this further, 
suggesting that the production can, in some way, ‘heal’ the audience, or address past 
psychological wounds. He is suggesting the production is a space through which people can 
undergo a therapeutic experience, acting as a healing process.  
It is this claim, I would suggest, that leads to the more troubling claims Ridiculusmus has 
concerning their work. They claim that the effect of the divided staging is to take the audience 
through the experience of auditory hallucination. In an interview with The Guardian, David 
Woods claims, 
It’s as if you’re having an auditory hallucination … Initially it’ll be overwhelming, chaotic. 
Then the audience will go out of the theatre, change sides. Slowly the voices will settle 
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into place. In a way, it’s the same with schizophrenia. You don’t get cured, but you can 
recover. (Woods in Barnett 2014: np) 
This is not an isolated suggestion. Elsewhere, Woods has noted, ‘we felt gave some physical and 
experiential experience of psychosis to a nonpsychotic audience’ (Woods 2015: 36). This 
suggests an equivalence of aesthetic interpretation with involuntary auditory hallucination. 
Moreover, this relies on the presumption that no members of the audience have previously 
experienced psychosis. 
I do not wish to suggest that these claims are something to be ignored. Through the staging of 
the production and the creators’ claims, The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland 
reifies logics of hallucination.  However, whilst acknowledging that to some degree the play 
indulges in an exoticized ‘tasting’ of mad experience, I suggest that the play simultaneously 
suggests a more politically charged mode of meaning making, that destabilizes these structures 
of hallucination. I want to suggest the play’s response and interrogation of Open Dialogue 
manifests through the theory’s latent political radicalism:  the acknowledgement and 
encouragement of uncertainty in meaning-making, and the integration of family perspectives 
and psychiatry. 
Tolerating Uncertainty 
The process of ‘reading’, to attempt to make a stable sense out of the latticed meanings of The 
Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, quickly proves difficult. The space is layered 
with a confusion of perspectives and gazes, amongst which the door between the two stages 
becomes a focal point. McAuley has persuasively argued that doors play a crucial part in our 
spatial constructions of theatre, that the door, ‘represents the relationship between the here 
and beyond’ (McAuley 2000: 87). Doors denote the boundaries between inside and out, 
onstage and off, the liminal distinction between interiority and exteriority. As I focus upon the 
door from either side, process the coming and goings of actors, hear sound travel across it, or 
even see a small glimpse of an alternative scene through it, the complexities of the production 
manifest themselves. 
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Most obviously, neither side is privileged. If a door is a divide between inside and outside, both 
sides are variously experienced as both. The order of rooms, the chronology of our experiences 
is decided through lottery rather than design. As a result, neither scene is prioritized as the real 
to the other’s imaginary, as the external to the interior. To suggest the domestic scene is a 
hallucination of a present-day psychiatric ward (or the reverse) is unsatisfactory. Whilst Richard 
seems the central figure, the only character who straddles between scenes maintaining his own 
(if altered) identity, it is uncertain if he is the individual hallucinating. The mother herself is 
briefly able to ‘see’ the construction of the space, ‘You know what it’s like. Today I feel really 
confused. There’s a lot of people moving about’ (Haynes and Woods 2014: 22). 
Moreover, the bodies of the actors, as they wander from stage-to-stage, are in no way stable. 
We feel and experience space through bodies, both of others and our own. These bodies resist 
a stable semiotics. Rupert, the younger brother is also a silent, unnamed patient in the 
psychiatrist’s chair. The mother becomes the stepmother. The psychiatrist is associated with 
the father. If the text at least provides us with some denomination of when one is the other, 
the performance resists such easy delimitation. The actors wear nothing different shifting 
between characters, their acting styles similar; far from establishing difference, the 
performances seek to obscure the passing from one ‘character’ to the next. 
Finally, the gaze of the audience becomes the object of its own analysis. Are we ourselves 
supposed to be engaged in some form of hallucination?  The psychiatrist directly addresses the 
audience as a patient, mocking the silence of the audience as un-cooperation: ‘You seem to 
have a rather fanciful picture of psychotherapy. It involves you sitting there, smiling sometimes, 
saying nothing, or very little, and me sitting here watching you, wondering what you’re 
thinking’ (Haynes and Woods 2014: 46). With this direct address, the psychiatrist ushers in the 
audience into the economy of perspective laid across the play. The layering of meanings 
becomes impenetrable underneath the abundance of perspective. Quickly, the politics of 
experience recedes into an infinite regress. The attempts to declaim the various configurations 
and tessellations of meaning are openly mocked within the text. The psychiatrist, quoting from 
R.D. Laing’s The Politics of Experience, attempts to delimit the possibilities that take place when 
we attempt to understand or know one another. The statements attempt to draw circular lines 
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of alterity and comprehensibility, ‘I do not experience your experience but I experience you as 
experiencing. I experience myself as experienced by you’ (Haynes and Woods 2014: 52). He 
quickly becomes confused in his alterations between interiority and exteriority, unsure of 
where to place himself. Failing at verbal communication, he attempts to draw a diagram, to 
extrapolate a geometry behind these experiential politics. This also fails. We cannot draw any 
frame, there is no stepping outside experience, we have to tolerate uncertainty. 
The various complexities of interiorities, exteriorities, bodies, perspectives are not a test of the 
audience’s perspicacity, or a narrative knot that is to be gradually unwoven. This is a labyrinth 
without a centre, of both perspective and understanding. Meaning can be briefly and 
incoherently established, but the physical construction of the play, the blocking of the actor’s 
movements, the interplaying elliptical dialogue, all seek to advance and enhance ambiguities, to 
proliferate meanings rather than systematize them into a clear apprehensible signified. 
Maddy Costa expresses the potential jubilance of experiencing and embracing this uncertainty, 
claiming, ‘there’s something electrifying yet oddly reassuring about this experience: what does 
it matter if nothing makes sense’ (Costa 2014: np). Following the various strands of narrative 
that refuse to cohere is not possible. This is not merely space as mode of intellectual process; it 
is space as profoundly felt. Ridiculusmus uses the innovations of their staging in order to 
cultivate this uncertainty. These multi-pronged assaults on certainty in The Eradication of 
Schizophrenia in Western Lapland shift us away from a space concerned with representation. 
With uncertainty, there can be no representation, madness cannot be laid claim to, be pinned 
down. Meanings are created, links are drawn, but without finality or solution. 
The Family Show 
If The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland compels us to continually make 
meanings, but without ever settling into a stable narrative, the meanings produced are always 
entangled with the relationship between family and psychiatry. The two scenes alternatively 
seen and heard are that of the domestic and the psychiatric. Whilst the play may not settle into 
an easily established story, nevertheless, the audience are compelled to put the domestic and 
psychiatric alongside one another, to understand them in tandem. 
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The place of the family, and its relationship to madness, is fraught in psychiatric history. The 
pathologization of madness into mental illness revolves around an isolation of the individual. 
The asylum sunders the domestic and the psychiatric, separating the mad person from the 
family. This bifurcation has been seen by some as an unhelpful intervention. For the likes of R. 
D. Laing, the structural complexities of schizophrenia can only be comprehended through 
engagement with the family. In Sanity, Madness and the Family, Laing compiles a series of case 
files, interviewing the entire family of those exhibiting psychosis. In the competing truth claims 
and disclosures, a better comprehension of schizophrenia can appear. For Laing, the family is 
the core unit of socialization, the mechanism through which we learn what it acceptable 
behaviour, ‘getting each new recruit to the human race to behave and experience in 
substantially the same way as those who already got here’ (Laing 1970: 43). Madness and 
psychosis can only be understood through these family structures, slowly teasing out the 
politics of speech and secrets. 
Open Dialogue likewise places family at the centre of therapy. But, in contrast to Laing, it is less 
concerned with extrapolating the ‘truth’ or actuality of schizophrenia. Rather, the mad person 
exists relationally, so therapy should reflect that relationality. The family is encouraged to 
attend therapy and Open Dialogue sessions with the person being treated. The voice of the 
patient is prioritized, but situated amongst the cacophony of alternative, conflicting and 
alternating family perspectives. 
Ridiculusmus’s interest in madness and the family predates their experiences with Open 
Dialogue; the conception of the production was always entangled with the relationship 
between family and psychiatry. The unpicking of this relationship takes form through an 
interrogation of ‘family drama’. The play attempts to poke at and unveil the precepts behind 
the genre. Indeed, an earlier title of the play was ‘The Family Drama’ (Woods 2015: 36). The 
family drama is a well-established genre in realism, emerging from figures such as Anton 
Chekhov and Eugene O’Neill, it often plays upon extremities of mental distress emerging from 
or leading to dysfunctional family structures. It usually revolves around increasing loud and 
dramatic conflicts, and the gradual unveiling of destructive secrets or revelations. 
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Woods notes how Open Dialogue attempts to dissipate tension, in sharp contrast to theatre, 
which, ‘generally aspires to the opposite of this; tension is ratcheted to a high level and is 
maintained for as long as is bearable’ (Woods 2015: 36). He explicitly draws a comparison to 
contemporary ‘in-yer-face’ theatre, and the tendency for the climatic act of the family drama 
where, ‘big things are communicated in big moments at big gatherings with great intensity’ 
(Woods 2015: 37). He envisions The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, whilst 
drawing upon the genre’s concern with family, as a potential site to avoid such dramatic 
moments, to move away from the classic tropes and cliché. 
Ridiculusmus is still drawn to the gravitational moment and orientates around family trauma. 
But this is a quiet devastation: the absence of the mother. The absence is not caused by some 
dramatic event, or sensational truth. The audience does not see the moment she leaves, it is 
only mentioned not shown, simply the consequence of her psychosis. It deliberately 
undermines the structure of a family drama, there is no emotional climax, nor a scene where 
secrets are revealed and emotional truths are spoken. The quiet catastrophe reflects the 
complexities of the relationship between family and the psychiatric.  
The play uses its physical staging to play upon these complexities in the connections between 
madness and family. The staging literally pits family and psychiatry against one another, 
competing for a voice. The borders, however, quickly become porous. The psychiatrist stands in 
for the absent father, his divorce problems parallel the family’s fragmentation, his open 
question to Richard: ‘You’re wondering if your Dad’s here?’ (Haynes and Woods 2014: 54). The 
mother of the domestic scene is apparently placed somewhere in the psychiatric ward. 
Simplistic answers to the relationship are quietly mocked, as Richard suggests the mother has 
made him ill as well, the psychiatrist responds, ‘it’s the gene that makes you flip’ (Haynes and 
Woods 2014: 58), a purely biomedical explanation that set alongside the domestic upheaval of 
the neighbouring scene appears hopelessly simplistic. As they interact, from an acceptance of 
their interplay emerges an understanding we cannot isolate understandings of madness (and 
the psychiatrist scene) from the familial (and the domestic scene). 
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The doubled staging likewise helps emphasize the doubled relationship that occurs. Extremities 
of mental distress or joy (and the failure to provide adequate support, or even the tendency to 
penalize mad persons, by the state) are felt through families and social structures. Likewise, 
family trauma, or upbringing, are a core component in approaching madness; madness reveals 
itself through family structures. This is not as simple as cause and effect; rather, madness is 
both experienced and apprehended through the primary social structure of the family. 
Psychiatric power attempts to isolate madness, to pathologize it into a discreet bio-medical 
manifestation, it fails to situate it in social structures. 
In the eventual ripping and destruction of the partition, Ridiculusmus renounce the possibility 
of separating the domestic and the psychiatric, one cannot be understood apart from the other. 
In a Chorus from the play-text titled ‘Four Voices in Darkness’ (that would eventually be cut 
from the production), this desire for integration is explicitly stated: ‘We want to open up the 
boundaries / And integrate family perspectives / Into Psychotherapy’ (Haynes and Woods 2014: 
9). Understanding can only be achieved through their integration and their relationality. This 
perhaps risks the abandonment of uncertainty, that the dissolution of the partition and 
coalescence of the performance into the singular, could be seen as a restoration to coherent 
meanings. Put simply, the domestic and psychiatric have finally been reintegrated, and 
comprehension is finally possible. Generously, we could frame this shift as less the 
abandonment of uncertainty, than its acceptance. The space is divided even as the physical 
division has been removed. Pluralism and polyvocality are still present, but no longer require 
the dividing construction of physical space. 
Hallucination: Family and Madness Coming Together 
In what ways does The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland entangle itself with 
hallucination, and to what extent does it resist some of its regressive logics? It must be 
acknowledged that the play, in certain forms, engages within problematic understandings of 
hallucination. The structure of material space, the experience engendered in the audience, is 
offered as a means to ‘taste’ auditory hallucination. This interpretation is encouraged by the 
creators, that the piece somehow replicates mad experience for the consumption of the 
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audience. This is further framed in therapeutic terms, that the aesthetic experience is capable 
of some form of healing. In this sense, the play perpetuates hegemonic structures. 
Despite this framing, I argue the play begins to burst and break away from this architecture. The 
doubled-space is used to cultivate uncertainty, to engage in a meaning-making through 
multiple voices rather than representational models. In interrogating the spatial logic 
underpinning The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, alternative spatialities of 
resistance to the traditional hallucinatory logic emerge. If hallucination operates upon an inner-
outer binomial distinction (simultaneously essentializing and depoliticizing madness), The 
Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland works to destabilize these distinctions, to 
accommodate us with uncertainty. Neither scene is privileged as ‘reality’, nor as ‘hallucination’, 
even as characters interact and change between the two spaces. 
This architecture, in turn, allows the play to pit the domestic against the psychiatric. Put 
together, the meanings the audience are compelled to create are always negotiations between 
the domestic and the psychiatric, as neither scene provides a narrative ‘solution’ to what is 
watched. Madness is touched upon, not within itself, but through these negotiations with the 
familial and continual (and never finalized) productions of meaning. Madness is regarded 
relationally, rather than in isolation; we can only understand madness in terms of its relation to 
the family structures. In this sense, it follows some of the embedded political ideals of open-
dialogue, that identity is fundamentally relational and inseparable from the social links 
surrounding the mad person.  
Through engaging with The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, new spatialities of 
thinking though madness can be imagined. This is a spatiality that re-politicizes madness, that 
neither remainders madness to an exotic and private space, nor renders madness defined 
purely in the sense of another concept. It is this difficult playing between these two 
possibilities, of a porous relationality that neither essentializes nor reduces madness, upon 
which The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland plays. Flourishing its uncertainties, 
the play engages with the relationship between family and madness, insisting on their deep 
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entanglement, but resisting simplistic aetiological accounts of madness as purely a 
manifestation of family dysfunction. 
It is this particular form of re-politicisation of madness, using its spatial architecture of 
proliferating uncertainties, through which the play offers a more radical apprehension of mad 
experience. If hallucination is a process by which we de-politicize madness, contain it into a 
private and discernible space, The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland introduces a 
potential spatiality that re-politicizes madness, offers a more nuanced place of madness in the 
‘real’, rather than simply sectioning away mad experience. If space is that through which 
society thinks and conceives, The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland begins to 
point to new ways of thinking madness that evades easy essentialisms or simplistic political 
overlays. 
Away with the Fairies: Globalization, Madness and the Fairytale in The Skriker 
In Caryl Churchill’s The Skriker, the titular character appears to chase after the sisters Lily and 
Josie, seeking to entice them into her world and wishes, to their destruction. Lily and Josie 
alternatively both yearn for her and reject her. Their wishes to the Skriker are frequently simply 
passing the Skriker from one to the other: ‘I wish you’d have her instead of me’ (Churchill 
1998b: 251) or ‘I wish she’d come and help me then’ (Churchill 1998b: 258). They reject the 
Skriker, but following, immediately yearn and desire her again. As Josie expresses, ‘when you’ve 
lost her you want her back. Because you can see what she can do’ (Churchill 1998b: 268). The 
play ends with the Skriker victorious, claiming Lily, and flinging her into a desolate future. 
Who is the Skriker, what her function in the play, and what does she represent? As a character 
she appears in almost every scene, but evades easy categorization, transmogrifying from old 
woman to small abandoned child to American yuppie to Fairy Queen of the underworld. Is the 
Skriker meant to be the psychotic delusions of Lily and Josie? Or are we meant to take the 
mythological logic of the play seriously? 
The Skriker pushes and stretches what we frame as ‘hallucinatory’. It evades easy distinctions. 
There is no singular person who ‘hallucinates’, who acts as a gateway for the audience into the 
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state of psychosis (such as Lisa in The Wonderful World of Dissocia). The Skriker switches 
between Josie and Lily, seducing one and then the other. Josie’s mental state and history 
suggests the Skriker plays a role in psychosis; Josie is first seen as a patient in a mental hospital, 
it is quickly established that she has killed her own daughter. But the Skriker’s seduction of the 
comparatively ‘stable’ Lily conflicts with this interpretation. The Skriker draws upon Josie’s 
instability, upon her desperation, culminating in Josie’s descent into the underworld. In 
contrast, the seduction of Lily draws upon material desires; she’s gifted a hiccup of money. 
Is the fantasy world an illustration, a mode of understanding hallucination, or is it simply 
mythical imagery without representative purpose? Harpin notes that the Skriker exists as both 
within the mythological logic of the play and as manifestation of ‘real’ psychosis. She draws 
upon a scene where Josie accuses Lily’s baby of being a changeling, suggesting the scene is, ‘a 
tightrope dance between mythology and realism’ (Harpin 2014: 206). Is the changeling a 
psychotic delusion or a genuine mythological creature within the play? As Lily cries out to the 
Skriker, ‘I wish Josie wasn’t mad’ (Churchill 1998b: 278), she frames her sister’s fantastical 
experiences as delusional whilst simultaneously investing into mythology of the wish. As Harpin 
notes, the wish, ‘confirms the real fact of illness in the same instant as it ushers the register of 
myth back on stage’ (Harpin 2014: 207). Through this fundamental ambiguity, The Skriker 
ushers in the possibility of hallucination, only to render it fundamentally undecidable. In this 
manner, The Skriker evades the easy exoticization of madness. The Skriker never indulges in an 
easy inner-outer dialectic of hallucination. In The Skriker, the fairytale creatures are 
simultaneously real and not real, touching between the psychological and the material. 
The première of The Skriker, at the National Theatre, arrived in 1994, in the petering days of the 
Conservative government. Churchill had shown interest in the interlacing of gender and late-
capitalism throughout the 1970s and 1980s, whether housing markets in Owners or 
interrogations from a feminist perspective in Top Girls. But, in 1994, the frisson of neo-liberal 
reform under the premiership of Margaret Thatcher had withered to the grey status quo of 
John Major; the jubilation of capital in a play such as Churchill’s own Serious Money in 1988 had 
given way to a more wearied perspective of a now Hayekian landscape. The Skriker revels and 
reveals in this desiccated landscape. 
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My own response and understanding of the play has emerged from watching the production at 
the Manchester Royal Exchange in 2015. Inevitably, it reverberated to a different political 
landscape. It followed the rise of austerity Britain following the economic crash of 2008, the 
unexpected Conservative win at the general election and the sudden rise of the radical Left in 
Labour in the form of the candidateship of Jeremy Corbyn. Centrist assumptions that had 
governed political motions of Britain and global politics were being uprooted. Likewise, its 
position in Manchester shifted the tones and themes of the play; Churchill’s play is firmly 
located in the fairytales of Northern England, its plot involves the journeying of northern 
working-class women to a metropolitan London. In an environment where the city and 
conservatism had re-established their cultural and economic dominance, this was a play placed 
to talk back to the ossified power structures of neoliberalism. 
Fairy of Nature or Madness: A Confusion of Meanings 
If one difficulty of The Skriker is its simultaneous embrace and rejection between the world as 
phantasm or as real, then this has likewise lead to the difficulty of its thematic flexibility, 
between madness and nature.  The damage of the Skriker seems to be both personal and 
global, of both psychosis and capitalism. The Skriker is another name for ‘The Black Dog’, a 
ghostly hound that famously became a colloquialism for depression. She ghosts Josie in a 
psychiatric ward. Yet, she also associates with globalization, in both ecological and economic 
senses. The Skriker alludes to ecological disaster, as its titular character even appears to draw 
power from it: ‘Earthquakes. Volcanoes. Drought. Apocalyptic meterological phenomena … 
Some people might feel concerned about that. But it makes me feel important’ (Churchill 
1998b: 282-3). She frequently manifests herself in the symptoms of late-capitalism, of both the 
emerging underclass and privileged few, as the parentless desperate young child and as the 
business woman. Following Elaine Aston, ‘but always in relations that are hierarchical, vampiric 
and never mutual’ (Aston 2003: 31); Josie and Lily are drained by their encounters with a late-
capitalist world. 
The critical reception to the 1994 production reflected a discomfort and bemusement with such 
unstable thematic and symbolic theatre. This has shifted, in reviews for the 2015 production in 
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the Royal Exchange in Manchester, to an attempt to section it away to a particular theme or 
topic. This is perhaps most evidently exposed in Michael Billington’s review, as he notes how 
the 1994 production was ‘regarded as bafflingly obscure’ but that the 2015 interpretation, 
‘offers, amongst other things, a vision of climate change we can all understand’ (Billington 
2015: np). He clings upon the ecological as its thematic unit. Susanna Clapp notes its staunchly 
feminist concerns, noting, ‘Churchill’s play is almost entirely female. The voice of its ancient 
Cassandra is dominant’ (Clapp 2015: np), whilst Claire Allfree returns to its concern with 
madness, that the play skewers distinctions, ‘between the real and the imagined, sanity and 
madness, consciousness and the subconscious’ (Allfree 2015: np). This search for a singular 
‘subject’ is, according to Paul Vallely, even reflected in the marketing, where the play is 
depicted as, ‘an apocalyptic metaphor for the revenge of nature over human despoliation of 
the earth’ (Vallely 2015: np). But Vallely considers this account ‘too limited an account of this 
dark piece’ (Vallely 2015: np), the play bursts outside its own publicity, unable to be contained 
into such a static interpretation. 
The Skriker invites meanings, only to resist their stability. It flirts and flits between different 
modes of interpretation. Graham Wolfe (2011), pushing this further, suggests that The Skriker 
attempts to push against our tendencies for symbolic order and for clear representational 
paths. Ann Wilson suggests this resistance to an easy representational or symbolic coda is 
politically charged, that ‘Churchill’s refusal to allow the audience access to a position of 
interpretive “mastery” over The Skriker is an act of political resistance (Wilson 1998: 187). 
The Skriker, as a thematically febrile play, carves out an ambiguous space in which to conceive 
of madness. Yet, this ambiguity fosters certain dangers. Ambiguity also can grant a looseness of 
meaning. From this, the play’s engagement with madness can be reduced to the functional and 
illustrative, whereby we view madness only as a consequence of the globalized forces of the 
play. 
Critical response has commonly focused upon the critique of globalization that permeates the 
play. The Skriker is analogous to capitalism in her simultaneous ubiquity and sickness. Candice 
Amich extends this analysis to the opening monologue; in the rush and confusion of syntax, 
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‘words and phrases overlap each other, creating a feverish, claustrophobic effect’ (Amich 2007: 
397). This is extended by Peake’s vocal declamation in the 2015 production, setting an irregular 
pulse, she rushes through phrases only to elongate others. The monologue looks forward, to 
Josie’s murder of her baby, ‘I’ve been a hairy here he is changeling’ (Churchill 1998b: 244) and 
her entrapment in the fairy underworld from her consumption of the underworld’s food, 
‘eating a plum in the enchanted orchard, cherry orchid, chanted orchestra was my undoing’ 
(Churchill 1998b: 245); in the anticipation of the future narrative, ‘she plunges us into the 
future of the play and then retreats into the action’ (Amich 2007: 397). Through the opening 
monologue’s playful attitude towards time, it prepares us for the exposure of dislocated 
identities and inconsistent time frames that are consequential of a globalized economy. 
This understanding frames the madness as a consequence of capitalism; broken subjectivities 
emerge from late capitalism’s dysfunction, fractured political structures have led to fragmented 
minds. Under this interpretation, madness is either an illustrative metaphor for broken 
subjectivities or simply a consequence of late capitalism’s excesses. For Elin Diamond, The 
Skriker in particular is playing upon the fragmentation of identity, in particular distortion of 
time and space that emerges from the late-capitalist globalization. For Diamond, the Skriker is 
engaged in the formation of neo-liberal identities, ‘manipulating the desire of Josie and Lily and 
turning them into consumers of fairy glamour’ (Diamond 2006: 483). The distortion of time 
throughout the play reflects the distortion of late capitalism upon vulnerable subjectivities. 
Madness is perceived as an object, a consequence of the play’s concern with globalization. 
Whilst these accounts provide a compelling account of the psychological effects of capitalism, 
for Harpin, the focus upon the politics of globalization, ‘has been largely at the expense of a 
sustained engagement with the drama’s relationship to madness and, in particular, psychosis 
and schizophrenia’ (Harpin 2014: 201). Following the opening monologue, Harpin12 suggests, 
rather than purely the troubled temporal shifts of late capitalism, that, ‘Churchill’s sculpting of 
the Skriker’s language is precisely engaged with the apparently distended logic of psychotic 
                                                          
12 It should be noted, that Harpin troubles previous descriptions of the opening monologue as ‘schizophrenic’ (see 
Cousin 1998, Wolf 1996) without an in-depth analysis. Often, the term ‘schizophrenic’ is problematically used as a 
shorthand for obscure, unclear or nonsensical. Harpin seeks to resist this. 
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thought disorder’ (Harpin 2014: 205). Following this understanding of the Skriker as a phantom 
of mad experience, in the 2015 production, towards the end of the monologue the ensemble 
began to convulse, imitative of electro-convulsive treatment, or an epileptic fit. The Skriker’s 
monologue, in its seeming randomness that opens upon study to pregnant and playful 
meaning, is offering a new means of ‘touching’ madness, to reflect upon madness within itself. 
In these various responses, the Skriker’s engagement in the politics of both globalization and 
madness is evident. Whilst Amich and Diamond’s analysis perceptively note the psychological 
impact of late-capitalism, they risk not engaging with the play’s politics of madness, of 
rendering madness into a metaphor for the distortions of globalizations. Yet, to ignore the 
play’s engagement with globalization risks an attention to madness ‘itself’, as object, risking the 
essentialization of mad experience. I want to suggest that, rather than either essentializing 
madness or rendering it a redundant metaphor, The Skriker cultivates a porous spatiality than 
can incorporate both without a conceptual collapse. If these two aspects of the play, of 
madness and globalization, interact in a way that exceeds simply a causal or a metaphorical 
mode, then we need to explore how this achieved. In particular, to examine The Skriker’s 
engagement with genre and the fairytale 
Far, Far, Away: Playing with the Fairytale 
Churchill herself describes The Skriker as an ancient fairy, ‘a shapeshifter and a death portent, 
ancient and damaged’ (Churchill 1998b: 243). This notion of damage is particularly important to 
the scholarly attempts to understand The Skriker; Matt Wolf quotes Churchill, in one of her few 
commentaries on the play, that it concerns, ‘damage to nature and damage to people’ 
(Churchill in Wolf 1996: np). This concern with the global, the personal and their interplay, is 
perhaps one of the difficulties of the play; it shifts from the intense personal catastrophe of 
post-natal psychosis to a wider globalized chaos. The Skriker herself is both damaged and 
damaging; her language is broken and fragmented, yet throughout the play she parasitically 
draws upon Lily and Josie, seeking their destruction. 
In this examination of ‘damage’, of both the ‘person’ and the ‘world’, divisions between the 
material and the psychological have to be disrupted. Both madness and capitalism operate 
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between these two different levels, on both the person and the global. Yet, if The Skriker 
achieves a new spatiality, that evades the divide between material and psychological, how is 
this achieved? 
The Skriker plays up the history and cultural tropes of the fairytale genre. In particular, the 
figure of the Skriker herself opens up the history of and various constructions of the fairy. In the 
beginning of the 2015 production, as in the marketing, she appears with heavy eyeshadow and 
a punk hairstyle, resembling a dark, contemporary gothic fairy, something emerging from 
Mervyn Peake or Angela Carter. Later, seducing Lily to Josie’s protest, she almost seems like a 
faux-prettified plum fairy, mockingly coquettish, as with our contemporary stereotypes of the 
Edwardian fairy, as a Tinkerbell. Finally, in the underworld, dressed in the famous wig and gown 
of Elizabeth the First, as the Faerie Queen, Gloriana, or Titania. In playing upon the variations of 
the ‘fairy’ (notably drawing upon notions of femininity and their deconstruction), we’re 
reminded of the particular theatrical history of the fairy, whether in the games of the sexual 
sprites of A Midsummer’s Night’s Dream and Puck’s request for applause, or the life-sustaining 
clapping in Peter Pan. 
The Skriker is, throughout the play, engaged in questions of the fairytale genre. It openly 
identifies and connects itself to the Northern folktale and fairytale tradition; the various 
creatures that litter the otherwise domestic scenes (including Rawheadandbloodybones, a 
Kelpie, a Brownie, a Spriggan) all emerge from these traditions. If narrative tropes such as ‘the 
true child replaced with a fake’ or ‘the descent into the underworld’ can be found in other 
cultural genres (Orpheus and Persephone in Greek mythology), this is a play than nevertheless 
insists upon understanding these constructions through the lens of a fairytale, and the 
respective cultural associations. Many of Churchill’s plays play fantastical beasts or creatures – 
the spectres of Fen, the vampire of Mad Forest – but The Skriker specifically aligns itself in the 
traditions, both in terms of imagery and narrative, of the fairytale. 
The structures of the fairytale offer The Skriker particular possibilities in conceiving space. In an 
irony that Tracy Davis appreciates, structure gives liberation, ‘extreme convention is a form of 
license’ (Davis 2005: 57), whereby the creators can play upon the audience’s expectation of 
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convention. In terms of theatre, productions can take advantage of the particular spatial 
configurations and structures of the fairytale. The spatiality of the fairytale is reliant upon a 
central divide, following Alfred Messerli, ‘the European fairytale creates two 
nonhomeomorphic worlds – a magical world of supernatural beings from the beyond, and a 
non-magical one of normal human beings’ (Messerli 2005: 275). Yet, all these narratives 
involve, in some way, a sense of journeying between these two places. In travelling between 
these two worlds, a pliable spatiality begins to take shape, leading Messerli to suggest that the 
spatiality of the fairytale is, ‘erratic, not homogenous … simultaneously contractive and 
expansive’ (Messerli 2005: 282). The invisible becomes visible, eternity becomes a second, and 
a second becomes an eternity. 
These structures of space play interestingly with our own social narratives of madness. 
Madness, in our cultural imagination, frequently figures as a singular site, as a location ‘far, far 
away’. To be mad, as Harpin lists, means, ‘one has lost the plot, gone out of one’s mind, taken 
leave of one’s senses; you are out to lunch, round the bend, away with the fairies, round the 
twist, in a dark place’ (Harpin 2014: 187). Madness as hallucination is, much like the fantastical 
world, defined by its seclusion from the material world, understood by means of this partition, 
a depoliticized experience sundered from other political concerns. In contrast, capitalism 
portrays itself as existing on a purely material level; our imagined geographies of capitalism are 
flat, forged through the accumulation of material wealth. 
Churchill uses the genre of the fairytale to create a new space that can explode the distinction 
between the material and the psychological using the imagery of the fairytale. The fairytale 
world has thoroughly rooted itself inside the mundane. She fills scenes typically situated in 
‘gritty realist’ drama with the fantastical, blurring the boundaries; the mental hospital occupied 
by, ‘the Kelpie, part young man, part horse’ (Churchill 1998b: 247), a bar frequented by ‘a 
Spriggan, grotesquely ugly and ten feet tall’ (Churchill 1998b: 253). Frequently, they can’t be 
seen, as the stage is populated by ‘A Businessman with a Thrumpin riding on his back. He 
doesn’t know it’s there’ (Churchill 1998b: 275), or as Lily and Josie sit on the sofa, 
‘Rawheadandbloodybones sits on a shelf watching, invisible to them’ (Churchill 1998b: 275).  
The Manchester production illustrates this further, as the main stage is surrounded by little 
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alcoves of ‘gritty realist’ imagery, of kitchen sinks and bedrooms, with strange, wonderful 
flowers sprouting out of them. The ecological world of the Skriker has punctured into the real. 
Both madness and capitalism scale between these two worlds. The spatial distortions of time 
prevalent in fairytales illustrate how Churchill brings together these concerns. In an episode of 
extreme time compression, Josie experiences her hundreds of years in the fairy underworld, 
only to return in the real world at the same time. Lily questions Josie’s experience, stating, 
‘Josie, I was with you all the time’ (Churchill 1998b: 276), she frames it as a psychotic episode, 
as the tumult of individual experience. Yet, the distortions of scale are reversed in the final 
scene of the play, as Lily’s compact with the Skriker leads her to decades in the future, meeting 
with her descendants in a ruined world. If Josie’s experience reflected that of psychosis through 
the land of the fairies, this reflects reality-in-extremis; as the Skriker narrates of Lily, ‘‘Am I 
fairylanded?’ she wandered. ‘No,’ said the old crony, ‘this is the real world’’ (Churchill 1998b: 
290). Suddenly, ecological obligations are brought to the fore, time distortion a means of 
apprehending our future. Churchill’s use of a classical fairytale device, the varying compression 
and expansion of time, becomes a means to set alongside psychosis and the material. Yet, 
beyond simply a collapse between the psychotic and the material, this device seems to indicate 
both connection and disconnection; they are intertwined yet polar opposites. 
Likewise, the fairytale’s concern with children - their abduction, their innocence, their 
vulnerability, their greed – acts as a lynchpin between concerns of madness and globalization. 
Josie’s murder of her own child remains inscrutable; though implied she worried that it was a 
‘changeling child’, these are extrapolations. Yet, the clear framing is that the fantasy world has, 
in this sense, operated as manifestation of madness, that Josie suffered post-natal psychosis. 
Yet, the concern for our children, the precarity of their future, is also highlighted as a central 
concern of globalization and its ecological effects. In the final scene, Josie is confronted by her 
descendants in a ruined world; our ethical responsibility to the environment is framed as an 
encounter with our children’s children.  
The Skriker exploits the doubled-space that the fairytale simultaneously exists in and 
undermines, acting as a means to deconstruct the relationship between the material and the 
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psychological, and in doing so opens parallels and connections between late-capitalism and 
madness. On the one hand, it demonstrates capitalism does not simply occur on a material 
level, that it works upon and across multiple spaces. But it also places madness as 
fundamentally involved in the material, in its causes and consequences. Josie must respond to a 
late-capitalist world that fails to provide adequate resources (politically, bureaucratically, 
socially) of support. The Skriker creates a space that can dart between madness and 
globalisation, mark their overlay, without subsuming one into the other. Even as it 
demonstrates connection, it emphasizes disconnection. By flirting between these two 
possibilities, The Skriker hints at possible connections and fruitfully blended understandings, 
without fulling committing to any formalized account of their relationship. 
Away with the Fairies: The Magical and the Real in Material Space 
If The Skriker ushers in confusions, offering its mythological visions as crossing the material and 
psychotic, productions of The Skriker can play upon the materiality of the theatrical space to 
prod at this divide. Whilst the original production maintained a more traditional staging, 
subsequent productions have been drawn to staging that pierces the spectator-performer 
divide more explicitly; both Red Tape Theatre’s production in Chicago and a student production 
in Warwick University were drawn to promenade performance. In the 2015 production, taking 
advantage of the round stage of the Royal Exchange, some of the audience were placed 
alongside three, long wooden tables, cutting across the space in the shape of a large ‘Y’. The 
performers would then use both the tables and the spaces in-between to enact and entrance; 
the main action of Josie, Lily and the Skriker occurs predominantly on the tables, with the 
various incidental fantastic beasts and creatures scattered across the spaces in-between the 
tables and audience members.  
Yet, the special relationship is not consistently one of porous engagement between spectator 
and performer. The spatial politics of this staging, and the audience’s relationship to the 
‘fantastical’, became most fraught in the transitional scene where Josie descends into the fairy 
underworld of the Skriker. This scene represents one of the few points where there is no trace 
of realist setting:  
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it looks wonderful except that it is all glamour and here and there it’s not working – some 
of the food is twigs, leaves, beetles, some of the clothes are rags, some of the beautiful 
people have a claw hand or hideous face (Churchill 1998b: 268-9).  
The world is purely fantastical, a magical and raucous feast. But even as the descent occurs and 
the table placed with food and drink, the audience members are not welcome in the land of the 
fairies. Those seated along the long tables are escorted by various fairies to the perimeter of 
the space. They remain there for the rest of the performance, with the main space of the 
performance no longer lined across with spectators and non-performers. The porosity of 
audience and performer has been rejected, and a new line has been redrawn. 
The transition is not incidental, nor an awkward shuffling. The departure of the audience is 
incorporated into the transition of the scene. The fairies come to take each audience member 
individually by the hand, and lead them away. The transference is extravagant, it calls attention 
to itself; a fairy escorted me away, the movements of his hand guided me into twirling into a 
circle. Those audience members forced to move become part of the spectacle. The process is 
slow and individuated. In my own experience, I find myself self-conscious as being made, in a 
small way, to perform.  
The relationship between different sections of the audience, one acting as spectacle for the 
other, is attested to in various reviews, particularly from those located in the upper or lower 
circle. Several reviewers positioned from this vantage point reflect upon the discrepancy. 
Allfree, feeling dislocated from the action, ponders, ‘perhaps those seated at the tables feel 
more deeply the threat of rupture onto the real world’ (Allfree 2015: np); whilst James Varney 
observes, ‘the luckiest members of the audience (myself not included) find themselves sat in 
the hollow where the play takes place, at tables more banquet than picnic’ (Varney 2015: np). 
In both these cases, the staging has (if partly through envy) ruptured the experience of the play. 
They themselves wish to be part of the show’s glamour, start to imagine other viewpoints. Far 
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from simply affecting those ‘lucky’ few seated by the tables, the staging implicates all audience 
members in a complex economy of spectatorship.13 
These two accounts both presume, or hope, for a greater emotional connection for those of us 
closer to the actors. Yet, despite these politics of connection and disconnection, those of us 
‘amidst the action’ of the play were most visible at our departure. The Skriker as a whole 
appears to encourage slippage between the mythological and the mad. Yet, as the audience 
appear to travel into the most purely ‘psychotic’ or ‘magical’ landscape, the audience are 
excluded. The production appears to be following some of the tensions of the text, whereby 
Lily, despite seeing the Skriker in her everyday life, refuses to believe Josie travelled to an 
underworld. A limit has been reached. In this, The Skriker refuses to declare, define, or provide 
us access, to a ‘space of madness’. ‘Pure’ madness is rendered inaccessible, as untouchable. If 
the notion of a ‘space of madness’ is, following Lefebvre, regressive, then The Skriker teasingly 
creates one, only to prevent and obstruct our apprehension of it. If The Skriker as a whole uses 
the fairytale and the fantastical to skirt between both madness and the politics of globalization, 
then curiously, this production creates a mad landscape only to emphasize its utter 
inaccessibility. This, coupled with the ambiguity of meanings across madness and globalization, 
troubles the traditional logics of hallucination. 
Madness Through Magical Thinking 
The Skriker quickly works to destabilize the exoticization of mad experience through logics of 
hallucination. The hallucinatory mode of The Skriker is troubled, its fantastical modes both 
encourage and discourage interpretation of its visions as psychosis. The creature of the Skriker 
seems to evade easy categorization. Both engaged in the mythological logic of the play and as 
embodiment of psychosis, it seems to exist in a liminal space. We are given a ‘mad’ character, 
introduced to her in a psychiatric ward for the murder of her own child, that is later associated 
with the fantastical visions of changelings; in this, the audience are encouraged to associate the 
                                                          
13 This economy is not simply conceptual. Intentional or not, there is the additional irony of the economic 
component in a play attempting to skewer globalized capitalism. The seats amongst the actors, along the tables, 
naturally cost more than those in the more detached circles. Hierarchies of spectatorship in this anti-capitalist 
production are drawn on decidedly financial lines. 
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strange imagery, not with a quirky ‘magic-realist’ aesthetic, but as emerging from a psychotic 
landscape. Yet, these visions extend beyond her and shift to the ostensibly ‘sane’ Lily like a 
pathogen, they resist such any simple categorization as hallucination, evade any easy 
belonging. Likewise, in the staging of the Manchester production, the staging of the fairy’s 
banquet emphasized a pure mad landscape, only to render it inaccessible. The play confuses 
the easy inner-outer logic of the hallucinatory. 
Whilst it is the play least evidently participating in regressive inner-outer distinctions, it is 
consequentially also the play most vulnerable to a disregard to madness itself. The play evades 
any easy theme or concern. For some, it’s the ecological and economic damage of late-
capitalism, imagine on a psycho-fantastical realm. Others focus on its attention to madness 
itself, aping the ostensible structures of psychosis and schizophrenia, whilst demonstrating the 
meaning-making processes that emerge from these structures. In isolation, these theories and 
interpretations risk respectively remaindering madness into metaphor, or essentializing mental 
health into certain aesthetic modes. In its confusion of themes and meanings, encouraged by 
the ambiguous ontology of the Skriker herself, The Skriker risks sublimating madness into an 
after-effect (or psychological metaphor) of the forces of globalization and capitalism. 
Primarily, through its relationship to the fairytale genre. The structure of the fairytale relies 
upon a spatiality of ‘here’ and ‘there’, of home and far, far away. Moreover, the fairytale relies 
upon the journeying between these two, between the shift. Its plays upon the visible and the 
invisible, the dimensions and complications of the fairy, questions of scale. The play then 
troubles these neat distinctions, between the real and fantastical, as one invades the other. 
Through this mode, the Skriker can implode distinctions between material and the 
psychological landscapes, set one alongside the other. I can set the play’s concomitant concerns 
with late-capitalism and madness alongside one another. On the one hand, I can see a 
capitalism that functions beyond a purely ‘materialistic’ mode, that has psycho-social 
permutations, and consequences. Likewise, I can place madness in the material, understanding 
how it manifests alongside the material circumstances of capitalism. 
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In using the internal geography of the fairytale, The Skriker creates a new geography of 
madness, one that neither seals away madness, nor renders it an illustrative metaphor of 
globalization. In contrast to hallucination, the audience approaches a re-politicized 
understanding of mad experience. Through this re-politicization, The Skriker resists the 
hegemonic logic of hallucination that seals mad experience away into its own space. 
Smoke in your Eyes: Spaces of Hallucination, Intersectionality, and Invisible 
Violence in debbie tucker green’s nut 
In debbie tucker green’s nut, the politics of madness come in contact with those of race and 
gender. The loose structure of nut could be described as follows. In the first act, Elayne, a 
reclusive black woman, bickers with her white friend Aimee, her black friend Devon, and a 
young black boy called Trey. The conversation becomes increasingly ominous, circling around 
funerals and suicide. In the second act, two characters simply called Ex-Wife and Ex-Husband, 
insult each other, bitterly recollect their failed marriage, as they wait for their daughter to 
arrive. In the third act, the audience discover Elayne and the Ex-Wife are sisters and Elayne 
experiences psychosis of some description. As Aimee, Devon and Trey populate the stage, it 
becomes evident they are unnoticeable to the Ex-Wife. They are revealed to be hallucinations, 
the action of Act One all a manifestation of Elayne’s psychosis. 
There is no uncertainty in the framing of hallucination in nut. Unlike The Skriker or The 
Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, that seep their architecture of hallucination 
with ambiguity, nut clearly designates particular scenes and characters as ‘hallucinations’ and 
imaginary. It even uses this distinction as a narrative twist, pulling the rug from underneath the 
audience’s understanding. To this extent, nut is participating within and perpetuating the inner-
outer logics of hallucination; the audience enjoy an exoticized taste of ‘mad experience’. But, 
whilst fulling recognizing these unambiguous hallucinatory structures, I want to suggest that 
despite these regressive aspects, through an engaged reading of the play, we can see how nut 
works to unpick easy assumptions about the relationship between the political and madness. 
In order to do this, some background of the play and tucker green’s position in black British 
theatre is necessary. Both tucker green’s place within black British theatre, and the motivations 
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behind ‘The Shed’ at the National Theatre (the stage at which nut was performed in 2015), 
interact strangely with the play itself, reveal tensions between subject matter, audience 
composition, and the aesthetic choices of the play. With the rise of black British theatre onto 
main stages and new writing theatres across the past twenty years, the predominant aesthetic 
mode has been realism. Roy Williams, Kwame Kwei-Armah and Bola Agbaje have sought to 
reveal and expose the diversity of black British experience through broadly realist or ‘slice of 
life’ dramas. In contrast, tucker green eschews realism; her plays are frequently situated in 
traumatic landscapes, as she ‘breaks away from the predominance of social realism in black 
British playwriting by focusing on the emotional aftermath of these issues’ (Goddard 2015: 69). 
In her few interviews, debbie tucker green shows a wariness concerning the composition of the 
audiences at these theatres, and her own role in this regards. Questioned by Lyn Gardner about 
the overwhelmingly white audiences of the Royal Court, tucker green replied:  
It won't, if the marketing department does its job properly … It makes me laugh when I 
walk into theatres and people are tripping over themselves because I am a black 
playwright. If you're black and working in a shop nobody trips over themselves (tucker 
green in Gardner 2005: np).  
This juxtaposes on the one hand a notion that her plays are written with a black audience in 
mind, against the acknowledgement that, institutionally, the audiences to her plays are 
overwhelmingly white. 
The motivations behind The Shed, a temporary stage set-up by the National Theatre whilst 
renovations were occurring at the Cottesloe, extend this conflict. This stage not only 
represented a pragmatic stop-by, but an attempt to extend the National Theatre brand. For Ben 
Power, the associate director in charge of its programming, the Shed was an opportunity to 
extend the National’s audience, claiming:  
There are people who go to see new writing Upstairs at the Royal Court or at the Arcola, 
or who go to the Young Vic for its bar … And they don't come to the National because 
they think it's establishment and not for them or they find the building intimidating or the 
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programming old-fashioned or over- literate. Actually that audience would really enjoy 
what we do. This is a way of reaching towards that (Power in Jones 2013: np). 
This notion of a new audience, emerging from the new writing theatres, as somehow more 
desirable and worth pursuing, follows a particular image. It suggests tucker green’s writing is 
scheduled, and valued, for her cultural capital with the predominantly white audiences 
frequenting these new writing theatres. 
In order to get around these tensions, Goddard suggests that tucker green moves ‘beyond’ 
race, and attempts to integrate black identities into the universal. For Goddard, the characters 
of tucker green’s play, ‘happen to be black/women, experiencing traumas that could happen to 
anyone, rather than black women experiencing such traumas because they are black women’ 
(Goddard 2015: 93). Certainly, many of tucker green’s plays have seemed to implode or disturb 
white presumptions and experiences. In stoning mary (2005), a catalogue of catastrophic 
situations, usually associated with black African experience, are played out with white actors. In 
this regard, alongside her intention to write for black audiences, she seems to be involved in 
provoking and confronting white privilege and presumption. But, I am suspicious of the term 
‘universal’, in both the often hegemonic resonances of the term (universal often being equated 
with the dominant) and the static conceptualisation it provides. I would rather suggest, tucker 
green veers between black and white concerns, shifting emphasis and perspective. Nor is this 
ability to veer between perspectives limited to race. In nut, tucker green situates questions of 
race against the identity politics of both gender and madness. In order to understand tucker 
green’s work, we must trace the lines and consequences of violence emerging from various 
supremacist structures. 
I am unaware of any subsequent productions of nut since its premiere. Regrettably, I was 
unable to watch nut live in the original performance. Rather, my analysis has been informed by 
the play text, a recording of the National Theatre production, examination of the stage design 
documents, various notes made through the rehearsal process, and various accounts by 
reviewers and bloggers as to the experience of watching the play, particularly in reference to 
the play’s use of smoke as metaphor and sensation. 
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Smoke and Light: Invisible Violence in nut 
Violence seeps through debbie tucker green’s nut. White-on-black violence, male-on-female 
violence, sane-on-mad violence. The violence is not of an overt, traumatic act; nut resists the 
inclusion of more easily identifiable traumas of her previous work, of domestic abuse in dirty 
butterfly (2003a), of sexual child abuse in born bad (2003b). Rather, nut is concerned with a 
violence that resists such easily identifiable traces. 
The traces of violence in nut seem to be seen in the trails of smoke across the stage. Smoke, 
and the practice of smoking, gets everywhere in nut. Characters lend one another cigarettes, 
berate each other for smoking, attempt to wave away the smell and foggy air. The cigarettes 
are shared, enjoyed together, act as a mechanism of connectivity. For the Ex-Wife and Ex-
Husband, sharing a cigarette is a brief return to marital intimacy, an oddly sexual encounter, 
‘she doesn’t hold the cigarette but takes a pull from his as he gently holds it temptingly for her’ 
(tucker green 2013: 51). The cigarette allows them to briefly touch one another, the butt of the 
cigarette transferred across their lips, a nicotine kiss-by-proxy. Yet cigarettes are also a source 
of destruction and damage. The ‘trick’ played across the play, of tipping ash upon the hand, 
become a stand-in for Elayne’s self-harm as she stubs out cigarettes on her arm. 
The smoke even begins to stain the palpable space of the stage, as countless cigarettes are lit 
and enjoyed. For Lulu Raczka, this obscuring of sight during the second act between the Ex-Wife 
and Ex-Husband was a visual metaphor, as ‘the smoke from the cigarettes visually blurs the 
scene, so that the messiness of their relationship seems to hang there, ignored’ (Raczka 2013: 
np). She was not the only critic to feel the significance of this obfuscation, as the writer for the 
Evening Standard noted that, ‘the sharing of cigarettes seems to forge deeper bonds than 
words can. It also serves as a reminder of death. Menace floats in the air yet wafts away amid 
the characters exaggerated, almost competitive puffs of smoke’ (Evening Standard 2013: np). 
The trailing metaphors seem to suggest a continual economy of connection and damage; 
characters seem only able to forge connections alongside a veneer of harm. The summation of 
these exchanges seems to leave a smog of violence in which the characters live. 
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Smoke is both there are not-there, perceptible and yet intangible. Emerging from a cigarette, it 
reflects a form of violence, sensed and observed, but not easily given articulation. Smoke 
invades space, obstructs our ability to see. In this, nut’s concern with smoking and smoke 
evokes a common concern with visibility and violence, about a violence that evades easy 
observation. The smoke of nut carries across the stage like the violence between characters. 
The violence of nut is rarely explicit; it does not revolve around a catastrophe or disaster. 
Rather, nut is concerned with a less overt violence, an invisible violence, that doesn’t reveal 
itself or emerge from the consolidated traumatic event. Violence drifts around and between 
characters like the cigarette smoke they frequently exhale. 
The nature of violence in nut is difficult, obscured. Aimee, both the imagination and friend of 
Elayne, never evidently expresses racial hate, or even regression to stereotype. Nor does Trey 
outwardly claim that Elayne’s supposed weakness stems from her womanhood. Yet, in Aimee’s 
continuous assertions of superiority, there emerges the portrait of a white woman 
psychologically abusing a black woman.  Aimee suggests that Elayne’s unpopularity would cause 
her funeral to be only attended by, ‘cupful of few friends’ (tucker green 2013: 7); she vaguely 
refers to ‘your kinda people’ (tucker green 2013: 17) in a derogative fashion, and notes that 
Elayne will probably die from suicide, encouraging her to do so: ‘pills or something mixed with 
something – that might work for you’ (tucker green 2013: 25). Whilst a vague malaise of 
violence emerges, on initial watching, these exchanges evade an easy slotting into explicit 
racism. Overt racist epithets are not used, nor a clear stereotype, and yet there is a violence 
occurring, that evades an easy articulation. 
These small exchanges could be simply understood as ‘microaggressions14,’ but this is to 
atomize a violence that is invidiously structural. Rather than simply focus upon the individual 
event, invisible violence also takes form in the lived experience of existing within a society 
designed to punish on the basis of race, gender, and madness. In order to attend to violence 
from the perspective of the persecuted, we must attend in a more complicated meaning-
                                                          
14 The term ‘microaggressions’ has been developed in the work of Derald Wing Sue (2010). For Sue, 
microaggressions are the ‘brief and commonplace verbal, behavioural or environmental indignities whether 
intentional or unintentional which communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative slights and insults to people from 
marginalized groups’ (Sue 2010: 5) 
125 
 
making process that situates the microaggression both in a social context and the lived 
experience of those persecuted. In this more nuanced apprehension, we can begin to draw the 
lines around such ‘invisible violence’, the unseen modes of persecution in everyday experience 
(and indeed, how its invisibility is a component of the violence itself). Bluntly, a new spatiality is 
necessary, through which to see this invisible violence. 
In nut, debbie tucker green opens up hallucination as a means to create this new spatiality. The 
initial response to the interactions between Elayne and Aimee is one of confusion, a vague 
sense of drifting violence, like the smoke in the air. Aimee prods and attacks Elayne 
psychologically, but the nature of the violence, and its effect, evades articulation. However, in 
reframing the scene from a realist aesthetic to that of the hallucinatory, tucker green clarifies 
and changes its significance; Aimee emerges as an embodiment of internalized white privilege, 
the totalizing effect of being non-white in a white supremacist society. bell hooks, framing it in 
Foucauldian terms, notes simply that, ‘power is inside as well as outside’ (hooks 1992: 116).  
Understood this way, we can perceive how nut’s use of a problematic logic of hallucination is 
imbibed in a deeply political consideration of visibility and invisibility. tucker green uses 
hallucination as a revelatory device, the previously obscured suddenly made clear. Far from 
‘divorced’ from reality, the hallucinations revealed are pregnant with political significance. 
These experiences, as the accumulated consequence of living as a black woman in a racist and 
sexist world, are not phantasms to dispense, they are palpable and real lived experience. 
Madness exists and manifests itself alongside other political structures of identity. 
Realism, the Ex-Wife, Gender and Madness 
This opening of space, to make invisible violence visible, is not confined to Elayne, but also in 
the experience of the Ex-Wife. In doing so, tucker green opens a commentary on different 
aesthetic modes, and their possibilities in depicting experience of violence. The second act 
almost acts as a critique and pastiche of realism. With character names such as Ex-Husband and 
Ex-Wife, the roles appear functionary; filling in for the appropriate tropes, it almost forms a 
parody of its genre. But the scene is not structured purely satirically; tucker green is not 
completely dismissing the possibility of realism. If the name Ex-Wife is perfunctory, and 
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suggests the tendency of a certain realist tradition to easily insert black characters into 
traditional character tropes, her development across the play beyond this functionary cliché 
encourages a more nuanced understanding. Rather than a complete denunciation of the genre, 
tucker green seems more interested in exposing its inadequacies in portraying the complexities 
of oppression.  
Much as with Elayne, in the exchanges between the Ex-Wife and Ex-Husband, the audience 
garner the sense of violence; though there is no physical abuse, the scene is exhausting to 
watch, as the two batter against each other psychologically. Perhaps more evidently than 
Elayne’s phantasms, he pokes and prods at the Ex-Wife’s insecurities, saying to her, ‘You was a 
shit wife … Now you showin your colours as a shit mother’ (tucker green 2013: 53). Addressing 
his daughter’s absence, and the Ex-Wife lack of knowledge as to where, he condemns her 
parenting skills, ‘What kinda parent is that – that on page two of your parenting books parta 
the chapter – ‘Don’t Give a Shit Where They Are?’ (tucker green 2013: 52).  Most insidiously, he 
suggests the daughter is happier in his company, that she prefers him as a parent, that she sings 
joyfully in his company. The beautiful singing of the daughter, that the Ex-Wife has never heard 
nor will hear, becomes a taunt: ‘She can sing the phone book and find a melody in it’ (tucker 
green 2013: 49). 
The image of the singing daughter follows through into the third act, as Elayne and the Ex-Wife 
meet and negotiate with the various psychological pressures inflicted upon them. As they talk 
of the husband, Elayne says to the Ex-Wife, ‘he can make you think things’ (tucker green 2013: 
71). Again, we return to invisible violence, to the secret interpellated abuses, but this time to 
the ‘sane’ woman. The audience are enticed to imagine her own phantasms and ghosts; it’s no 
coincidence that the third of Elayne’s hallucinatory figures is a singing child. I imagine Elayne’s 
own tormenting images, of her daughter singing, happier in the company of her father, the 
ghost forged through patriarchal, psychological abuse of her previous partner. And yet, the 
audience is not given unfettered access to this image; if I am encouraged to imagine and see 
similarities between Elayne’s hallucinations and the Ex-Wife’s persecutions, then I am deprived 
direct access. 
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Across both Elayne and the Ex-Wife, we see how the logic of hallucination is used as a platform 
to open up a new type of space, one that can reveal invisible violence. This is not, within itself, a 
radical apprehension of madness. To use madness simply as a ‘device’ without acknowledging 
its own politics, its own substantiality, would be to de-politicise it as functionary metaphor or 
tool. However, nut does not simply use madness as a metaphorical device to open up the 
politics of other identities. In the final exchange between the two sisters, alternating between 
mutual verbal abuse and affection, the madness of Elayne becomes the obstacle between 
herself and the Ex-Wife. The Ex-Wife patronizes and insults Elayne, says she is ‘a fucking 
liability’ (tucker green 2013: 68). She tries to silence Elayne, ‘no-one wants to know … bout your 
fuckin whatever-the-fuck goes on with you up there’ (tucker green 2013: 77). The Ex-Wife 
echoes the various phantasms, observing and mocking Elayne’s isolation and loneliness. 
Madness, to put it simply, is not only a mode of ‘seeing’ invisible violence, it is an object of 
violence, a cause of oppression and persecution. In this scene, madness is set alongside race 
and gender into the complicated economies of violence in identity politics. In nut, the 
regressive hallucinatory inner-outer logic is used in order to directly situate madness in a 
political context. 
Intersectionality and Space 
The economies of violence throughout nut follow the lay lines of intersectionality. 
Intersectionality, described succinctly by Patricia Hill Collins, ‘refers to particular forms of 
intersecting oppressions, for example, intersections of race and gender, or of sexuality and 
nation. Intersectional paradigms remind us that oppression cannot be reduced to one 
fundamental type, and that oppressions work together in producing injustice’ (Hill Collins 2000: 
18). Intersectional theory emerged from developments of black feminism in the 1980s and 
1990s, with key figures such as Crenshaw and hooks arguing that approaches to identity had to 
be multivalent, or risked falling into alternative structures of dominance. Crenshaw suggests 
that, in both legal and intellectual terms, to focus on a single axis of identity has led to an 
‘erasure’ of certain identities. For Crenshaw, ‘this single-axis framework erases Black women in 
the conceptualization, identification and remediation of race and sex discrimination by limiting 
inquiry to the experience of otherwise-privilege members of the group’ (Crenshaw 1989: 140).  
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This continues, for example, in my own positioning to this work. I am white, male, middle-class. 
My social privilege is not simply the cumulative effect of these various identities, but how they 
interact and meld into one another. bell hooks eloquently describes the predicament of cultural 
studies: 
I am continually distressed by the willingness of one group to repudiate domination in 
one form while supporting it in another – white men who take sexism seriously but are 
not concerned with racism or vice versa, black men who are concerned with ending 
racism but do not wish to challenge sexism; white women who want to challenge sexism 
but cling to racism, black women who want to challenge racism and sexism but claim 
class hierarchy (hooks 1994: 6) 
If this is a difficulty for theatre, it is likewise a difficulty for intellectual frameworks. 
Throughout her work, tucker green has continually examined concepts of race and gender 
alongside one another, and how various forms of abuse play along these lines. In nut, she 
complicates this further, examining the sprawl of madness, and how it plays against these other 
identities. To grapple with how nut situates madness is to grapple with tucker green’s 
apprehension of intersectionality. Elayne experiences hallucinations, she has prescribed 
medication; but her hallucination, her experience of madness, occurs along the lines of her 
experience as a black woman, of internalized white and male privilege. 
In nut, intersectionality becomes bound up with the possibility of solidarity, and its subsequent 
failure. The possibility of forming alliances in nut against this economy of violence seems to be 
continually frustrated. Amongst this ubiquity of invisible violence in nut is the suggestion that 
identity will always be an instigator of difference rather than communality. Aimee and Elayne 
share the same gender, but Aimee emerges as an embodiment of white privilege. The Ex-Wife 
and Ex-Husband share the same race, but find themselves adopting and resisting lines of 
regressive patriarchal structures. In many ways, this adoption of difference over solidarity 
becomes the chief focus of the play, it draws out the similarities of Elayne and the Ex-Wife, 
literal sisters, nevertheless divided by Elayne’s madness. The play seems to adopt a pessimistic 
view of intersectionality. That, regardless of potential solidarity, there is always something to 
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divide: women divided by whiteness, those of the same race divided by gender – and finally, 
two black women, divided by the barrier of madness. 
Understanding intersectionality gives us another possible configuration of invisible violence. 
Intersectionality claims that the critical frameworks that we deploy, by regarding identity as 
occurring on a single axis, often ignore and fail to account for certain identities (such as black 
women). We fail to see violence, it remains invisible, because our critical frameworks fail to 
account for the multiplicity of identity. Intersectionality, seen statically, can almost seem an 
impossible (though always to be pursued) ideal. There is always another identity, another 
complexity, another specificity we’ve failed to account for adequately. For this reason, rather 
than succumb to a fatalistic intellectualism, it is desirable to imagine intersectionality as 
dynamic, as process. 
The difficulties of intersectionality can be understood through spatial lines. Intersectionality 
aims to flow between different spaces of identity, to break apart cordoned-off barriers of 
identity. Kyoo Lee imagines intersectionality as ‘interstitial,’ conceives Crenshaw’s project as a 
geographical project, an attempt to create, ‘a cartography of the margin, not some general or 
universal or generic map’ (Lee 2012: 469). Identities are not stable, they cannot be held and 
contained, and the task of intersectionality is not to create a ‘fixed space’ with can account for 
these possibilities, to simply provide a definition for previously under-examined identities, but 
rather to be ‘a ninja of organic intellect’ (Lee 2012: 475). In other words, to always be open to 
new possibilities, configurations, and modes of identity. 
It is a new conception of space which tucker green creates in nut. If the hallucinatory logic 
opens a way of articulating the invisible violence behind microaggressions, it also demonstrates 
how this violence occurs upon an intersectional basis of identity. If nut is concerned with 
division, it is likewise concerned with the possibility of forming a communal resistance; the 
possibility of alliance against power seems a continual concern of tucker green’s work, as 
Marissia Fragkou notes of random, the play, ‘opens up the possibility of a provisional 
community, addressing a heterogeneous audience’ (Fragkou 2010: 80). Again, tucker green’s 
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challenge is, amongst the diversity of identities and differences which we all weave within and 
away from, how to form solidarities?  
New Spatialities of Madness: The Possibility of Solidarity 
In the final scene of nut, the sisters begin to unconsciously imitate each other’s oppressor, 
echoing lines and insults of the Ex-Husband and the hallucinatory persecutors. Elayne throws 
doubts on the Ex-Wife’s ability to be a good mother; she repeats the taunting image of the 
singing daughter. The Ex-Wife mocks Elayne for her lack of friends and isolation: ‘Who the fuck 
company you got? Who’s here? Who comes round here?’ (tucker green 2013: 63). As they 
bicker, disagree, rub against one another, they cannot connect without causing damage. Yet, 
Elayne sees the connections between the two of them, stating plainly, ‘You’re like me’ (tucker 
green 2013: 71). The Ex-Wife repeatedly rejects this; for the Ex-Wife, the psychosis of Elayne 
precludes any possible solidarity or identification. In the end, Elayne attempts to connect the 
only way she knows how, through sprinkling ash onto the hand of another. But the Ex-Wife 
refuses to engage, doesn’t put her hand out, as ‘Elayne gestures for Ex-Wife’s hand. Ex-Wife 
doesn’t respond and doesn’t touch her’ (tucker green 2013: 81). The ashes fall on the floor. The 
sisters have failed to connect. 
This failure to connect, to imagine a shared space occurs as the audience are invited to see a 
different spatiality, that strides across the ‘realist’ and ‘hallucinatory’, that can incorporate both 
the mad and the sane. The play renders visible the communalities between Elayne and the Ex-
Wife, how they are both persecuted (and attempt to resist) by structures of patriarchy and 
white supremacy. Yet, the inability to approach madness results in being the final barrier, as the 
Ex-Wife is unable to see or accept potential communalities with her sister. The space the two 
characters occupy is divided, fragmented; unlike the play, their experiences are partitioned 
from one another. Rather, they have to continue to exist in the haze of violence that haunts the 
play. 
In this, the complexity of tucker green’s attitude to madness is revealed. Hallucination in nut 
provides the audience with a new means to conceive the lived experience of invisible violence, 
and the interrelations of race, gender and madness. Likewise, nut dramatizes how the exclusion 
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of madness breaks alliances, limits understandings of identity. If the play is a pessimistic 
examination about how the multiplicity of identity leads potential allies frequently becoming 
persecutors, the third act places madness, and the rejection of mad experience, as the final 
culmination of this. Moreover, that the rejection is double-edged, not only of mad persons, but 
of the new spaces made conceivable by incorporating mad experience. 
To what extent does nut perpetuate the political structures of hallucination, and to what extent 
does it resist the concomitant exoticisation and de-politicisation of mad experience? Compared 
to the architectures of hallucination in The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland and 
The Skriker, nut presents us with the most simplistic and regressive understanding of 
hallucination. It cleanly delineates hallucination from the real, and doesn’t seek to meaningfully 
disturb these boundaries. Yet, whilst nut relies upon a simplistic logic of hallucination, it uses 
this as a springboard to explore the political dimensions of mad experience and the place of 
madness within intersectional politics. It undermines the notion of ‘realism’ as an adequate 
mode through which to apprehend the complications of identity politics. In order to understand 
the complexities of political violence, we have to incorporate lived experience, understand how 
the accumulation of oppression results in a psychological violence. Hallucination becomes a 
device through which we can understand the complexities of the reality of political violence. 
This, by itself, could regard madness as metaphor, as a mode that fails to pay attention to the 
specific politics of madness itself. However, nut extends beyond this, incorporating madness 
into its complex web of intersectional politics. In Elayne and the Ex-Wife’s failure to form 
solidarity, I see how the politics of madness is subject to its own form of invisible violence. In 
this, madness sits alongside race and gender in a complicated economy of violence. In nut the 
logic of hallucination is used against itself, to create a new spatiality that reveals the 
complexities of invisible violence, how the intersectional politics of race, gender and madness 
are deeply enmeshed, and reveal the possibility of new connections. 
Conclusion 
As we reckon with ‘mad experience’, its visibility or invisibility, we find a complex interaction 
between engagement with and resistance against certain political structures. Suddenly the mad 
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person comes to the fore, steeping outside of the asylum. But, even as we attend to mad 
experience, we exoticize it, de-politicize it. The purpose of this chapter has been to imagine 
how new possibilities of imagining mad experience might be created, how to resist the 
hallucinatory logics that surround and bracket our understandings of mad experience, and in 
doing so, re-politicize our understandings of mad experience. Each of these plays engages with 
the troubled relationship between our constructions of madness and constructions of reality. 
These are all plays that open up the politics of the mindscape, of mad experience and 
hallucination. They play upon the thresholds of visibility. They variously participate and resist 
the spatial configurations of hallucination. All these plays tease out questions of space with 
regards to madness, and in doing so, disturb the neat boundaries through which we place 
madness. From this more troubled entanglement with madness, they re-integrate madness 
with the political. 
This entanglement with hallucination is not always radical or resistant. The plays cannot 
completely evade hallucinatory logics. To entangle with mad experience directly on stage is to 
entangle with the political constructs and cultural idioms that surround any aesthetic 
consideration of ‘mad experience’. The creators of The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western 
Lapland claim that the process of watching the play is directly analogous to experiencing 
auditory hallucination. The play is, in some sense, complicit in an essentializing of madness and 
acting as an exoticized ‘tasting’ of the mad experience. The Skriker, of all the plays, evades such 
essentialization, maintaining the relationship between its fantasy world and psychosis as 
fundamentally undecidable. Yet, such ambiguity can lead to a conceptual collapse of madness 
into metaphor or illustration, evidenced by the critical disregard to the play’s engagement with 
mad experience, sublimating it into the politics of globalization. In nut, the binary distinctions of 
inner and outer are maintained in its dramaturgy, by the end of the play, the audience are able 
to discern between the ‘hallucinatory’ and ‘real’ characters. Even if we accept hallucination as 
fundamentally ‘revealing’ a political reality, this still risks reducing madness into a tool or a 
device in service of other political identities. There is no stable ideal, between these two 
possibilities of madness is either essentialized or disregarded. 
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Yet, each of these plays puncture the political structures of hallucination, even as they find 
themselves enmeshed within them. With nut, its adoption of hallucinatory tropes act as a 
platform to proliferate question of visible and invisible violence, to the necessity of 
incorporating mad perspectives into any adequate understanding of the ‘reality’ of political 
violence. If The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland is structured to suggest 
equivalence between its unconventional staging and the experience of auditory hallucination, 
then its insistence upon the complexities of experience continually interrupts and obscures this 
possibility. In The Skriker, such ambiguity is necessary to avoid easy designations of the Skriker, 
allowing for a porous account of the relationship between globalization and madness. As I parse 
out the plays’ reductive structuring of hallucination against their more resistant aspects, no 
‘perfect’ image, or preferable dramaturgy emerges. Their modes of resistance are wholly 
entangled with their more troubling architectures of mad experience.  
In all these cases, these plays have exploited the internal spatial politics of genre to supplement 
and inform their own. The Family Drama, the ever-heightening stakes with an understanding of 
madness as simply the psychological manifestation of familial dysfunction, is confronted and 
denied. The fairytale’s internal spatial logic, of a home and a far, far away, is opened in parallel 
to the relationship between the material and psychological. The urban, council estate, Black 
British drama, with its gritty exposure of material violence, is presented to demonstrate its 
political inadequacy, to frame the necessity of mad perspectives. All these genres have troubled 
relationships with madness and mental distress. In parallel with the plays’ general engagement 
with hallucination, the adoption of a ‘restrictive’ or ‘regressive’ modes facilitate a more radical 
agenda. 
In doing so, they reveal how mad experience occurs alongside a variety of political concerns. 
The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland re-integrates madness and structures of 
family, our meaning-making always teasing out their relationship. The Skriker contracts and 
expands space-time to chart the relationship between madness and globalisation. Whilst nut 
offers madness not only as another consideration to the fabric of intersectionality, but a mode 
through which to reconsider the economies of violence and identity. In all these cases, madness 
exists alongside and through these political concerns. These wide socio-political concerns 
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influence, bracket, and frame the lived experience of madness. But likewise, the consideration 
of madness radically reframes these political constructions, and (without naïve or romantic 
utopian expectations) offers new ways of seeing. 
It is the re-integration of the political into our consideration of mad experience that these plays 
chiefly offer. If hallucination divides between mad experience and reality, in these plays, the 
private space of madness is, to some extent, burst. Whilst not perfect examples of resistance, 
these plays offer a radical new direction in our spatial configurations of madness. And in doing 
so, these plays begin to shift towards a creation of new idioms, new architectures, and new 
spatial logics. Space is that through which we think, it acts as a core mechanism through which 
hegemony is perpetuated and resistance is possible. These plays offer a radical imagination. 
Through an interrogation of space, through a playfulness in its construction, these plays begin 
to conceive of new ways of thinking and seeing madness. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
OTHER LIVES AND RADICAL PERSPECTIVES: WITNESSING THE SUICIDE, 
WITNESSING THE MAD 
As with hallucination, the suicide has become a core aspect of our construction of madness. 
Perhaps less evident, nevertheless, suicide is understood as an act of madness. With few 
exceptions, society tends to read suicide in psychopathological terms. Suicide is deemed tragic, 
as unnecessary, thereby irrational, subsumed in madness. The increasingly suggested position is 
that typified by Kay Redfield Jamison, that, ‘the most common element in suicide is 
psychopathology, or mental illness’ (Jamison 1999: 100), and that certain mental illnesses, ‘are 
particularly and powerfully bound to self-inflicted death’ (Jamison 1999: 100). One cannot talk 
about the mystery of suicide without echoes of our understandings of madness. 
Our conceptions of suicide have not always been aligned with madness. Greco-Roman 
conceptions of suicide were profoundly different, less bound up with a focus upon 
‘individuality’ and the ‘self’, rather prioritizing position within a community. Timothy Hill, 
defying pathological interpretations, insists that, ‘the Roman self that emerges from Latin 
writings on suicide is in the final analysis purely socially defined’ (Hill 2004: 16). The term ‘self-
murder’ emerged in the late-sixteenth century, reflective of criminal and theological rather 
than medical concerns. Critical approaches across this time reflect a theological and moral 
defence of the individual, voluntary act of suicide. John Donne in his treatise Biathanatos (1981) 
and David Hume’s Of Suicide (1998) follow this model, interrogating the suicide as an individual, 
potentially justifiable act. 
The term ‘suicide,’ emerges in the mid-seventeenth century, reflecting an increasing 
secularization of the concept. Voluntary self-murder shifts into the involuntary structures of 
madness, Rab Housten notes, ‘in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century nearly all suicides 
were found felo de se; after about 1750 nearly all were non compos mentis’ (Housten 2009: 
91). Andreas Bahr reflects, ‘the invention of “suicide” mirrored less stringent prosecution of 
self-killing … the concept of “suicide” reflects a gradual and complex historical process of 
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pathologizing and decriminalizing the act of taking one’s own life’ (Bahr 2013: 620-1). In this, 
whilst the process is necessarily complicated and non-linear, the voluntary act of self-murder is 
slowly replaced by the involuntary compulsion of suicide. As this shift is made manifest, the 
power structures of madness and suicide become firmly enmeshed, the pathologization of 
suicide made possible through this entanglement. Ian Marsh notes that Jean-Etienne Esquirol, 
student of Phillipe Pinel, establishes the pathologized logic of suicide, ‘that as suicide was 
madness and madness was medical, it followed that suicide was medical’ (Marsh 2010: 115). 
Through this period, our narratives and conceptualisations of madness and suicide become 
compounded. Accounts of contemporary suicide are now almost exclusively phrased in 
psychiatric terms. In Marsh’s terms, suicidal acts, ‘are now, for the most part, understood and 
explained by reference to psychopathology and mental illness’ (Marsh 2010: 27). Suicide is 
deemed tragic by its irrationality, subsumed in madness. Likewise, our understandings of 
madness are often buoyed and informed by a fear of suicide. Following Marsh, the 
‘redescription of suicide also changed, in part, what it was to be mad’ (Marsh 2010: 132). The 
state penalizes the mad person, forcibly detains them under the 1983 Mental Health Act 1983 
or the Irish Mental Health Act 2001, upon the basis that they are of immediate harm to self or 
others. The violence of suicide has become justification for the violence of the state. 
By imposing the biomedical model, we limit our interpretative possibilities. Marsh notes how 
the biomedical model results in the, ‘marginalization of other meanings of self-accomplished 
death – an act of protest or resistance, of self-determination, choice or will, an event of moral, 
criminal or political concern, even as subject of philosophical debate’ (Marsh 2010: 4). Marsh 
himself advocates a Foucauldian genealogy as a mode of resistance. Without rejecting that 
mode, and fully supporting the possibility of a practical critique of suicide, I want to explore 
alternative possibilities and methodologies that performance can offer to resistance. To this 
end, I want to explore two broad alternative strands by which to apprehend suicide – the socio-
political and ethico-individualistic voluntarism - both in terms of how they offer productive 
alternatives to the psycho-pathological, and also some of the further problems they bring. 
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Suicidology: Durkheim, Sociology and Politicized Accounts 
Bio-medical models, whilst imagining the suicide a passive victim, locate the cause of suicide in 
the brain, a disease to be cured. In contrast, various sociological and political models have 
imagined the suicide as a victim emerging from various sociological and political frameworks. 
The pioneering figure of this practice is Émile Durkheim, who uses suicide as a platform by 
which to create modern sociology. In Suicide (2002), by means of the increasing accumulation 
and gathering of statistical and numerical data, Durkheim performs a quantitative analysis, 
forming a topography of suicide into four different ‘types’ of suicide. For Durkheim, ‘social 
forces, conductive to low or high social integration, produced distinctive types of suicide that he 
arranged in pairs: anomic and egoistic; altruistic and fatalistic’ (Wright and Weaver 2009: 5). 
Under this argument, though suicide cannot be eliminated, it can be reduced by attending to 
social cohesion. Durkheim shifts from the amoral de-political bio-medical model, into one that 
positions society as cause, and thereby responsible. It pushes the possibility (and moral 
necessity) of a political response. By drawing attention to suicide as sociological phenomenon, 
we can begin to imagine our own political responsibilities to the phenomena. Namely, the way 
we form society, the way we participate within it, can lead to suicidal behaviour.  
Whilst this socio-political perspective provides us with a framework to reinstate our 
responsibility to the suicide, it also provides certain problems. It risks reducing suicide as a 
mere illustration for social fracturing. Beyond this, Durkheim uses the troubling silence of 
suicide from which to establish a new discipline. Laird notes, ‘the rhetorical energy in 
Durkheim’s study is directed not at explaining suicide but carving out sociology as an 
autonomous new field’ (Laird 2011: 529). Durkheim is less concerned with listening to the 
suicide itself, than forging a new discipline in the space of its silence. Moreover, in the use of 
numerical data to draw larger patterns, Durkheim risks failing to attend to the catastrophic 
individual event of suicide. 
There have been various critiques of Durkheim’s approach within sociology. Jack Douglas (2015) 
suggests an interpretivist approach, emerging from Durkheim’s failure to consider how the 
suicides themselves interpret the event. To do this, Douglas performs a qualitative approach, 
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interweaving the substance of suicide notes, family members, diaries, interviews with 
unsuccessful attempts into his analysis. Yet, from this he extrapolates his own topography, 
using the silence of suicide as an object for sociological illustration. Again, the emphasis is upon 
an attempt to explain suicide, and use this explanation as a platform for sociological analysis. 
Naturally, sociology’s relationship with suicide is wide and extensive, and a fully comprehensive 
analysis would be the work of a thesis, rather than a section of an introduction. Rather, I want 
to observe how certain sociological models of suicide, in following either quantitative or 
qualitative analysis, succeed in politicising suicide, at framing it in a wider sphere, but in doing 
so, risk speaking upon suicide, attempting to explain it away, or even systematize it. In the 
attempt to create categories of suicide, it can reduce the individualization and heterogeneity of 
suicide. 
Ethical Relations to the Individual Suicide Event 
Works such as Jean Amery’s On Suicide (1999) and Simon Critchley’s Notes on Suicide (2015) 
approach suicide differently, offering a differing mode of attacking the psychopathologized. 
These, in part, return to the more moral, individualistic works of Donne and Hume, but for a 
secular attitude. Rather than attempt to construct a different cause of victimhood, these works 
question the attribution of victimhood itself. Namely, through a more individualistic, ethical 
mode of enquiry, a re-establishment of suicide as choice, as a voluntary death. Why shouldn’t 
someone choose to commit suicide? For Amery, the aim must be, ‘rehabilitating voluntary 
death as an act as natural or as unnatural as every other kind of death’ (Amery 1999: 52). 
Rather than a political structuration of the suicide act, this is an ethical re-framing of how we 
regard the suicide itself.  
Amery and Critchley reject the attempt to reduce suicide into the political. Amery in particular 
attacks the attempt of suicidology to impress itself upon the individual suicide, suggesting that, 
‘whenever suicide is observed as objective fact, as when scientists observe galaxies and 
elemental particles, observers become distant from voluntary death’ (Amery 1999: 3). For 
Amery, the crucial point is the inaccessibility of the suicide as an experience; the lived situation, 
‘can never be communicated, so that every time someone dies by his or her own hand or even 
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just tries to die, a veil falls that no-one can lift again’ (Amery 1999: 8). The living can provide no 
testimony towards suicide. Those who have attempted and failed can provide us with nothing 
to resurrect the thrust of the leap: ‘a rescued suicide has returned again to the logic of life and 
speaks its language to the satisfaction of those who belong to it and society in general’ (Amery 
1999: 20) Meanwhile, suicide notes are gestures to the world they intend to abandon (or, 
indeed, destroy). They say nothing of the momentum of the suicide itself.  
Yet, how can we make this neat separation between the political and the suicidal? Amery’s 
suggestion that, ‘each human being essentially belongs to himself or herself – outside of the 
network of social engagements, outside of the network of a biological destiny and prejudgment 
that condemns one to life’ (Amery 1999: 99-100) is deeply uncomfortable, a position that 
removes itself from any communal concerns. Moreover, this de-politicization is itself a form of 
‘imprinting’ upon the act of suicide, a form of essentialism. Why can’t suicide be, itself, an act of 
political rebellion? By positing his own Sartrean declarations of radical individual freedom, 
Amery disqualifies other possibilities. 
In order to maintain this argument, to maintain this sundering of the individual lived experience 
of the suicide from the political, both Amery and Critchley both find themselves, despite 
themselves, in phenomenological and even psychoanalytical postulations upon suicide. Amery 
makes the claim that, ‘suicides are frightened of the nothingness that they want to take to 
themselves’ (Amery 1999: 48). These dubious essentialisms are in conflict with proclamations of 
the impossibility of understanding or interpreting the suicide. 
To square this circle, they invoke their own history or current experience of suicidal ideation in 
order to legitimize their position, despite their suggestion that the previously suicidal can no 
longer speak for the suicide. Amery draws upon his own history of suicidal behaviour to justify 
his wider proclamations on the suicide. Meanwhile, Critchley plays upon the possibility of his 
own potential suicide; opening with the proclamation ‘This book is not a suicide note’ (Critchley 
2015: 11), he later disowns the statement, notes his recent struggles with suicidal thought, then 
notes, ‘of course, to say this is to confess that the first sentence of this book is perhaps not to 
be trusted’ (Critchley 2015: 16). Even as they have observed that the living, the survivors of the 
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attempt, cannot speak for the suicide, they do it anyway. Their claims necessitate recourse into 
faulty autobiographies that they themselves have already discredited. Despite the claims of the 
incommensurability of suicide, these works nevertheless inflict their own form of 
epistemological violence. Namely, these modes of thought, obsessed with individualized lived 
experience, to the point of its utter de-politicization, try to speak upon the silence of suicide. 
The Possibility of Witnessing 
Each of these different modes of addressing suicide raises different questions of the suicide 
itself. We can use them to parse the different significations of suicide, and the silence involved 
with it. From the socio-political, the suicide is victim, unable to speak or reply, led to suicide by 
the surrounding socio-political environment. Yet, the suicide is also a self-imposed suicide, a 
deliberate withdrawal. The suicide silences themselves, a self-created silence. So, our 
understandings of suicide can shift between the imposed and the wilful. Whilst these models 
can be helpful in moving beyond a pathological model, there is also a danger of totalizations. 
There is, as I have noted, a tendency of these varying critical approaches and epistemologies to 
over-claim, to subsume suicide within their respective framework. Rather than simply provide a 
partial, possible account, they are drawn towards an explanation for suicide. Yet, suicide 
exceeds any stable narrative thrust upon it. 
The temptation to explain suicide is a violent one, to fail to respect and account for the 
incommensurability of suicide. I am suspicious of the search for an alternative totalising 
explanation for suicide. Suicide is elusive; it evades simple causalities. Wherever you look, 
suicide is elsewhere; and yet, we cannot ignore the suicide. Suicide compels us to look, even as 
it rejects our gaze. It is this complication of the gaze, what it means to look, that concerns this 
chapter. Whilst I could attempt to imagine a fragmentary perspective that incorporates its own 
fallibilities, or a pluralistic model that anticipates multiplicities, I am concerned more with a 
refutation of explanation itself. I want to self-reflect upon the act of explanation itself, what it 
means to explain or respond to suicide. I want to look at our looking; in other words, I want to 
understand how to witness. 
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To witness, far from a speech-act communicating knowledge, is not about such transfer of 
information. Witnessing incorporates the impossibility of adequate expression from the 
addressor, and comprehension by the addressee. Jacques Derrida (2000a) notes that the very 
premise of ‘bearing witness’ is the impossibility of proof. If proof were available, no testimony 
would be necessary. In other words, embedded in the act of testifying is the notion that what is 
being testified to is impossible to verify. Lyotard suggests to bear witness to something is not to 
claim to represent or signify something. Rather, it is to attest to the impossibility of expression, 
‘to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what can presently be phrased’ (Lyotard 
1988: 13). To witness is to say: ‘I cannot say what I saw’, or ‘I cannot understand what you 
experienced’. In the absence of adequate expression, this becomes a radical act. 
Yet, we should not conflate witness with simply looking, nor as passive resignation. And whilst 
some have persuasively argued that looking can be potentially a radical act, as can listening, I 
am less interested in witnessing as sentiment than witnessing as an act. When we use the word 
witness, in the context of Derrida and Lyotard, they are frequently using the term ‘temoignage’. 
But temoignage does not simply mean ‘to see,’ but rather to testify, or to bear witness. I want 
to consider witnessing not simply as a type of sight, indeed want to suggest it can move beyond 
sight, but rather a very particular form of politico-ethical engagement, tied up in understanding 
the complexities of positionality, acknowledging the limits (even impossibility) of 
comprehension, but accepting the necessity of engagement. 
Much critical literature refers to witnessing as a singular concept, as bound up in one particular 
act. Yet. what is meant by witness, and what form of witnessing occurs, is not singular. In his 
analysis of Paul Celan’s poem Aschenglorie, Derrida (2000a) noted the semantic and 
etymological confusion of the verb ‘to witness’ within and between different languages. 
Likewise, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub (1992) distinguished between three different orders 
of witnessing. Through this confusion, the multivalence of witnessing, and its regard for 
madness and suicide, becomes clearer. 
The first level describes testifying to one’s own experience, ‘the level of being a witness to 
oneself within the experience’ (Felman and Laub 1992: 75). In the act of testimony, we account 
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for our own lived experience, and thereby bear witness to ourselves. For Derrida, the authority 
of testimony emerges from phenomenological experience, from the specific and privileged 
position whereby only the witness can ‘know what he has seen, lived, felt’ (Derrida 2000a: 199). 
Derrida claims that, ‘a testimony is always autobiographical: it tells, in the first person, the 
shareable and unshareable secret of what happened to me’ (Derrida 2000b: 43). 
Laub’s second level of witnessing refers to, ‘the level of being a witness to the testimonies of 
others’ (Felman and Laub 1992: 75). An act of testimony cannot exist in isolation. It is necessary 
to have both an ‘addressor’ and an ‘addressee’. In other words, it is necessary for there to be 
someone to ‘witness the witness’. The role of this witness is not to incorporate the ‘lived 
experience’ of the testimony of the original witness, rather it is to concede to the impossibility 
of transference. The witness of testimony, the witness of the witness, as Derrida states, ‘does 
not see for himself what the first witness has seen; the addressee has not seen it and will never 
see it.’ (Derrida 2000a: 189) 
Derrida also observes a third notion of witnessing; he claims that Aschenglorie manages to 
witness the process of witnessing itself, that is, the process of witnessing. Laub similarly notes 
the third level of witness as ‘being a witness to the process of witnessing itself.’ (Felman and 
Laub 1992: 75) Derrida focuses on Celan’s phrase, ‘no one bears witness for the witness’. 
Derrida suggests this marks a focus on the limitation (arguably, the impossibility) of witnessing. 
It is an act of communication premised on the failure of communication. For Derrida, it is this 
examination of ‘extremes’ that qualifies Celan’s poem as an act of meta-witnessing. 
Rather than pose these different levels as stable positions, to be allotted or discerned critically, 
I want to suggest they are all interacting and concomitant parts of any act of witnessing. All 
witnessing involves the declaration and positioning of testimony, the involvement of an 
external addressee, the interrogation and upheaval of witnessing even as it occurs. These 
positions shift and change. Through these reflections of gazes, we can begin to respond, 
without explaining, rather, look back upon our looking. 
These theories of witnessing have elaborated a model of ethical and political engagement that 
actively avoids explanatory models. If the intellectual legacy of what it means to witness is rich 
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in development, as something that necessarily exceeds traditional modes of semiotics, then 
there are two limitations to the majority of work that conceives upon what it means to witness. 
Firstly, many of the theoretical formulations of ‘witnessing’ are constructed around oral or 
written testimony; the theatrical, with its emphases upon presence and the spectacle, offers 
particular difficulties and potentialities in any consideration of witnessing.  Secondly, much of 
the scholarship surrounding witnessing emerges from Holocaust studies. Felman and Laub 
established their 'crises of witnessing' as they embarked on one of the most extensive oral 
histories of Holocaust survivors. Derrida unpicks this possibility or impossibility of witnessing 
through Paul Celan, the irony and necessity of speaking of the Shoah in German, the language 
of the guards. Lyotard’s declaration of the necessity of witnessing, as a mode of resisting the 
Differend, emerges from a passionate philosophical rejection of Holocaust denial. But suicide 
contains different complications and questions for what it means to witness. The structures and 
complications of madness, of agency, and of culpability, come to the fore. 
Witnessing and Performance 
In terms of the performative, there has been a surge in recent scholarship concerning 
witnessing in performance. Certain critical approaches pose witnessing as an interruption of the 
‘traditional’ mode or understanding of theatrical spectatorship. Thereby, politico-ethical 
engagement in theatre is imagined as a mechanical shift of the audience’s perception, from 
passive ‘spectator’ to actively engaged ‘witness’. Hans-Thies Lehmann, suggesting an aesthetic 
of response-ability, suggests that particular modes that emphasize the, ‘mutual implication of 
actors and spectators in the theatrical production of images’ (Lehmann 2006: 186), can elicit an 
ethico-political response. These forms of argument have tended to emphasize the ethical 
potential of aesthetically innovative and formally experimental work; the transformation takes 
form through an interrogation and deconstruction of the axioms of spectatorship. In Nicholas 
Ridout’s terms, these are works that render, ‘the audience actively aware of their own 
participation in the event rather than a passive recipient of media saturation’ (Ridout 2009: 58). 
Spectatorship of the audience, in this sense, must be mechanically and fundamentally shifted. 
144 
 
This position, that equates audience participation with politico-ethical engagement, quickly 
proves problematic. Most famously, Jacques Rancière has outlined the patronizing assumptions 
in understanding the spectator as passive, requiring a theatrical production to ‘wake them up’. 
In The Emancipated Spectator, Rancière pushes for a more active and democratic anticipation 
of spectatorship, that, ‘emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition between 
viewing and acting’ (Rancière 2009: 8). In this, he shifts away from the suggestion that the 
spectator is one who has to be ‘educated’ by the theatrical production. Anna Harpin (2011) 
elaborates further on this, on how even the assumed mechanical passivity of the audience 
member can be pregnant with ethical and political questioning. Indeed, the traditional passivity 
of the audience, in the face of action that otherwise would have elicited immediate response, 
leads to a more layered consideration of what it means to ‘respond’. 
If we dispose of the notion of ‘mechanical’ interaction as somehow more interactive, this 
challenges our ability to discern ‘witnessing’. Whilst we may disturb any clear distinction 
between spectatorship and witnessing, or hierarchical understandings of passive and active 
looking, does it follow that all spectatorship engages in the ethical and political wrestling of 
witnessing? Rancière seems to suggest all attempts to discern differing values of spectatorship 
is fraught with anti-democratic sentiment, that all lead to a vilification of the spectator; he 
critiques both Artaud and Bertolt Brecht’s attempts to manipulate and alter spectatorship, that 
they themselves fall into this dichotomy of the passive and active, ‘they have claimed to 
transform theatre on the basis of a diagnosis that led to its abolition’ (Rancière 2009: 5). But, 
any notion of witnessing requires some aspect of discernment, of the political and ethical 
frameworks of looking; Rancière’s democratic principles leave little space with which to critique 
our modes of looking. This frames the difficulty of understanding theatrical witnessing: how to 
frame witnessing as distinct, without recourse to problematic dichotomies of passivity and 
activity. 
If witnessing is understood as ongoing (and never completed) process, rather than state, or 
transformation, or event, between the various levels of witnessing (testimony, witnessing, 
meta-witnessing), we can evade some of the more simplistic dichotomies of spectatorship and 
sight. Pursuing this further, I want to shift away from the concentration of the audience or 
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‘spectator’ as the object of analysis. With overly stable categories of witnessing, there is a risk 
of falling into patronizing notions of ‘educating’ the audience. I want to suggest that witnessing 
in performance is not simply something to be cultivated in the audience, or isolated, but rather 
a series of ongoing processes within the production itself. We can understand the production 
itself as incorporating and wrestling with these differing aspects of witnessing, creating its own 
testimony, bearing witness to its testimony, reflecting on its own processes. Rather than see 
the performance as engaged in a confrontational dialectic with the audience, I want to 
understand the audience as potentially enveloped in these various processes. The audience, 
rather than an external force to be positioned or altered, becomes incorporated within the 
various negotiations. 
Witnessing and Suicide in Performance 
Suicide offers particular challenges to how we understand what it means to witness. Witnessing 
the Holocaust gave us a particular vocabulary, of victim, perpetrator and bystander, as 
famously categorized in Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah. Even the particular complications of this, of 
Sonderkommando forced into complicity, of the Musselmann who is incapable of bearing 
witness, fall in the background of Nazi persecution. In suicide, these barriers become far more 
confused and perilous. The question of victimhood is fraught: is it internal decision or external 
compulsion, to what extent is the deliberate suicide to be framed as a tragedy, or one of 
political resistance. With suicide, the troubling structures of agency in madness come into play. 
As elaborated, using witnessing in terms of both performance and suicide offers new 
perspectives upon what it means to witness. But likewise, the interaction in witnessing 
between performance and suicide is further complicated. Suicide’s own relationship to 
performance is fraught. On the one level, suicide is a deeply performative act, a demonstration. 
Suicide is an extreme act, written upon the body. And yet, suicide is also a withdrawal from the 
world (even an elimination of it, from a phenomenological perspective). It is an elimination and 
erasure of the self, a rescinding from the social gaze. Suicide is both a deeply performative act, 
and one that evades performance. The plays of these chapters all, in some sense, grapple with 
this aporia. 
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Some thinkers have attempted to rupture the connection between madness and suicide, and 
thereby hold a mode of resistance. They wish to expose the historical contingency of the 
connection between the concepts, or reframe suicide as a potentially ‘rational’ act. I am not 
interested in such a separation. Such separations are often formulated on a faulty historicism 
that proclaims the separation of concepts as somehow more ‘natural’ than their conflation, or a 
naïve undesirable construction of madness. Rather than arbitrarily split these concepts for 
epistemological clarity, I want to re-imagine suicide as a constituent part of our construction of 
madness. Our relationship to suicide is a component of our response to madness.  
This is not to suggest suicide is not singular. Across these plays are reflected different 
apprehensions of it. How suicide is lived, as experience and as a process. How suicide exhibits 
itself in the midst of the leap, as precarious and undecidable. How suicide seals itself off in its 
completion, as an isolated, finished event. These plays, far from monolithic, examine the 
differing modes of what it means to witness suicide. Variously, these plays stretch from an 
interrogation of what it means to adequately intervene, to a reflection upon the violence (and 
incessant compulsion) of interpretation, to the strained complicated call of witnessing that 
flutters between desire to be acknowledged and wish to recede from our gaze. 
I want to look at how these plays witness madness through suicide. This will, in part, involve a 
complication of the representation of madness, but beyond this, will involve an interrogation of 
our interpretations and understandings of suicide, crossing over ethical and political lines. 
Moreover, I will interrogate how these plays respond to this complicated nexus of witnessing, 
posit their own particular ecologies and configurations, and look back upon their own looking. 
In all of these plays, it will involve to some extent their negotiation of the fictional in 
representations of suicide. I will question, not only the theatrical and metaphorical modes by 
which this may be possible, but examine how these plays incorporate the audience into these 
processes.  
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Victim, Perpetrator, Bystander: Seeing the Witness in 4.48 Psychosis 
‘Witness me’ (Kane 2001: 243): this imperative emerges in the final moments of Sarah Kane’s 
4.48 Psychosis. 4.48 Psychosis continually refers to issues of sight, of light and of looking. The 
main character of the work repeatedly implores for our regard. Yet, coupled with this, they 
seem to reject the gaze of the audience, of the stage. There is an injunction to look away; sight 
has become constraining and crippling. Between this appeal and rejection, the simultaneous 
construction and interrogation of witnessing takes place. 
Kane’s play, first produced in 2000, represents a watershed moment in depictions of mental 
health and madness. The subsequent two plays of this chapter, David Greig’s Fragile (2011) and 
Bush Moukarzel and Mark O’Halloran’s Lippy (2014), whether consciously or not, emerge in the 
wake of the rupture of 4.48 Psychosis. 4.48 Psychosis is a play that eschews traditional narrative 
description; influenced by Martin Crimp’s Attempts on Her Life (2007), the script has no clear 
direction or characters, rather taking the form of poetic fragments. The play appears to wander 
between internal monologue, duologues between patient and psychiatrist, entreaty to an 
imagined other, the recitation of psychiatric exercises and documentation. Sprawling across 
these fragments appears to be a voice, articulating its pain, its descent into the suicidal, 
culminating into a suicide imagined as an act of disappearance. 
Unlike the subsequent two works, whereby suicide is an external event, whether precarious or 
completed, 4.48 Psychosis attempts to engage directly within suicide and the suicidal as lived 
experience. In this sense, suicide is not object, or singular event, but rather experiential 
process. It is about the rise to the leap. And yet, 4.48 Psychosis avoids causational accounts, it 
positions the suicidal process, not to ask the why, but to interrogate the possibilities of 
response. If there is discussion of causation, it is in the refusal of easy explanations. The main 
character of 4.48 Psychosis repeatedly resists any Werther-like Romantic notion of suicide: 
claiming, ‘I do not wish to die’ (Kane 2001: 207) and ‘I have no desire for death. No suicide ever 
had’ (Kane 2001: 244). This seeming paradox appears throughout the play: ‘I have become so 
depressed by the fact of my mortality that I have decided to commit suicide’ (Kane 2001: 207). 
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This is a portrait of one who takes their own life but do not wish to die. Far from a romanticized 
embrace of suicide, 4.48 Psychosis examines how suicide occurs despite its undesirability.  
Understanding 4.48 Psychosis through the lens of witnessing is not necessarily new. Alicia Tycer 
(2008) interprets the play through a notion of melancholic witnessing. In a review of Christian 
Benedetti’s production, Lyn Gardner notes how the production is, ‘an exploration of ways of 
seeing’ (Gardner 2009: np). And yet, many of these productions frame witnessing alongside, or 
even under, other constructions. For Tycer, the psychoanalytic construction of melancholia 
props her notion of witnessing. These interpretations offer crucial developments in 
understanding 4.48 Psychosis, however they situate witnessing underneath other 
constructions. I want to look at witnessing from the perspective of witnessing itself. 
Haunting the analysis of this play is, inevitably, the circumstances of Kane’s own death. ‘How do 
you judge a 75-minute suicide note?’ (Billington 2000: np) asks Michael Billington, in his 
notorious response to Kane’s final play. The play had been written during a period of severe 
depression, Kane had committed suicide soon after its written completion; the first production 
was thereby posthumous. Billington would elaborate the remark, comparing her to Sylvia Plath, 
implying Kane belonged to a linage of suicidal female writers, ‘recording the act she is about to 
perform’ (Billington 2000: np). Likewise, some frame 4.48 Psychosis as a work that Kane had 
martyred herself to produce. Charles Spencer described it as a work of ‘artistic heroism’ 
(Spencer 2000: np), that it was a chronicle of Kane’s depression such that, ‘it is impossible not 
to view it as a personal howl of pain’ (Spencer 2000: np). In assent, Susannah Clapp describes 
the play as, ‘a declaration of suicide’ (Clapp 2000: np). This framing of the play as 
autobiographical extends beyond the original production. It is described by Charles Isherwood 
as being, ‘close as world literature has ever come to receiving a dispatch from a dead soul’ 
(Isherwood 2005: np) and Billington continues to insist that, ‘the play can hardly be divorced 
from the tragic circumstances surrounding her suicide in 1999’ (Billington 2008: np). 
What does it mean to dub something a suicide note? The suicide note reflects our desire to 
locate a clear meaning to suicide, to explain it away. Society attempts to contain the suicide by 
forming pathologies and ratiocinations. This tendency, to seek explanation rather than 
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engagement for the unknowable, extends beyond individual scraps of writing. Critics even turn 
entire lives into suicide notes, forge teleological biographies from their actions and their work. 
From an aesthetic point of view, denoting something as the suicide note sets work outside the 
daunting difficulties of the cultural and the aesthetic. Billington, in his review of the original 
production, would not allocate a star rating. Perhaps this was intended as a sign of respect, yet 
it also unavoidably denotes the play as ‘unreviewable’. To call something a suicide note is to 
take it outside the realm of aesthetic judgement. This often falls, unsurprisingly, upon gendered 
lines. In Billington’s review the reception follows a worrying tradition of forming a ‘genre’ of 
female writers who commit suicide. The critical reception of writers such as Virginia Woolf, 
Sylvia Plath, and Anne Sexton has sometimes focused on the mythology of their suicide to the 
detriment of the appreciation of their worth as writers. 
The irony is that 4.48 Psychosis is a play consummately concerned with how our gaze, the way 
we look, can be an unbearable violence. A play so consummately concerned with troubling the 
way we respond to suicide has been imprinted and contained as a suicide note. In a play that 
focuses upon the act of silencing upon those designated as mad, many critics have refused to 
listen.  This irony, however, should not be mistaken for a purposeful intention on the part of 
Kane. That would re-inscribe the work into a romantic incorporation of the suicide act as 
something built into the genus of the play. Rather, this analysis will attempt to elucidate the 
deft association of sight and damage across this play, and the potential to witness through a 
radical, contradictory means of looking. 
Kane’s play premiered in 2000, shortly following her suicide. Kane’s plays had often negotiated 
questions of suicide: both the Soldier and Ian commit suicide in Blasted, Phaedra kills herself in 
Phaedra’s Love, Robin hangs himself in Cleansed. But this represented a departure, in its 
examination of interiority, a self-reflexive act of looking at looking. Influenced by Martin 
Crimp’s Attempts on Her Life, in 4.48 Psychosis, Kane resisted many of the traditions of the 
dramatic text, drawing closer to an interior monologue. Whilst Kane’s play premiered in the 
same year as Joe Penhall’s Blue/Orange, they almost seem to remark from opposite positions; 
Penhall examines the gaze of the institution and its treatment of the mad, whilst Kane looks 
from the interiority of the mad person to their mistreatment under these institutions. 
150 
 
4.48 Psychosis has since become well established as part of the canon, attracting a variety of 
productions across the globe. If I am interested in its significance to the context of Britain and 
Ireland, it should nevertheless be noted that the significance of this play stretches outside these 
borders. Likewise, it should be noted the subsequent plays of this chapter will, inevitably, have 
been shaped it their apprehension of suicide by this play. My own experiences of the 
production have been limited to student productions, rather than any professional version. 
Thus, my own analysis of the production will primarily use upon the text of 4.48 Psychosis and 
draw upon photography and certain descriptions of various productions, with a focus upon the 
original production by James MacDonald at the Royal Court in 2000. 
Testimony: Sight and Light 
If 4.48 Psychosis is a work that returns to suicide as something lived as experience, what does it 
mean to testify to this effect? The main character repeatedly returns to light as an image to 
express herself, as a mode to explain her own acts of looking. If witnessing cannot be contained 
as simply sight, nevertheless metaphors of sight and looking can reflect back on the witnessing 
act. Typical imagery of depression depicts it as darkness or fog, or even the Miltonic imagery in 
William Styron’s Darkness Visible (2004). In a sharp inversion, Kane evokes suicidal depression 
as sharp gleams of penetrating light. Depression, far from a cloud, is an illumination of an 
unbearable reality:  
a consolidated consciousness resides in a darkened banqueting hall near the ceiling of a 
mind whose floor shifts as ten thousand cockroaches when a shaft of light enters as all 
thoughts unite in an instant of accord body no longer expellent as the cockroaches comprise 
a truth which no one ever utters (Kane 2001: 205) 
Light pervades the play, in gleams through her mind: ‘Hatch opens/ Stark Light/ and Nothing’ 
(Kane 2001: 239). The image of light, in its absolute white, has resonated across design 
decisions. Harpin notes how various productions of the play have been realized, ‘through 
shards of brilliant light, white boxes and the multiplying reflections of glass’ (Harpin 2014: 190). 
Throughout, these productions draw upon light, idealized white light and white space, and 
reflected gazes. 
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The use of light exceeds easy analogy. Light is not simply visual metaphor; it is the precondition 
of visual metaphor. The main character puts it in idealist terms: ‘Why am I stricken? / I saw 
visions of God’ (Kane 2001: 228). Light is the pre-condition of sight, as a result, it stretches 
beyond a metaphor. Derrida, in White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy (1974), 
notes how the heliotropic metaphor is always imperfect, acting as a metaphor of a metaphor. 
In using light, Kane’s metaphor will always fail; the use of light becomes the base of the failure 
to testify. The main character refers to light, as unbearable and utterly clear, but exceeding the 
everyday and the expressible. The light of suicidal depression is not a concrete metaphor with 
signifier, it is the process of sight itself. 
Kane weaves this concern with sight and light within many of the traditional constructions 
surrounding our understanding of witnessing. The classic trinity of witnessing, of victim, 
perpetrator and bystander dominates the play. Even the structure of the play tends towards 
this division; James MacDonald’s original production of 4.48 Psychosis was performed with 
three actors, according to David Greig, ‘representing the division of a person into 
victim/perpetrator/bystander’ (Greig 2001: xvii). Depression itself constitutes this old division, 
whereby, ‘Depression is anger. It’s what you did, who was there and who you’re blaming’ (Kane 
2001: 212).  
Within this, what is the position of the main character to this triad? Certainly, the character is a 
victim of this ‘light of depression’. It precludes her ability to speak. The light is not merely 
inexpressible, it damages the ability to speak, it infiltrates the person who sees. Illumination, far 
from liberation, damages the ability to testify: ‘I had a night in which everything was revealed 
to me. How can I speak again?’ (Kane 2001: 205). Accompanying this, is a dissolution of self. The 
main character, despite the revelation of the light, seems incapable of forming a formal self, ‘It 
is myself that I have never met, whose face is pasted on the underside of my mind’ (Kane 2001: 
245). Yet, the main character does not simply position herself as victim, rather she blames 
herself, she exists as perpetrator as well. As the doctor asks ‘And who are you blaming?’ she 
can only reply ‘Myself’ (Kane 2001: 212). Elsewhere, she frames her blame in more genocidal 
terms, ‘I gassed the Jews, I killed the Kurds, I bombed the Arabs’ (Kane 2001: 227). Likewise, the 
main character is a bystander to herself. She is dissociated from herself, stands as bystander to 
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her own roles as persecutor and victim. Mind and body have become utterly separated, and the 
main character can find herself as spectator to herself: ‘Here am I/ and there is my body/ 
dancing on glass’ (Kane 2001: 230). Again light and sight become image for the main character’s 
predicament, this time as reflection. In original production of 4.48 Psychosis at the Royal Court 
in 2000, directed by James MacDonald, a large mirror was positioned above the stage at a 45-
degree angle. This manipulated and extended the possibilities of the theatrical space, actors 
could lie down on their back and the audience could their faces clearly; reminiscent of a Busby 
Berkeley film, the bodies of the actors formed arrangements on the floor. In photos of the 
production, the actors appear on the mirror as if they were suspended in the air or floating, 
continuing Kane’s exploration of disembodiment. 
Across the piece the audience see the main character shifting between the positions of victim, 
perpetrator, and bystander. Kane uses light as a means to explore the complications of sight 
and image with regards to suicide as experience and process. Across these possibilities, images 
of light and sight are insidious and damaging. She is victim to the light, in rendering speech 
impossible, she is persecutor, as the light reveals her as culpable, she is bystander, as the light 
dissociates body from self. In this, light and sight are used to establish the impossibility of 
testimony, that to see is to be unable to exclaim or explain. 
Psychiatry and the Absence of the Witness 
If sight is shown to be internally damaging, capacitating the erasure of the individual, then 4.48 
Psychosis extends this to a critique of contemporary psychiatry and the damage present in the 
external gaze. In objection to some of the interpretations that shape 4.48 Psychosis as a 
personal cry of pain, or internal monologue, some critics have emphasized the play’s overtly 
social and political commentary. Graham Saunders claims that 4.48 Psychosis is, ‘only ever 
partly introspective in its treatment of mental illness. For the most part it is an impassioned 
critique of the hospitalization and treatment of those with mental illness’ (Saunders 2003: np). 
In this, Saunders perhaps is leaning too heavily on the divide between personal and political; in 
4.48 Psychosis, internal monologue is politically structured, the therapeutic sessions are warped 
by internal distress, the two have collapsed into one another. 
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If 4.48 Psychosis uses light as an inexpressible metaphor and metaphor of inexpressibility, then 
the language realm of psychiatry is attentive only to the destruction of metaphor. In a 
discussion, where the subject claims to have plans to ‘take an overdose, slash my wrists and 
then hang myself’ (Kane 2001: 210), the doctor responds by merely pointing out the logistical 
difficulties. Later in the conversation, when the subject claims that, ‘I feel like I’m eighty years 
old’ the doctor responds, ‘that’s a metaphor, not reality’ (Kane 2001: 201). When confronted 
with the notion that, ‘the defining feature of a metaphor is that it’s real’ (Kane 2001: 201) the 
doctor begins to question whether the subject is delusional. Throughout, the doctor 
consistently refuses to acknowledge metaphorical and poetic language, the means by which the 
subject attempts to express and account for the lived experience of depression, rather 
attempting to reduce it to the literal, to the language realm of the psychiatric. 
Both the bureaucracy and the language of the medical establishment is critiqued and mocked 
by Kane’s incisive gallows humour. The mental establishment is a faceless institution populated 
with, ‘Dr This and Dr That and Dr Whatsit’ (Kane 2001: 209). Kane evokes the trope of the 
delays and waiting periods in the NHS: ‘I dreamt I went to the doctor’s and she gave me eight 
minutes to live. I’d been sitting in the fucking waiting room half an hour’ (Kane 2001: 221). In 
one segment of the play, a list of medication and the main character’s varying reactions is 
spoken. The majority of the medication does not appear to help her, creating distressing side 
effects or exacerbating her condition15.  Eventually, when the subject consumes an overdose of 
aspirin and mixed with alcohol, the only comments of this suicide attempt are, ‘Severe stomach 
pain. No other reaction’ (Kane 2001: 225). Kane satirizes and parodies how the language of the 
medical establishment translates even suicide, a result of extreme mental distress, into 
biomedical terminology. 
The power of medical language is not only an external political force; it insidiously affects the 
internal state of the ‘I’. Kane references a variety of psychiatric tests throughout the work. 
Throughout the play, several sections are merely a selection of numbers darted around the 
                                                          
15 The exception to this is Melleril (the only anti-psychotic on the list) which is marked as ‘co-operative’ (Kane 
2001: 224). However, the insidious term ‘co-operative’ marks a greater concern with patient compliance than well-
being. 
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page. These sections are representative of a psychiatric test, whereby the patient counts down 
from a hundred in sevens. Each section progressively becomes more ordered, from a jumble of 
numbers scattered around with mistakes to a consecutive, ordered perfect line. This increase in 
‘sanity’ and success in the test nevertheless correlates with an increase in desperation and 
suicidal thought.  It is the language of the medical establishment which prevents her from 
understanding herself: ‘My life is caught in a web of reason/spun by a doctor to augment the 
sane’ (Kane 2001: 233). 
Again, the complications of sight, of seeing, relate back to the triad of victim, perpetrator and 
bystander. The consequences of the failure to witness are framed as more consequential than 
the absence or success of the look. To look in this way, is to affect the one who looks as well. 
‘Please don’t cut me up to find out how I died’ (Kane 2001: 241). In describing how she died, 
she states, ‘I’ll tell you how I died. One hundred Lofepramine, forty five Zopiclone, twenty five 
Temazepam, and twenty Melleril’ (Kane 2001: 241). In attempting to respond to the main 
character’s distress, through translation rather than witnessing, the psychiatric industry 
commits harm on to the subjectivity of the witness herself. Bystander becomes perpetrator. 
Finally, in a complication of this critique of psychiatry, the doctor is positioned as victim as well: 
‘Most of my clients want to kill me … I fucking hate this job and I need my friends to be sane’ 
(Kane 2001: 237).  
Alongside the internal damage of the main character through her own insight, through the 
portrayal of the medical establishment, the play demonstrates the damage that sight can inflict 
from an external force. Psychiatry attempts to bracket and control the main character. If 4.48 
Psychosis demonstrates how light and insight become acts of violence upon the self, it also 
frames how the contemporary psychiatry inflicts violence through the failure to see, the 
attempt to deny and contain all metaphor and experience. Again, across all these possibilities, 
sight and reflection become a form of violence, modes of sight become potential forms of 
violence. 
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The Theatre and the Audience, Possibilities of Sight and Witnessing 
Across these two different interrogations of sight, as the internal light of insight of the self and 
the external diagnostic gaze of psychiatry, the audience are given understandings of sight as 
damage, of violation. The illumination of depression, obscures the possibility of testimony, and 
actively damages itself. The sight of depression eradicates the self, disembodies the identity of 
the testifier. The perspectives of the psychiatric industry, their perspectives, are likewise 
damaging. Destruction of metaphor leads only to a disregard and diminution of experience on 
the part of the suicide. If sight is continually a source of damage, can it ever become a more 
productive mode? Can our understanding of witnessing through looking and through sight ever 
be productive, beyond a catalogue of the harm sight can inflict? 
We return to the stark, short imperatives at the end of 4.48 Psychosis: ‘Validate me/ Witness 
me/ See me/ Love me’ (Kane 2001: 243). This call seems to be to both the audience and the 
theatre itself. The audience and play are called upon to witness the main character of the piece. 
Testimony involves the direct appeal to the addressee to regard and watch them. 4.48 
Psychosis is constantly invoking and responding to this appeal. The shortest ‘segment’ of the 
play is merely the two words, ‘RSVP ASAP’ (Kane 2001: 214); these two short acronyms 
emphasize the notion of testimony as a desperate ‘message’ that, rather than passively 
consumed, demands an active response. 
Yet, the main character of 4.48 Psychosis also resists the gaze of the audience and the play. In a 
dialogue with an apparent doctor, the main character repeats the phrase ‘Look away from me,’ 
as she seeks to resist the medical gaze that subsumes her experience of mental distress into a 
biological phenomenon (Kane 2001: 227-228). The medical establishment fails in its ethical 
obligation to act as witnesses to the subject. However, later the phrase ‘Don’t look at me’ is 
repeated without the habitual dash that Kane uses to denote dialogue. The addressee of the 
phrase has changed into a wider appeal. It is not only the gaze of the medical establishment the 
subject wishes to avoid, but the gaze of the stage, of the mirror, of herself, and of the audience. 
The play catches the audience between two possibilities. On the one hand, the appeal to be 
looked at, in the desperation of being unable to articulate the knowledge of depression. On the 
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other hand, the evasion of the gaze as diagnostic, from the impositions of a psychiatric model. 
This contradictory movement, between a call to be looked at whilst resisting the gaze, is central 
to 4.48 Psychosis’s response to witnessing suicide as lived experience. In the final moments of 
the play, as the central character appears to commit suicide, the main character calls out to 
‘watch me vanish’ (Kane 2001: 244). In play-text, the words dissipate and spread out upon the 
page. To watch something vanish, to see something disappear, invokes a doubled motion, of an 
appeal to watch as an ethical engagement, against vanishing as a reticence and withdrawal 
from such a gaze. It is between these two positions, the appeal to be looked at, the 
renunciation of the gaze, that 4.48 Psychosis finds the productive potential for witnessing. 
Steve Earnest describes his experience of the mirror in the production, noting how the actors 
appear on the mirror as if they were suspended in the air or floating, and how the four 
horizontal gaps in the mirror created the impression of a prison. Most interestingly, he states 
that, ‘the production gradually trained the audience to watch the action in the mirrored 
surface’ (Earnest 2005: 300). In a play that returns to the different implications of what it 
means to look, this production trains the audience to look differently. Much as the text veers 
between the imperatives to watch and to avoid watching, the production simultaneously 
encourages the audience to watch through the mirror, whilst (by means of the gaps in the 
mirror) suggests the ‘gaze’ may be itself a form of prison. The stage, and the gaze upon it, is 
both liberation and imprisonment. 
In that final gesture, ‘please open the curtains’ (Kane 2001: 245), theatre itself has become the 
object as well as mode of investigation, a fully meta-theatrical sentiment. On the one hand, to 
open the curtains, is to start the theatrical, suggesting the main character is pleading for the 
theatrical, that in the wake of suicide, she seeks theatre as a site of witnessing. However, the 
line is also placed at the end of the play; the traditional convention, to close the curtains, seals 
the play off, a particular period of fictional representation that is then cut off. But, in the final 
gesture of opening the curtains, theatre doesn’t close down, but extends. In this sense, opening 
the curtains, is not merely to begin the theatrical, but to extend beyond it, to refuse the 
concrete limitations of theatrical space. It opens up theatre, stretches the theatre beyond its 
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original moorings, looks beyond the representational space. This curious final phrase, seems to 
both invoke theatre as a possible space of witnessing, and seek to move beyond it. 
James MacDonald’s original production contributed further to this notion, as the ending of the 
play was accompanied by the opening of the theatre’s shutters, letting in the noise and traffic 
surrounding the Royal Court permeate into the space. On the one hand, this is the notion that 
the theatrical can incorporate the external, letting the sounds invade the theatrical space. On 
the other hand, it is a gesture to the outside, to moving beyond the theatrical. Again, as with 
the pleading and rejection of sight, in 4.48 Psychosis, witnessing is made possible through a 
doubled movement, between embrace and dismissal. 
In 4.48 Psychosis, the different possibilities and politics of looking become apparent. Through 
looking, understanding the complexities of the look, we can appreciate the impossibility of 
testimony of the suicidal (as unbearable light), the harmful consequences of the violating 
diagnostic gaze, and the possibility of witnessing as response. Across the play, looking is 
frequently either painful or an infliction. In the complexities of sight and light, barriers between 
victim, perpetrator and bystander become blurred; the politics of suicide upsets the traditional 
triad that repeats itself in Holocaust studies. The main character is victim to the light, is made to 
feel perpetrator, as the source of the light, and, in her disembodiment, stands as bystander to 
herself. The psychiatric forces, ostensibly a bystander to the main character’s suffering, 
nevertheless in their failure to respond, insistence on transcribing metaphor into the literal, 
become perpetrator, whilst the doctor herself becomes a victim to the pressures of her job and 
position. Violence abides, positions shift with a glance, and damage proliferates. 
The potential of witnessing through looking, in such an evisceration of the violence of sight, 
may seem bleak. But it is precisely through the evisceration and critique of what it means to 
look that 4.48 Psychosis can gesture towards what it means to witness. The play invokes the 
necessity of witnessing, even as it demarks the dangers of looking. Witnessing, in 4.48 
Psychosis, takes on a radical form of sight, of both looking and not looking, of wavering 
between the two possibilities. Likewise, theatre itself is held up as a site of witnessing, but 
nevertheless the play seeks to stretch beyond the theatrical, into the wider world. The audience 
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are enmeshed within these processes, encouraged to look and not look, just as the stage is 
framed as both ideal site of witnessing and utterly inadequate. These seeming contradictions 
become the only mode through which to witness and engage with the aporia of suicide and 
sight. 
What’s My Motivation? The Implications of Engagement in David Greig’s Fragile 
If witnessing has frequently evoked questions of sight, it is by no means exclusively preoccupied 
with questions of light and image. Witnessing can also involve an interrogation of response, 
what it means to respond, and how we react to the mad person as suicide. In David Greig’s 
Fragile, suicide is placed within a debate concerning the consequences of Conservative 
economic policy and resulting dilapidation of psychiatric health services. Jack, a psychiatric 
user, is distraught that his local centre is going to be closed down. He goes to the house of 
Caroline, one of the workers at the centre and threatens to commit suicide by self-immolation. 
He compares his action to the Tunisian activist Mohammad Bouazizi, whose self-immolation 
contributed to the Tunisian revolution. Caroline attempts to talk him down, repeating his 
political slogans, trying to suggest that such an ‘extreme act’ is unnecessary for political change. 
The piece ends ambiguously, as Jack decides whether to set himself alight, or hand the lighter 
over to Caroline. 
Complicating this further is the mode by which Caroline’s character is represented in the 
performance. The play, ‘in the spirit of austerity’ (Greig 2011: 51), has only one actor, playing 
the character of Jack. The role of Caroline is, rather than embodied through an actor, played by 
the audience as a whole. The play begins with a request of the audience to play the part. This is 
not a request for the audience to speak in unison: ‘Some of you may not want to do everything 
on the slides. That’s fine. Some of you might not want to do anything. That’s also fine’ (Greig 
2011: 52). The role of the audience to speak the words of Caroline is a choice. The audience 
members are encouraged to speak from lines projected upon a screen. 
Fragile was produced in 2011 in Theatre Uncut alongside a series of other plays addressing the 
budget cuts of austerity. The original Theatre Uncut was a series of short plays addressing the 
budget cuts to theatre funding and general policy of austerity of the coalition government. 
159 
 
Since then, the company has produced a number of shows with new plays addressing topics 
such as the Scottish Referendum and the 2015 General Election. The explicit concern of Theatre 
Uncut, as written on their website, is ‘to raise debate and galvanize action’ (Theatre Uncut 
2012: np). In terms of this, Fragile runs the risk simply of ‘using’ suicide as an emotionally 
manipulative device to deplore Conservative economic policy. Questions of madness, in 
particular suicide, have often been deployed as a rhetorical or emotional device, without a 
serious interrogation of the politics of madness or suicide itself. However, Fragile incorporates 
these concerns and questions, and is not naïve about its own understanding of the political; it is 
a play concerned with what it means to politically protest, our responsibilities to communal 
protest, and troubles our relationship to the suicide in those circumstances. 
I want to look at how Fragile structures its engagement with suicide, how it resists a naively 
biomedical model, and how it places suicide in relation to its wider politics. But, beyond simply 
a practical critique of how suicide is placed, this will study how this converges and reforms into 
an examination of the politics and ethics of sight. I want understand the mechanisms by which 
Fragile looks at its own looking, ushers in the question of responsibility, and engages in an act 
of witnessing. I will look at how Fragile navigates the ethico-political axis when we engage with 
suicide. Also, I will examine how the role of the audience plays alongside the act of witnessing 
in Fragile. That is not to say that Fragile creates witnesses in a transformative effect, but rather 
the audience are enveloped within the play’s negotiations with suicide, response and 
responsibility.  
A close friend of Sarah Kane, David Greig has produced a substantial and wide-ranging body of 
work since the 1990s, he earns particular cultural relevance as one of Scotland’s most 
successful playwrights and directors, currently acting as the artistic director for the Lyceum 
Theatre in Edinburgh. If the breadth of Greig’s output defies identification of characteristic 
themes or occupations, nevertheless, Greig appears drawn to the politics of connection, 
specifically, the difficulty and possibility of meaningful communication across nation-states. 
Whether the railway station in Europe, the cornucopia of nationalities in The Cosmonauts Last 
Message to The Woman He Once Loved in the Soviet Union, or the staging of Western-Arab 
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interactions in Damascus, Greig appears drawn to the borders that forge cultural identities yet 
breed difference. 
In Fragile, responding to the specific national backdrop of austerity, his concern with 
connection seems drawn to that between the mad person and the carer. Writ more broadly, he 
seems concerned with the ethical logics of responsibility between those in positions of power 
of care (if undermined by the state and legislative powers) and the dispossessed. An attention 
to the vulnerable (whilst not depriving them of agency within the narrative) seems to govern 
this play and its response to madness and suicide. The analysis of the production emerges from 
the text, having neither seen the original production nor obtained a recording. 
Within The Leap, Precarity, Interaction 
Fragile confronts us with suicide at its most precarious: within the ‘leap’ itself. The other plays 
of this chapter are concerned with how we engage with suicide as known fact, documented 
statistic, or psychological process. Plays such as Lippy are placed after the leap, are concerned 
with the aesthetic possibilities and ethical responsibilities within mourning. 4.48 Psychosis is 
more concerned with the illumination of suicide as process than with the suicide as event. But 
Fragile embeds the audience in the event of the leap itself, and in doing so, emphasizes the 
suicide as an unnecessary, as something potentially evaded. This uncertainty should not lead us 
to take the moment of suicide less seriously, as Amery notes, ‘a subsequently “rescued” 
potential suicide is often at the moment of the act a deadly earnest real suicide, so much so 
that the distinction between suicides and suicidals … is quite arbitrary’ (Amery 1999: 81).  If the 
other plays of this chapter are concerned with how we regard suicide as a completed 
occurrence, by looking at the suicide amidst the leap, by not ‘completing’ the event in narrative 
terms, Fragile emphasizes the preventability of suicide from within the event itself. 
Yet, to usher in the suicide as a ‘preventable event,’ and to invoke our responsibilities, is to 
usher in the difficulties of causation. To simply evoke a semblance of responsibility is not 
necessarily radical. Simplistic portrayals of suicide frequently portray it as an irrational and brief 
compulsion, as a condensed, pure moment of irrational madness. In such accounts, our 
responsibility to the suicide is that of a liberal individualism; simply to say the right thing, to 
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argue and persuade for the irrationality of the event. In doing so, we risk avoiding the wider 
socio-political tapestry within which the suicide is concerned and emerges. 
Audience interaction in this sense does not necessitate a deeper response to suicide and may 
even obscure it. Ludological framing and gamification of suicide within the leap can quickly re-
enforce de-politicized understandings of suicide. It can suggest deep cultural structures can be 
rendered simply solvable through individual action. In this sense, the framing of ethical 
responsibility involves an individual encounter that somehow can be seated outside or above 
the political. 
This is not to claim ludological interactions are all inherently a depoliticized modes of 
engagement. Instead, I am pushing against the notion that audience interaction within itself 
ushers in a new, radical form of spectatorship. To involve the audience in forms of 
spectatorship that veer outside conventional theatrical modes does not necessitate a radical 
political position. Rather, we need to situate the mechanics of the production alongside a 
critical analysis of how Fragile critically frames suicide. I suggest the radicalism of Fragile 
emerges not simply from its particular form of audience interaction, but how this manifests 
alongside a deeply political and radical conception of suicide itself. Moreover, far from 
innocently deploying an interactive framework, it deconstructs the possibility of theatre to elicit 
responsibility. 
Multiplicities of Suicide Within the Leap 
Rather than naively understand the mechanics of interaction as a mode that directly transforms 
audience members into ‘witnesses,’ we must look at how the ‘interactive device’ of the play 
converges with the wider narrative structuration of suicide in the piece. If suicide is commonly 
framed as the result of madness, the regrettable result of biomedical mental health problems, 
in what way does Greig resist or conform to these expectations? Most of all, if representation 
of the suicide is confined to within 'the leap' itself, how does Greig allude or relate to the 
personal and social structures that surround the leap itself? 
Jack attempts to frame his suicide as a political protest. He compares himself to Mohamed 
Bouzazi, a Tunisian protestor whose self-immolation contributed to the Tunisian revolution. 
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Jack frames his suicide as a possible catalyst for change, romanticizing about, ‘the day he lit the 
spark which changed the situation’ (Greig 2011: 62). Jack, in these terms, rather than 
understanding suicide as an expression of self-hatred or self-destruction, expresses his act as an 
abandonment of the self in lieu of the political ends. 
The mode of suicide – self-immolation – has a historical, cultural and metonymic implication of 
the elimination of the self in favour of igniting political change. It takes various forms, emerging 
in Asian cultural and religious practice, notably in particular forms of Buddhism and Hinduism. 
More famous contemporary examples include the Buddhist monks protesting the South 
Vietnamese government’s oppressive regime in the 1960s, Tibetan Buddhist monks objecting to 
the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and cases against the reservation system of India. Speaking of 
the Tibetan immolations against Chinese rule, Tsering Woeser even rejects the dubbing of 
suicide, as, ‘self-immolation is not suicide, and it is not a gesture of despair. Rather, self-
immolation is sacrifice for a greater cause, and an attempt to press for change’ (Woeser 2016: 
26). During the Arab Spring, the more commonly Buddhist and Hindu practice of self-
immolation occurred within Muslim communities in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. Given that 
cremation is, in general, understood as haram in Islam, the act of self-immolation takes on 
further complications.  
With this particular genealogy, Greig’s use of self-immolation sits uncomfortably as an 
appropriation of a very particular non-western act. The occasions of self-immolation have 
commonly been used a means of western oppression; Gayatri Spivak famously exposes how the 
practice of sati was used and framed by westerners in order to propagate orientalist structure; 
its abolition by the British administration, ‘has been generally understood as a case of “White 
men saving brown women from brown men”’ (Spivak 1994: 93). In the case of Fragile, Greig is 
drawing upon a romanticization of self-immolation, as the ultimate political sacrifice and a 
gesture of helplessness. The piece as a whole could be seen as an uncomfortable transposition 
of a non-western practice with a specific and complicated genealogy into a Western setting, 
possibly even hinting towards equivalences between the Arab Spring and potential protests 
against austerity in the United Kingdom. Greig’s problematic attempt to find a parallel in a non-
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Western context, an indulgence in orientalism, is the result of the little space Western 
conceptions of suicide give to the political. 
Self-immolation is an action rooted in the impossibility of alternative protest, of extremity. 
Greig draws upon this as a call for political action, Jack challenging the audience to protest, that 
such an extreme act should not be ‘necessary’ to ignite political change. As Caroline suggests 
alternative forms of protest, such as a sit-in or an internet campaign, Jack is cynical about their 
efficacy: ‘the old train of shittiiness will just go rumbling on down the old shitty tracks. How do I 
know that won’t happen Caroline?’ (Greig 2011: 63).  
Yet, Fragile is not only concerned with an apprehension of how suicide can be figured as 
political protest. Jack is also presented as a vulnerable body, as a member of the precariat 
severely affected by the instabilities of a neoliberal economy. He is dispossessed of the 
psychiatric services upon which he is reliant. He, in part, acknowledges his own vulnerability, ‘I 
am mentally completely fucked’ (Greig 2011: 58). The piece does not simply romanticize Jack as 
a strident, self-sacrificial protestor. As the name of the piece connotes, Jack is fragile. The 
audience are confronted with suicide as a consequence of political and economic violence upon 
precarious lives. Suicide as intentional act is being complicated, by a consideration of how the 
dilapidation of mental health services deprives vulnerable lives of resources upon which they 
are reliant, resultant in a rise in suicidal behaviour. 
In this, we can see how Fragile is playing with multiple levels of un-decidability. Most obviously, 
the aforementioned incompletion of the leap, the suicide as preventable. The ambiguous end 
of the play buoys up the un-decidability of the event. Jack could complete the act, or hand the 
lighter to Caroline; the act is in suspension. But beyond this, Fragile is also drawing upon the 
precarity of mad lives in an environment of austerity. The title is expressly concerned with 
precarity, fragility being a core consequence of precarity, as Butler states, ‘precarity exposes 
our sociality, the fragile and necessary dimensions of our interdependency’ (Butler in Berlant et 
al 2012: 170). Jack is reliant upon services of which he is suddenly deprived. In both these 
senses, following Claire Wallace, Fragile, ‘is a piece of theatre that works significantly to make 
the precarious palpable’ (Wallace 2014: 130). Likewise, in negotiating both of these factors, the 
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impact and variability of our own responses is illuminated. To frame the suicide as avoidable, to 
frame austerity as optional, is to provoke our own responsibility for the suicide, to question 
how we can respond to it.  
In both these cases, we are seeing a radical re-conception of suicide in political terms. Greig 
steers away from simply presenting suicide as personal tragedy, as inevitable outcome of 
internal instability. Rather, his understandings of suicide are framed between two political 
possibilities. Firstly, suicide as an intentional political act to protest and plead for change. 
Secondly, suicide as a consequence and human cost of austerity economics. In these two 
conceptions, we can read Jack’s suicidal behaviour in two contradictory impulses: suicide as an 
active choice by a political agent against suicide as a result of neoliberal expediency upon 
passive victims. Likewise, both reveal potential political responses: to render suicide-as-protest 
unnecessary and to resist austerity’s violence to precarious lives. 
The piece, in negotiating these different possibilities, never clearly resolves their possibility. 
Jack even anticipates designation of madness as a means to discredit suicide as legitimate 
protest. Asked by Caroline to take his lithium, he responds, ‘Fuck lithium Caroline. That’s what 
Mr and Mrs Bouazuzu probably said to Mohamed. That’s what anyone would have said to 
Mohamed’ (Greig 2011: 62). Jack clearly inscribes himself as politically aware and active, and 
the piece is cautious of denuding him of agency. Yet, his protest concerns the deprival of 
psychiatric facilities, that which renders him more vulnerable to suicidal behaviour. He 
acknowledges and owns his own vulnerability. Rather than settling upon a singular ‘mode’ or 
understanding of suicide, the piece is continually on the move, shifting between the two 
different apprehensions, showing how their mutual reliance and contradiction form an aporia. 
This is, within itself, not necessarily an act of witnessing. To simply present ambiguities, to 
critically equivocate between frames of understanding, does not necessitate a self-reflexive 
gaze, an examination of our own sight, to look at our looking. To understand how this 
presentation of the aporia bleeds into an act of witnessing, it is necessary to examine how 
these critical structures interact with the interactive innovations of the piece. In doing so, I will 
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approach how the audience is enveloped into the play’s own consideration of violence, and 
questioned how to adequately respond to the suicide. 
What’s My Motivation: Suicide and Audience Interaction 
This chapter is not simply attempting to suggest theatre can provide a ‘practical critique’ of 
suicide, that can unpick or reveal the complexities of a suicide. Beyond this, I want to look at 
how theatre works out the complexities of our responsibility to suicide, through a self-reflexive 
gaze. In the case of Fragile, this involves following how its understandings of suicide converge 
with its mechanisms of audience interaction. Rather than arguing for a naïve transformative 
effect, I want to look at how the play incorporates and ensconces the audience in these 
questionings of suicide, and how the audience are encouraged to work out their own responses 
and responsibility. Wallace suggests that the mechanisms of the play, of the audience speaking 
the lines of Caroline, ‘realigns relationships in the theatre space, casting the audience as a 
community but also more obliquely as agents’ (Wallace 2014: 131). But how does this 
complicated realignment take place? I want to perform a more detailed excavation of how the 
play challenges the audience with the question of our response to suicide, even as it troubles 
our propensity to understand the event. 
The first, most immediate level of interaction is one of roleplay. The audience are called upon 
to play the individual role of Caroline. Caroline is a character not embodied through an actor, 
but rather constructed in the fragmented call-outs of the audience. Caroline is not simply a 
function constructed by the audience – the audience are instructed to read out the specific 
words printed out for them – but only comes into being through audience participation. But in 
doing so, the audience become entangled in the phantasm of the character and her 
motivations. They are required, if at a dispersed and fragmented level, to embody Caroline. As 
Caroline (and the play as a whole) is confronted with Jack’s suicide, the audience are similarly 
called upon to assess and consider her responses, to consider the individual character’s 
motivations. 
Simultaneously, a complicated notion of the communal begins to take place. The audience are 
also being called upon and formed as a political unit. Some of Caroline’s lines appear almost as 
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political anthems, ‘We’ll call people. We’ll use the internet. We’ll start a campaign’ (Greig 2011: 
63). In this sense, Greig is not simply interested in establishing the character of Caroline, but 
attempting to forge a political communality amongst the audience. The words are not only 
spoken by individuals, but by a chorus. In this sense, this call for communal endeavour as 
protest involves an ironic interpretation of conservative rhetoric; during the explanation at the 
beginning of the play, the communal construction of the play is explained to be, ‘in the spirit of 
big society’ (Greig 2011: 51). This sense of community is buoyed up by the audience’s own 
decision to attend an event called Theatre Uncut, itself a political choice. Likewise, the 
audience’s necessary action for the piece to function asserts the need for communal action. 
Individuals can choose not to participate, but in order for the play to work, at least one person 
must read out the lines. If the play’s narrative exposes the complexities of Caroline’s response, 
the performance is ushering in a communal response to austerity as a whole. It breaks out of 
the individual narrative into a wider consideration of political action. 
The audience are both playing the part of Caroline and forming a communal unit, and through 
these forms are involved in the play’s question concerning how we regard and respond to 
suicide. But in what way do they converge in terms of their response? For Wallace, the 
audience becomes implicated in Caroline’s apologias: ‘if they participate as planned, the 
audience are obliged to explain the very situation they themselves are protesting by their 
presence at the Theatre Uncut performances’ (Wallace 2014: 131). Across these two levels is an 
engagement across both individual and communal, across our responsibility to Jack, but this is 
necessarily taking place within and through a political environment. Both as the character of 
Caroline and as community, the audience are working out suicide both a protest and as a 
vulnerability of the precariat. In terms of an individual ethical level, the audience are brought 
into the intimacy of the duologue, and a response to Jack. Through this, Greig unveils the 
inability of framing suicide prevention in anything other than radically political terms. The work 
calls upon the audience to respond seriously to Jack’s framing of his act as political protest, and 
to Jack as a victim of austerity. Simultaneously, however, the audience are fostered as a 
community, bursting out of the individual encounter. In part, the structural change and 
resistance needed to ethically respond to the suicide can only occur on a wider level, expanded 
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out of the individual encounter with Jack. Fragile draws possible lines between Caroline’s 
individual responses to Jack and wider, communal terms. 
Witnessing and the Self-Reflexive Gaze 
Towards the end, Fragile more concretely becomes a reflection of spectatorship, action and 
responsibility running across both the individual level of Caroline and the communal level of the 
audience. The lines towards the end of the play, as the audience/Caroline follow Jack in 
shouting out, ‘We’re coming out from under the wardrobe … This situation is all fucked up and 
it has to change … That’s what we’ll say’, (Greig 2011: 64) take place on multiple levels of 
understandings. The audience speaks out the mantra as a political unit, an enforced 
communality, taking a political stand. Yet, simultaneously, in part through Caroline’s 
motivations, the words are incorporated as the desperate attempts to say anything in order to 
prevent suicide. As Wallace notes, ‘following her admission of an overwhelming sense of 
pessimism and powerlessness … is not particularly convincing’ (Wallace 2014: 131). The 
individual motivations of the character undermine the communal politic of the audience. 
Furthermore, the sequence questions and exposes the mechanisms of audience participation 
deployed in Fragile. The lines are simply repetitions of Jack’s own mantra. In seeing Caroline 
simply repeat the words spoken to her by Jack, a black mirror is formed of the audience’s own 
behaviour in simply reading out the lines on the page. If Caroline’s lines are politically inert, 
empty repetition, to what extent is the audience’s own activity similarly vacuous of radical 
intent? Even as it is invoked, the political communality is being undercut by the substance of 
the text. In this sense, Fragile is questioning the audience’s own participation, the sincerity of 
their engagement, their ability to act and respond outside of the confines of the performance.  
In this crisis of overlapping positions and intentions, Fragile places the audience in an 
interrogation of motivation, response, and witnessing. In the introduction to the play, as the 
audience are informed of their role in the performance, they are amusingly implored to not 
ever ask, ‘What’s my motivation?’ (Greig 2011: 52). Yet, ironically, this crisis of perspective 
posits exactly such a question. It throws into relief the presumed action of engaging with the 
piece, speaking out the words of Caroline, repeating the power-point presentation. In both 
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individual and communal sense, the question of motivation opens up a level of responsibility. 
What is Caroline’s responsibility to Jack: is it simply defined by her ability to talk him down from 
suicide, or does it involve a deeper form of engagement? What are the motivations of the 
audience for participating in the performance, to what extent will it take form outside of the 
performance, and how does it reflect our wider communal responsibilities to suicide in an age 
of austerity? Fragile is invested in mechanisms that question the motivational structures, of 
why and how the audience respond to both Jack’s suicide and austerity as a whole. 
Beyond an interrogation of the audience themselves, the play appears to be eviscerating its 
own claims to radicalism, or substantive response. Far from simply interrogating the audience’s 
own agency, it is also deconstructing theatre’s own potential to act as a radical force. As the 
piece forms a mimicry of the interactive device of the piece within the narrative, Fragile 
develops a self-reflexive and critical perspective.  
In other words, Fragile uses the latticing of various motivations to bring our response to a crisis. 
Far from simply advocating a particular or single response, Fragile brings into our gaze the 
various crises and contradictions in our response to suicide. It uses a mechanism that appears 
to ape or mimic social action, only to drastically undermine and challenge its efficacy. It is this 
self-reflexive crisis which involves a mode of witnessing. Far more than simply sight, witnessing 
emerges a complicated mode of response. Witnessing anticipates its own crisis, indeed, is 
premised upon its own failure. 
Agency and Response to the Precarious Suicide 
Our constructions of suicide have often returned to questions of agency and motivation.  Across 
Fragile, a complicated nexus of motivation and response comes into play. The motivation of the 
suicidal is interrogated, as Jack is held simultaneously as passive victim of austerity and active 
protestor. The motivation of Caroline and her attempt to prevent his suicide is highlighted 
against the motivations of the audience as political community. And finally, the motivations of 
the piece itself, the efficacy of the work itself, are brought into question. Through relating these 
different interrogations of agency, of the suicide, of Caroline and the audience, of the 
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theatrical, to one another, it is possible to witness what it means to respond to the suicide 
amidst the leap. 
Fragile does not ‘transform’ the audience from passive spectators into active witnesses. 
However, it inveigles the audience within the wider questions of our responsibility to suicide, 
and complicates their position with regards to the performance. Questioning and emerging 
from looking at suicide from within the leap, it creates an undecidable understanding of suicide 
and is consistently both ethically and politically charged. It expresses a concern with the fragile 
and precarious lives of psychiatric users, and through participatory mechanisms, in inveigles the 
audience into these interrogations. Using multiple levels of participation, whereby audience are 
simultaneously individual character and political collective, in a self-reflexive gesture, it troubles 
the very political gestures it brings into being.  
It Didn’t Happen Like This: Lippy and the Crisis of Voice 
In Fragile, the act of witnessing relates to the leap of the suicide, an interrogation of 
responsibility to suicide as unfinished, and thereby precarious and preventable. In contrast, 
what does it mean to witness suicide as a finished event? Our approaches to suicide contain 
multiplicities; to witness the completed suicide requires different engagements with 
responsibility and representation. There is no longer any prevention possible in the finished 
suicide, the subject we witness is outside the realm of intervention. Simply referring to the 
prevention of future suicides, whilst perhaps socially beneficial, is a displacement of the 
question. What does it mean to witness those who have completed suicide, what does it mean 
to respond and what do we owe (politically and ethically) to the dead? 
Lippy is a response to a real-life suicide pact that occurred in Kildare, Ireland. In 2000, Frances 
Mulrooney and her three nieces - Josephine, Catherine, and Bridg-Ruth – sealed themselves 
inside their house, and starved themselves to death. They shredded and pulped their 
documentation and correspondence, stuffing it into black big liners. Despite a dearth of 
information, the act elicited attempts to make sense or meaning. Their deaths provoked 
moderate press interest, including a Channel 4 documentary aimed at detailing their deaths. A 
few fragments written during the starvation were discovered, which the Irish Independent 
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presumptively suggested ‘reveals that the women starved themselves to death to repay a 
karmic debt as part of a new age philosophy which has its roots in Hindu worship’ (Irish 
Independent 2002: np). The family was economically precarious, they had been forced to move 
from Dublin, and deprived of housing benefits; even the discovery of their bodies was 
precipitated by the landlord delivering a note telling the women to vacate the premises 
(Guardian 2001: np). Added to this complicated nexus of meanings is the particular significance 
starvation has in Ireland, from both the Famine and the structures of martyrdom surrounding 
Bobby Sands and the hunger strikes. 
In Lippy, the conflation of these meanings is brought to a crisis. The summary of the play, 
repeated in both the programme and the back of the playtext, is a clear resistance to any 
verbatim or documentary claims:  
In 2000 in Lexlip, co. Kildare, an aunt and 3 sisters boarded themselves into their home 
and entered into a suicide pact that lasted 40 days. We weren’t there. We don’t know 
what they said. This is not their story.’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: back-cover).    
It is this refusal to represent or account for the suicide (even as it is drawn to the event) that 
marks the mode of response Lippy takes to the completed suicide. In breaching the question of 
the suicide pact, Lippy seems to suggest its impossibility of representation. Rather than attempt 
to explain away the incommensurability of the suicide event, Lippy is more concerned with 
examining the limitations of our capacity to account or represents the actions of the 
Mulrooneys. Beyond simply the epistemological question of the possibility of knowledge, this 
extends into a politico-ethical questioning: what is the violence we do when we attempt to 
explain? It is this concern that marks Lippy as engaged in an act of witnessing. If Fragile 
deployed meta-theatrical devices to question the possibility of proactive engagement, Lippy is a 
more reflective glance at the possible damage we inflict in our response. 
Lippy is perhaps the work least evidently concerned with psychiatric service. Unlike 4.48 
Psychosis, there is no indictment of violence to the psychiatric services. Nor is it engaged, 
compared to Fragile, in the interplay between neutering resistance by appeal to mad structures 
and the consequences of ameliorating psychiatric services. Yet, our constructions of suicide are 
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inseparable from suicide; as Ian Marsh relates, madness is always the causation of the suicide, 
whilst suicide becomes the justification for the treatment of the mad. Lippy, in its questioning 
of our fascination with suicide, is opening up our cultural structures of madness when it comes 
to the suicide-as-event. Whilst not directly relating to psychiatric forces, it is witnessing the 
power politics of theatre, and exploring the unsafe borders between witness and accomplice. 
Dead Centre’s work has often orientated around voice, around its manipulation and alteration. 
A comparatively young company, their first work, Souvenir, played with voice, with performers 
Charlotte Moukarzel and Andrew Bennett only present through their voices. Meanwhile, in 
Chekhov’s First Play, the audience were given headphones, as a director’s commentary was laid 
over the action of the play; monologues spoken over, complaints about the actors moving away 
from their blocking, allusions to inter-cast romance. Lippy, in its evocation and evisceration of 
what the voice can do, offers us a new conception of what it means to witness. 
Dead Centre is a company based in Ireland; the play surrounds a group suicide of four Irish 
women, and the play makes references to the Irish literary exile, Samuel Beckett. The context 
of Ireland reshapes and alters our understanding and interpretation of madness and suicide. If 
marked similarities can be drawn between British and Irish mental health treatment, 
nevertheless, the colonial past between the two countries complicates and deepens our 
understanding. In a play about voice and the voiceless, these themes take resonance in a 
country deprived of a voice, even a language, by colonial forces. In a play about starvation, the 
Great Irish Famine inevitably looms in the background. In a play about the desire for self-
eradication, of using self-starvation as resistance, Bobby Sands and the hunger strikes 
immediately are evoked. If the silencing of a voice, and the tension between it being self-willed 
or imposed, comments upon suicide, nevertheless, it echoes and reverberates in a colonial 
past. 
Lippy demonstrates the entangled theatrical ecologies of Britain and Ireland; that a billiard ball 
approach to cultural analysis becomes increasingly redundant. Moukarzel himself is British; 
their productions tour outside of Ireland, not only in Britain, but around Europe and Australia. 
This analysis emerges from my attendance of their production of Lippy at the Young Vic in 
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London in 2015. Compounding this, I saw their production of Chekhov’s First Play at the Bristol 
Old Vic in 2016. In other words, their influence stretches outside of a specifically Irish context, 
they bring the preoccupations and cultural resonances of Irish theatre to other theatrical 
ecologies. In this sense, whilst awareness of a theatrical production’s cultural moorings remains 
crucial, this analysis will interrogate and incorporate Lippy as a play that emerged from and 
then infused across cultural borders. 
The Ethical-Moral Boundaries of Lippy, Treading in the Real 
Lippy evades simple summary, the work seems to trouble the explanatory nature of traditional 
narrative. This introductory section involves an ‘after-show talk’, in the front of the stage, with 
curtains to the rest of the stage closed. Throughout this, the Interviewer questions the Lip-
Reader about an imaginary show that the audience have supposedly witnessed beforehand. 
The show apparently concerned questions of lip-reading, and much of their conversation 
revolves around lip-reading, its practicalities, and its politics. The suicide pact is alluded to, that 
the Lip-Reader had been hired by the police to investigate a video of two of the sisters, ‘looking 
at some CCTV for the Gardi, helping them to decipher something to further their investigations’ 
(Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 24), and that it had briefly been the subject of a potential 
theatre project. Towards the end of this section, an impromptu lip-reading takes place between 
the interviewer and lip-reader. This eventually breaks down, as the Lip Reader relates the story 
of how the Mulrooneys were discovered. Pondering over the bin bags they had filled with their 
documentation, after shredding and pulping, he notes: 
It’s like they didn’t just want to die and leave this world, they wanted to get rid of any 
trace of their existence. They wanted to make it like they were never here. Completely 
cover the tracks of their existence. (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 28) 
The gauze rises for the second section of the play, to reveal the stage as the house of the 
Mulrooneys. Subsequently, a series of abstract scenes involving the suicide pact of the 
Mulrooneys is played. These series of sequences obliquely tell the story of their starvation, 
whilst simultaneously deconstructing the possibility of representing the events. The voices of 
the Mulrooneys are distorted and manipulated, at one point they are given surtitles, later their 
173 
 
lips sync to pre-recorded male voices. The Lip-Reader invades these scenes, bursting from one 
of their bin bags stuffed with mushed, unreadable paper. He interacts in the scenes, attempts 
to engage and interpret with the women. In one scene, he offers a cup of tea to Bridg-Ruth, 
encourages her to eat; the teacup breaks apart in her mouth, ‘she bites the cup. It cracks in her 
mouth. She chews the china. Blood runs down her face’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran: 36). At 
another point, he speaks out their dialogue, as they mouth his words. The section ends with 
their deaths. 
The final scene is a monologue, written separately from the rest of the play by Mark O’Halloran. 
A pair of large lips are projected onto a screen, an image briefly glimpsed in the first section of 
the play. The lips talk without pause, in fragmented glances of thought, reminiscent of Samuel 
Beckett’s Not I. They belong to Catherine, who speaks of the past, of her father and his drinking 
problem. Amongst this, brief speculations on loneliness and death are uttered. She states death 
is, ‘Private / Entirely / Personal / It can’t be shared / Only witnessed / And even then / Even that 
/ Is futile’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 62). At the end of the play, the gauze separating the 
front and the back of the stage is made transparent. But rather than revealing the house of the 
Mulrooney’s: ‘Everything has gone. It is a completely bare space; no room in Leixlip, no paper, 
no debris, no bodies. An empty theatre’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 63) 
Lippy, unlike the other two plays of this chapter, stems from a real-life case. It actively plays 
upon an actual, documented group-suicide. Rather than seek recourse in fiction, create its own 
fictional story as a means to circumvent the moral quandaries of representing ‘real’ suicide, 
Lippy uses an actual case of suicide even as it demonstrates the ethical and political 
consequences of theatre’s limitations and inclinations. It is in these ambiguities and unfinished 
contradictions of the process, and situating and implicating itself within its own critique that 
marks Lippy as engaged in witnessing itself, rather than an external commentary upon it. 
I am interested in witnessing as an utterance (rather than simply sight), that is never 
completed, that acknowledges and struggles with aporia. In this uncertainty, Lippy resonates 
along the ambiguities of suicide itself. The completed suicide always ushers in this question of 
self-erasure, the obligation to look against the response of self-erasure. Treating suicide as 
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simply another speech-act reduces our understanding. Suicide is a desire for self-erasure, not 
an active articulation; suicide eliminates communication even as it is uttered. And yet, suicide is 
simultaneously an act, a performance; if it is the elimination of the self, this elimination is 
necessarily written upon and through the body. As a result, suicide figures as aporia, an act that 
precludes its own utterance. If this aporia is at play in all suicides, the suicide pact in Lippy puts 
it forward in the extreme. Starvation as a mode of death, the destruction of all communication 
and written documentation, all stands as an act of the reduction and elimination of the self, in 
both material and non-material senses of the word. And yet, the extremity of the gesture, 
seems to invite attention, to place suicide as a performative and meaningful act that requires 
some form of meaning-making.  
Any act of witnessing not only requires us to look (and declare) at the victim, but to reflect 
upon the process of witnessing itself. The various levels of witnessing (the testimony of the 
victim, the witnessing of the testimony by the bystander, the self-reflexive witnessing of 
witnessing itself) are always simultaneously operational. Thus, rather than create a false 
division, between an examination of the suicide itself against an investigation of our modes of 
understanding, we should understand that witnessing in Lippy is necessarily involved in both. 
To engage in how we look at suicide is part of engaging with suicide itself. In this sense, I want 
to follow how Lippy presses and pursues our modes of reflection upon suicide, how it deploys 
theatre as a mode to reflect and look upon its own behaviour, in particular through 
understandings of voice, and meta-textuality. 
Putting Voices into Mouths 
If 4.48 Psychosis was a work that returned to sight as a means to explore the complexities of 
witnessing, then Lippy is a work that returns to images of the lips, the distortion of words, 
hearing and voice. The opening section of the play is an exegesis of lip-reading, as explicit 
critical commentary upon the activity. Lip-reading offers us a model through which to 
understand the processes of reclaiming and understanding a silent voice. Through lip-reading, 
we attempt to forge a voice out of the visual. The Lip Reader takes the silent moving lips, and 
grafts a meaning out of their motions. In a similar way to how we take documentation (in 
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suicide, notoriously the suicide note), and attempt to forge an explanation, lip-reading is not 
simply a passive interpretation, but an active and forceful implantation of meaning. Indeed, as 
is foregrounded in Lippy itself with a clip of John Terry’s racist abuse upon the football field, 
such lip-reading can even have legal consequences: ‘a man can be convicted because of what 
his lips say!’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 19). 
Why is lip-reading necessary? The lip-reader talks us through examples from 2001: A Space 
Odyssey and Casino. In 2001, the crew have entered a sealed-off room to attempt to avoid the 
surveillance of Hal, the homicidal computer A.I.  In Casino, the two gangsters attempt to cover 
their mouths, in order to protect their conversation from government. In both cases, lip-reading 
becomes a means to overcome resistance; it is a mechanism of surveillance, a forceful attempt 
to gather a voice which the subject has attempted to seclude. Lip-reading is, necessarily, 
something done forcefully upon the subject. 
Beyond simply the common thread that lip-reading is often performed on the unwilling or the 
unknowing, lip-reading also offers the possibility of misunderstanding, of incorrectly putting 
words to lips. As the Lip-Reader explains during the after-show, ‘a single shape made by the 
mouth can have multiple meanings. The word “bear” is the same as “pear” for instance’ 
(Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 21). Multiple meanings can be extrapolated by the same 
physical movements, offering the possibility of mistake. Towards the end of the play’s after-
show talk sequence, an impromptu lip-reading is set up between Interviewer and Lip Reader. As 
the Interviewer tells his story of awkwardly going to a gig, the Lip Reader incorrectly guesses 
many of the words, only correctly forming fragments, and creating a deeply distorted and 
different story. In contrast to the Interviewer’s tale, the story of the Lip Reader is fragmented, 
violent and misogynist; ‘in crowds of people’ becomes interpreted as, ‘I smashed her head in’ 
(Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 26). The overlapping of the two speeches, as the Lip Reader 
talks loudly (his own ears blocked by headphones playing loud music) over the Interviewer, 
gives an impression of two stories competing for a voice; the Lip Reader’s interpretation is 
violently talking over that which it seeks to interpret. Ironically, the only word the Lip Reader 
self-consciously struggles with is ‘violating’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 26). 
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Lip-reading is a mode of interpretation that exceeds reclamation into a reinvention of a silent 
voice. Within this reinvention is not only the possibility of failure, but potential violence in its 
intervention. In Lippy, lip-reading becomes a mode through which to examine political 
structures behind meaning-making. Lip-reading takes a trace of the voice, the physical 
movements of the lips, in order to assert a dominant narrative. It parallels to our tendency to 
take the paraphernalia of an event (such as the scraps of paper written by Bridg-Ruth as she 
was starving) to find explicable narratives. It becomes a wider image of the mechanisms by 
which we make meanings and expound upon the completed suicide as an unknowable event. 
Witnessing, the Textual and the Voice 
The practice of lip-reading is explicitly engaged in our understanding of the voice. In other 
words, we should not merely understand witnessing or constructions of power in simply textual 
terms. Beyond simply language, Lippy is expressly concerned with the question of voice. If Lippy 
returns to the silence of the completed suicide, and our compulsion to speak over it, then this 
silence is particularly rooted in voice. Lip-reading in Lippy more specifically revolves around the 
notion of voice, its location in the body, words as spoken and emerging from something 
corporeal, as occurring within and resonating alongside space. If we accept that part of 
witnessing suicide (and madness more broadly) is contesting with silence, then we must look at 
how Lippy takes advantage of the theatrical opportunities in investigating the voice and its 
potential silencing. 
What is voice? Voice acts as signifier and inscriber of identity; Kristen Linklater draws upon its 
Cartesian suggestions, ‘voice is identity. Your voice says I am’ (Linklater 2010: 43, italics in 
original). But also, voice is concerned with corporeality; it emerges from the body (and is 
culturally demarked by it). Adriana Cavarero takes this even further, suggesting that, ‘voice is so 
inherent to the human body that the body can be considered its instrument’ (Cavarero 2012: 
71). Likewise, voice can only take place in space. If we experience voice through space, we also 
experience space through our voice. Erika Fischer-Lichte notes how the voice conjoins these 
various concerns, that the voice unites, ‘totality, corporality, and spatiality so that the 
performance’s materiality constantly regenerates itself within it’ (Fischer Lichte 2001: 130). As 
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Annette Schlichter and Nina Sun Eidsheim declare, ‘simultaneously tied to the body and 
entwined with the external environment, the voice exists in a complicated interaction with 
multiple physical and sociocultural formations’ (Schlichter and Eidsheim 2014: np).  
Voice takes place at a multitude of levels of understanding, it often plays along these various 
differing levels, or across them, or in-between. Konstantinos Thomaidis and Ben Macpherson 
note that ‘this sense of “in-betweenness” pervades discourses about voice’ (Thomaidis and 
Macpherson 2015: 3). Voice becomes something that occurs across both language and body. 
Voice acts as a nexus of a multitude of concerns, that exceed simply an understanding of voice 
as language. Voice, far from singular, is pluralistic. 
To understand the voice as something not simply understood as textual, but as something 
multifarious, is to anticipate the immensity and diversity of silence, and its operations. 
Particularly when we understand silence can, beyond simply a linguistic absence, be also a vocal 
act. If voice is understood as an emergence from the body (rather than simply an aural 
transcription of language) then the self-starvation of the women, a mode of suicide that 
exemplifies the amelioration of the corporeal, is also in part the elimination of their voice. If 
voice occurs within a space, if we understand a space (in part) through vocal properties, by how 
our voice carries and reverberates, then by boarding themselves with the house, by sealing 
themselves in, doesn’t this offer another means by which they withdraw and hold themselves 
up? 
To understand voice as not simply textual, is to apprehend further dimensions of power and 
violence. If silence manifests through the body, then we can violently disrupt the silence of the 
body, force words through the body. If silence wishes to close off the space in which it 
resonates, then we can open up these spaces. Lippy explicitly engages and plays along these 
distortions and complexities of voice. Far from simply textual, it attempts to witness through 
aural distortion. In Lippy, lip-reading, its relationship to the voice, as forceful interpretation, as 
attempting to sunder voice from body and space offers a particular way of witnessing this 
violence. We can understand violence not only in terms of the semiotic, but in the multivalence 
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of voice as well. In doing so, our response, our witnessing, can also exceed a purely semiotic 
understanding of our utterance. 
Lippy repeatedly returns to the image of lips and distortions of the voice. The voices of the aunt 
and sisters are never left alone, are always troubled. At one point, Bridg-Ruth and Catherine 
mouth to pre-recorded dialogue, ‘their lips move and sync with the words we hear. Their voices 
are male voices’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 36); the dissonance of the vocal tone to body 
not only serves to emphasize the violent construction of these represented voices, it reminds us 
of the often gendered terms in which this violence takes place. In one sequence, the Lip Reader 
speaks dialogue whilst the women mouth to his words, the ‘Lip-Reader stands with the 
microphone, wearing headphones as in Part One and lip-reads’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 
2014: 39). If the Lip-Reader frames it as his ‘reading’ their dialogue, the impression is more one 
of them acting out his words; later, he admits to the possibility of his own mistake, echoing the 
possibility of the same shape of the mouth creating two different sounds. He is forcing his voice 
onto their bodies. The Lip-Reader, the modes of interpretative power he deploys, are clearly 
linked as patriarchal; at one point in the second section, he transforms into the absent father-
figure himself, asking Josephine with anger, ‘Aren’t you going to talk to your father? I am still 
your father you know’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 40). 
Lippy examines, not only the more generalized concern with how interpretation can be violent, 
but how clarification and explication can obscure meaning, how the elliptical can be more 
pertinent. In particular, the manner in which it utilizes real-life scraps written by Bridg-Ruth 
throughout the starvation. She walks towards the audience as she speaks the words written in 
the leftover fragments: ‘We must cast off these dense physical bodies which to me are like 
great overcoats which our soul inhabits’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 35) But as she enters 
the section of the stage where the after-show panel was performed, the other women cover 
their ears and her words begin to be covered by a large static noise, ‘similar to the effect of bad 
reception when speaking on a telephone’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 35). In this 
movement, the piece is contrasting two different spaces. Through the transferral of the voice 
from one space to the other, from a space of seclusion to a space of explication, meanings and 
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understandings are obscured. Talking and testifying suicide is distorted the moment it shifts 
into explanation and explication. 
Another manipulation of Bridg-Ruth’s written testimony appears at the end of the second 
section. A microphone is held over Bridg-Ruth’s mouth, and swung like a pendulum. Her voice is 
heard intermittently, as she reads out a real-life fragment, trying (and failing) to wrestle with 
their starvation, with loneliness, again with excepts from the fragments written by her 
throughout the starvation. The Lip Reader, in taking away her microphone, attempts to lip read 
her final words, but only makes out the words, ‘Remember to put the cat out’ (Moukarzel and 
O’Halloran 2014: 44) His intervention has only led to a banality. In attempting to simply explain 
away, rather than engage with the complexity of the suicide event, he reduces and obscures 
engagement. In attempting to clarify her voice, to read over her voice, to speak over silence, he 
fails to wrestle with the complexities of suicide and its meaning, the ambiguities and 
complexities of the event. 
Across these examples, in various manners, voice is used to enact and illuminate the processes 
of ‘retrieving’ a voice, of the violence involved. Theatre’s particular relationship with voice, 
allow for a forceful examination of the violence through the vocal (rather than simply semiotic 
violence). That voice is something immediate, unrepeatable and specific to body and space, 
then perhaps reflects back on our assumptions on retrieving voice from text. The play’s 
engagement with real-life testimony, using fragments written by Bridg-Ruth Mulrooney, 
position this not simply as external observation, but active ethical and political engagement. 
The play is continually looking back upon its looking, using the image of voice and lip-reading to 
cautiously upset any simple representative claim. Put simply, the play seems to return to a 
singular refrain, that, ‘it didn’t happen like this’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 36). 
Meaning Making in the Community of the Audience 
Beyond this manipulation of the voice, about the broader themes of violence and 
interpretation, Lippy is particularly interested in theatre’s own position towards interpretation 
and violence. The concern with the voice in Lippy, is a concern with meaning-making, with our 
responses to the completed suicide. The profession of the Lip Reader, is not only for the police 
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in reading CCTV footage, but as an actor in the imaginary show of the after-show talk. This 
simultaneous role of the Lip-Reader as ‘actor’ and as ‘interpreter,’ directly parallels the dangers 
of meaning-making with that of the theatrical. In Lippy, witnessing suicide constitutes an 
examination of the theatrical form and mode. Lines between the real and the fictional are 
deliberately teased. The play-text specifies that, ‘the names of the Interviewer, Lip Reader, 
Adam the Technician and Front of House should be changed in accordance with the actors 
playing these roles’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 13). 
This positioning of role as actor is nor isolated to the Lip Reader. A UV light is shone at the 
figures of the four women, creating silhouettes. As the women leave, their silhouettes remain, 
marked upon the back wall by the ultraviolet. The stage description specifies, ‘Hold the image 
for as long as possible as silhouettes fade’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 29). The women re-
enter, now dressed in forensic gear, and examine their silhouettes. Taking out chalk, they draw 
outlines of themselves. They do this hurriedly, with, ‘some urgency as the outlines of the figures 
are fading’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 30). This sequence takes place at the beginning of 
the second part of the play; it reveals a concern with delineation and meaning-making, with 
meta-theatrical devices (the actors playing the Mulrooneys as forensic scientists). 
As David Sack describes it: ‘four figures in hazmat suits investigate, cleaning up the refuse, 
righting an upturned table. They are a forensics team, physically resetting the scene to retrace 
its unfolding’ (Sack 2015: np). The sequence paints the actors as engaged in an act of forensics 
or autopsy. Even as the audience are introduced to the actors who play the Mulrooneys, the 
performers are framed as distanced from the roles they play, as tracing over the negative image 
that the women left behind.  The role of the actor, for both the women and the Lip Reader, is 
framed as interpreter. Lippy returns to voice as image of the violence of interpretation, of 
meaning-making when meaning has been deliberately rejected. Lippy emphasizes, through 
these meta-theatrical glances, theatre’s own involvement in these processes of making 
meaning.  
Lippy leans upon the marginalia of the theatrical event, of its conventions, the after-show 
discussion and the interval. In these, it becomes notable that these supplementary conventions 
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to the main event infringe upon our meaning-making. This is not simply a questioning of the 
role of the stage, of performers, of the spectacle of theatre. It is directly involving the 
audience’s own complicity in this meaning-making process. Namely, the audience are 
themselves part of these various proceedings, whereby they attempt to delineate and enforce 
clear meanings upon events that refuse such clarity. Again, this is not to suggest the audience 
are necessarily transformed or educated by the structures of the play. The audience is neither 
passively separated by these structures of witnessing, nor the sole source pf them. Rather, the 
audience is inveigled and incorporated into the wider structures of witnessing occurring across 
the play. The play uses an investigation of voice and silence, and incorporates meta-theatrical 
devices to examine theatre’s own complicity, and potential resistance, to violent meaning 
making. But, beyond this, the play places the audience within this meaning making process. 
The pseudo-interval offers a particular challenge to the audience, our understanding of the 
communal, and our response to our own voice. The Lip-Reader laments the decline of the 
interval in contemporary drama: 
It’s a shame that we don’t have intervals nowadays, they’ve fallen out of fashion. It’s a 
pity, as they’re a good chance for the audience to get to know themselves. A chance to 
talk to your neighbour, get to know your neighbour, get to dislike your neighbour.  
(Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 42) 
Following this, the Lip-Reader offers an alternative interval, one existing inside the play. This 
interval takes the form of a recording of the audience prior to the beginning of the play, as they 
enter the theatre, fragments of conversation chosen and emphasized. The recording is played 
across to the audience, their own voices emerging in bursts and fragments. 
The audience are implied within these structures. My own experience, listening to these 
disembodied voices, was one of conjoined voyeurism and vulnerability. As Sacks suggest, 
‘perhaps, in the manner of the Mulrooneys, we recognize our own voices taken from us and 
redeployed’ (Sacks 2015: np). But the audience are also still framed as complicit in this violent 
meaning-making. I was wary of my own voice, what I might have said, yet curious about the 
minutiae and mundanities in the voices of others. The audience are subjected to a form of 
182 
 
violence, but also invited to partake in the violence. In situating audience and performer both 
within these meta-theatrical gestures, the larger processes of meaning-making, in both creation 
and spectatorship, are interrogated and encompassed. This self-reflexive gesture, of 
examination turning back on itself, of considering how to respond to the suicide and reflecting 
upon our reflection, shift Lippy from an operation of critique into an operation of witnessing. 
Resistance to Meaning and the Voice 
The final monologue of the play, of Catherine’s lips, relating her personal fear and thoughts, is 
oddly essentialist for a work that repeatedly returns to the damage of representation. It seems 
to insinuate the father abused Catherine: ‘Your legs are wet too he said / The dew had fallen / 
We’ll wipe you down / Inside / It’s late’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran: 56-7). This seems out of 
kilter with the more nervous aesthetic elsewhere in the play. The monologue was written 
separately from other sections of the play, by Mark O’Halloran. In the context of the rest of the 
piece, which has deconstructed lip-reading, the relationship between the visual and the voice, 
and theatre’s place in this meaning-making, the monologue seems oddly absurd, a sudden 
simplistic recourse into the explanatory models of psychological realism.  
Yet, this final image is undercut and pierced. The image had briefly appeared before, in the 
Question and Answer session, when, ‘an image flashes up on the screen, but it is not the clip 
they were expecting. It is a huge mouth speaking in silence’ (Moukarzel and O’Halloran 2014: 
21). When the audience see it in the end, they have already positioned it in the space of 
needless explication. The gauze, upon which the image of the lips has been projected, becomes 
transparent. Behind it, is a barren stage, without any of the features of the house in Leixlip the 
audience saw before. In an odd reversal of the final gesture of 4.48 Psychosis, where the 
theatrical becomes a launchpad towards the outside, Lippy returns all representations to 
fictional imposition and the theatrical. Behind the naïve lips that splutter simplistic 
psychological truths, is an empty theatricality, a vacuous fiction. 
Despite this, the play is not simply a condemnation of the theatrical. The play is an eviscerating 
critique of how we force voices into the voiceless, the abuse of power that occurs surrounding 
these interpretations. It uses voice and lip-reading to explore the modes by which 
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interpretation becomes violence. It directly implicates theatre and the audience in these 
interpretations, as involved in these meaning making procedures. But it is precisely in the self-
reflexivity, in the staging of the emptiness and violence of these interpretations, that witnessing 
becomes possible. As Sack observes, ‘it i`s only in the empty theatre that the women of Leixlip 
can appear – precisely by not appearing, by not saying “not I”’ (Sack 2015: np, italics in original). 
If the completed suicide exists as a spectacle of self-elimination, then theatre’s relentless 
exposure of the emptiness and violence of representation, far from mere self-criticism, 
becomes the appropriate response of the witness.  
Conclusion 
Suicide and madness are bound to one another as concepts. We justify our treatment of the 
mad through the threat or potential of suicide, whilst suicide is admonished and understood in 
almost exclusively terms of madness. This chapter has not been about attempting to decouple 
these concepts, or forming a practical critique of suicide. Suicide, alongside madness, seems to 
invite interpretations that act as forms of violence. Rather than trying to encapsulate suicide, in 
a finally complete interpretation, these plays wrestle with the politics and ethics of 
interpretation itself.  
What this wrestling constitutes varies largely across each. Each of these plays deals with a 
different view and approach towards suicide. In 4.48 Psychosis, suicide is understood as lived 
experience, as a process. Fragile places suicide as precarious event, as preventable, before the 
leap. The suicide in Lippy is completed, finished, sealed-off, utterly inaccessible. Witnessing, 
across these plays, does not reveal itself as uniform, or simply a speech act. Witnessing is a 
response to a particular dilemma, or aporia. The witnessing of 4.48 Psychosis, as a direct 
response to testimony, is a doubled movement of sight. As sight and looking become modes of 
violence towards the main character, the possibility of witnessing as a radical form of looking, 
as both looking and not looking, presents itself. Fragile teases out what it means to respond to 
the uncompleted suicide, what it means to prevent as opposed to engage. Unlike the doubled 
movement of 4.48 Psychosis, Fragile gestures towards the possibility and necessity of a 
response. The possibility of effective action, that stretches across the individual encounter and 
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the communal politics, becomes clear. In Lippy, the response to the completed suicide is always 
a violent one, and witnessing becomes a continual withdrawal, even as we are compelled to 
give it a voice. 
If these modes offer a hope, a resistance to the violence of interpretation to suicide and 
madness, nevertheless they are premised upon the mutual necessity and impossibility of the 
act. In 4.48 Psychosis, witnessing is an aporia of sight, an impossible act of both looking and not 
looking. In Fragile, the mode of theatre to enhance an ‘active’ response is revealed as 
fundamentally inadequate. Lippy presents an evisceration of theatre’s attempts to give a voice, 
but acknowledges theatre is always compelled towards this meaning making. Perhaps, rather 
than understand this as the ‘impossibility’ of witnessing, we should follow it as the 
incompleteness of witnessing. Witnessing is not an occurrence that succeeds or fails; in these 
plays, witnessing appears to be a never-completed process. 
What is involved in this process? Witnessing requires an interrogation of itself, a witnessing of 
witnessing; witnessing must acknowledge and incorporate its own failure, it relies upon its own 
deconstruction. In each of these plays, failure comes to the fore in self-reflection, whereby the 
inadequacy of theatre to act as a site of witnessing is bound up with the attempt to do so.  In 
4.48 Psychosis, the curtains are called to be opened, the sound of the outside of the theatre is 
beckoned. In Fragile, the mechanisms of response within the theatre are demonstrated to be 
pallid images, inefficacious in the final analysis. Lippy’s final image, and almost as an inverse of 
4.48 Psychosis’s gesture of bringing the world within the theatre, reveals to the stage to be 
barren, lifeless, without meaning. 
This tension, between the theatre and outside, is perhaps a site of contention for this 
understanding of witnessing. If it is part of the process of witnessing as an ethico-political 
response, then it is also cause to its failure. Our continued critical bracketing of 4.48 Psychosis 
as a suicide note emerges from a tendency to evade deep engagement with work by suicides (in 
particular female authors) in favour of pseudo-autobiographical interpretation. David Greig’s 
uncomfortable cultural appropriation of self-immolation in Fragile, results from an uneasy 
attempt to relate the fictional suicide to the wider political climate. Lippy works continually to 
185 
 
investigate this interpretative violence, but finishes with a monologue that provides easy 
answers over ethical engagement. 
If the theatre is interrogated in its capacity and failure to witness, then the audience is likewise 
placed within the ecology of the theatrical, implicated in the processes. This is not a 
transformation, this chapter has been at pains to suggest that witnessing is not something that 
‘happens’ to someone, but rather that the audience are incorporated into the wider structures 
of witnessing across the plays. If witnessing involves a self-reflection about interpretation and 
meaning-making, then the audience are always complicit in these modes. The calls from the 
main character to witness in 4.48 Psychosis are directed, in part, to the audience, the mirrors 
and reflections of the original production enforcing this implication. Audience response, what it 
means to engage, are central to Fragile’s interrogation of response. The Question and Answer 
session and the Faux-Interval both serve in Lippy to integrate the audience in its severe critique 
of meaning-making. 
Witnessing offers a means to look at our looking. Many studies of witnessing have revolved 
around the semiotic and trauma studies; these plays show the possibility of extending our 
understandings of witnessing to the theatrical and suicidal. They show how we can move from 
beyond an attempt to lay claim to a concept, into a mode whereby we incorporate our own 
positionality, that this mode stretches across both political and ethical concerns. The critique of 
witnessing is bound up with the act of witnessing itself. Witnessing is simultaneously a critique 
of how we respond, look, interpret a phenomenon, and an action that moves beyond a critique. 
If witnessing is never fully successful, if witnessing is always in process, then nevertheless these 
plays begin to resist the old forms of violence inflicted through structurations of suicide and the 
mad. Rather than simply offer another interpretation, they reflect upon their own position, 
their relation to the suicide, and look back on their looking. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
MADNESS AND THE ETHICAL ENCOUNTER IN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
PERFORMANCE 
The practice of autobiography is enmeshed in the politics of speech and narrative. The capacity 
to speak has always been intrinsically political: who can speak, to whom, and of what do they 
speak? The demarcation of language and speech is a manifestation of power. It is for this 
reason that autobiography – within which the speaker and object of speech are synonymous – 
is popular with a variety of marginalized and persecuted groups; through autobiography, they 
become able to ‘resist marginalisation and objectification and to become, instead, speaking 
subjects within agency’ (Heddon 2008: 3). 
Autobiography as a genre is, as Jenn Stephenson notes, ‘more than simply a recording or 
retracing of a fixed, pre-existing life experience’ (Stephenson 2013: 3). Indeed, following the 
work of Phillippe Lejeune (1989), autobiography as the perfect expression of a pre-existing 
subject is an impossibility. Rather, it is the construction of a narrative out of one’s life, 
consolidated by what Lejeune refers to as the ‘autobiographical pact’, the acceptance by 
producer and spectator that what is shown is somehow ‘real’, despite its status as art. In the 
case of performance, this translates into an implication that the performer becomes the 
performed; that whilst we acknowledge the disjunction, somehow performer and performed 
become indistinguishable.  
Autobiography through performance has been marked as an idiosyncratic genre; Linda Park-
Fuller suggests that, ‘not exactly like a conventional play, a public speech, a literary narrative, or 
an autobiographical essay, this form, which partakes of each, defies traditional identification, 
containment, and criticism’ (Park-Fuller 2000: 22). The particular ontology of performance 
grants new possibilities to the politics of autobiography. As Peggy Phelan (1993) has famously 
argued, the ephemeral nature of performance capacitates its potential political radicalism. 
Performance - through its disappearance and ‘unmarked’ nature - can circumvent power-
structures that are embedded in written, archived work. Moreover, watching theatre takes 
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place amidst a community; the spectators as much a part of the event as the performer.  As 
Hans-Thies Lehmann suggests, theatre is a ‘real gathering’, where, ‘the aesthetic act itself (the 
performing) as well as the act of reception (the theatre going) takes place in as a real doing in 
the here and now’ (Lehmann 2006: 17). The politics of the relationship, not only between 
performer and audience, but between audience members becomes relevant. 
Performance, by its very ontology, can provide autobiography with a particular set of aesthetic, 
political and ethical opportunities. Obviously, it is possible for playwrights to create 
autobiographical works, thereafter performed by others. However, these performances do not 
engage in the particular politics of the physical presence of the author on the stage. Peterson 
defines ‘autobiographical performance’ as when the ‘author is onstage in the body of the 
performer’ (Peterson 1997: 12). In other words, the performed self is the performing self. It is 
this form of theatre (as opposed to autobiographical work, by a director or writer, which is 
performed in the absence of the author) that this chapter seeks to explore. 
The utilisation of the performer’s body is a core feature of autobiographical performance. All 
performance is engaged, to a certain extent, with the politics and presence of the body; it has 
even been suggested that the notion of body of the actor (all actors, whatever characterization, 
are in a sense playing themselves) highlights a common thread between autobiography and 
performance. The body lends particular significance to autobiographical performance. The body 
of the subject is site and archive of the history that is being attested to. Moreover, the presence 
of the body dictates that the ending of this ‘life narrative’ is, necessarily, the performance itself. 
Whilst much attention has been given to the rise of autobiographical performance (Peterson 
1997, Sandahl 2003) there has been limited discussion on its particular application with regards 
to mental health and madness. This is despite a variety autobiographical performance 
concerning mental health, including amongst others the work of Kim Noble, Bobby Baker, and 
Adrian Howells. Autobiographical performance gives an opportunity for those silenced by 
modern psychiatry to speak against it, and supplant the narratives of the psychiatric paradigm 
with their own. Moreover, as Geoffrey Reaume has critiqued, the academic establishment has 
given, ‘no serious attention to the voice of mad people who make up the background to their 
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studies’ (Reaume 2006: 170). The practice of autobiographical performance counters this, it 
legitimizes and centralizes the mad person as a producer of meaning and narratives concerning 
madness. 
The rise of autobiographical performance may appear surprising, in the context of post-
structuralism and post-modernism. We have seen an increasing scepticism to the idea of the 
‘essence of the individual’, or a notion of the self that is unmediated by society. However, the 
decline of the ‘unmediated self’ does not necessitate the death of selfhood as a concept; 
rather, it must incorporate the construction of identity. In other words, we must recognize that 
identity is a narrative construct; selfhood is, ‘a cloth of stories woven together’ (Ricoeur 1988: 
246). If we understand selfhood as a process and construct, the importance of autobiographical 
performance becomes more pronounced. Rather than a declaration of identity or an excavation 
of selfhood, autobiographical performance becomes potentially a process by which identity is 
formed and created. 
Many performers of the genre of ‘autobiographical performance’ have belonged to various 
marginalized groups, including those who have been involved with psychiatric institutions. 
There has been much work concerning women, homosexuals, transgendered people, disabled 
people, and mad persons. Some of the appeal of autobiographical performance to these groups 
is immediately apparent: from a practical perspective, the solo performance is comparatively 
affordable for emerging artists; moreover, the solo autobiographical performance, by its very 
nature, can avoid the structural social stigma and bias involved in the casting process. 
It is, however, the importance of narrative in the construction of identity that causes 
autobiographical performance to be a useful site of resistance for marginalized groups. 
Narratives frequently operate as power structures for prevailing hegemonies. In order to 
challenge these narratives, counter-narratives must be provided. Thus, marginalized groups 
have the most to gain from autobiographical performance, as their ‘official narratives’ have 
frequently been alienating and stigmatising. As Park-Fuller suggests, ‘experiences of illness, 
grief, crime, humiliation, crisis, and victimization are told personally and publicly, because, off-
stage, these personal stories are largely untold - at least outside of confidential groups.’ (Park-
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Fuller 2000: 23, italics in original) This is pronounced in the case of madness; those designated 
as mad persons are frequently held to be inadequate or unreliable narrators of their own 
experience. 
The Dangers of Essentialism 
The counter-narrative of disenfranchised groups is still a ‘narrative,’ rather than a revealed, 
essential ‘truth’.  Counter-narratives do not resist through automatically claiming a greater 
veracity. Rather, they provide an alternative to the hegemonic narrative. Often, this in part 
occurs through humour and irony, mocking the supposed ‘authority’ of mainstream narratives. 
Alternatively, they re-appropriate the language of the hegemony they wish to resist, with 
individuals proudly declaiming themselves as ‘crazy’, ‘mental’, or ‘mad’. This follows Judith 
Butler’s claim that, ‘those who are abjected come to make their claim through and against the 
discourses that have sought their repudiation.’ (Butler 1993: 170) Moreover, they site the 
disenfranchised individual as a legitimate producer of narratives. 
However, whilst autobiographical performance has the potential to be politically radical, it 
would be naïve to suggest that all such performance is necessarily progressive. As Deirdre 
Heddon observes: 
Some might prescribe to essentialist notions of self and identity, thereby further 
repressing or constraining us. Some might speak ‘for’, rather than ‘as’ … In acknowledging 
the potential of autobiographical performances, we need also to acknowledge the 
dangers. (Heddon 2008: 6-7) 
Under this understanding, the danger of an individual claiming to be representative of an entire 
identity, ignoring the vast heterogeneity of experience, is brought to focus. Moreover, there are 
dangers of what Jennifer Drake (2002) describes as autobiography as self-revelation, whereby 
the performer unpicks and analyzes their own life with an aim to explain or solve a 
quintessential identity. In doing so, the performer fails to demonstrate the political 
construction of identity. Within some communities, certain autobiographical narratives have 
been regarded as politically neutered. For instance, in some homosexual communities, there is 
a wariness to the narrative of ‘coming out’. Robert McRuer suggests that the narrative of 
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‘coming out’ is a, ‘suspiciously white and middle-class move towards “self-respect,” not a 
revolutionary social change, and many contemporary coming-out narratives might be seen as 
products of this shift towards individualism and essentialism’ (McRuer 1997: 36). Likewise, 
within disabled communities, there is a suspicion of ‘overcoming’ narratives, Carrie Sandahl 
claiming that, ‘I do not consider them crip stories or elements of crip culture; they fall squarely 
into the charity case and overcomer models’ (Sandahl 2003: 42-43). He connects these 
narratives to the attitude of ‘Better Dead than Disabled’ and support for euthanasia amongst 
the non-disabled. 
In these cases, we are seeing the rise of the depoliticised self, the result of a sentimental 
‘essentialism’ regarding the individual. Performance is particularly vulnerable to the mythology 
of ‘authenticity’ that essentialism brings. As Heddon observes, the confrontation with the body 
of the performer, ‘makes performance all the more tempting (and dangerous) a medium 
through which to make claims for the “real” or “truthful” self’ (Heddon 2008: 27). I would 
suggest that these essentialist narratives, far from inculcating ‘acceptance’, overwhelmingly 
produce pity in the audience. Pity, ‘implies not only compassion but contempt for the object, 
who is seen as weak or inferior.’ (Sandahl 2003: 42) This is a pity that is divorced from the 
political, and far from eliciting an ethical response, obfuscates its possibility. Far from 
establishing resistance, Sandahl  notes that, ‘playing the “supplicant” does not win one civil 
rights or even common respect’ (Sandahl 2003: 42).   
However, it is possible to create a narrative that resists such a reactionary essentialism, by 
acknowledging and incorporating the contingency of its narrative. In others words that, 
‘narrative imagination never forgets its origins in narrative imagination’ (Kearney 2002: 83). 
Park Fuller (2000) distinguishes between two different forms of autobiographical performance: 
as regressive ‘confession’ and as progressive ’testimony’. Whilst confessions perpetuate 
existing power structures, performance-as-testimony acknowledges the political construction 
of their identity, and the performance is not merely a representation of identity, but is rather 
explicitly procedural and constitutive of the identity itself. Moreover, many works engage in a 
refusal to disclose or reveal personal identity. Drake explores modes in which the performers, 
‘demonstrate that the self, close as we hold her, sleeps and wakes far beyond the reach of our 
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own arms’ (Drake 2002: 214) . For Drake, by positioning self-revelation as a public performance, 
performers can refuse to disclose and establish their right to privacy. Thus, the progressive 
autobiographical performance, in order to function as a site of resistance, requires the 
recognition of the political structuration of identity coupled with an incorporation of the 
fundamental alterity of the performer. 
The framing of autobiographical performance with the mad person as revealing an essentialist 
truth, and thus uncovering themselves as ‘knowable’, tends towards a relationship between 
audience and performer premised upon pity. Autobiographical performance that disturbs this 
notion, that frames identity as political and the performer as Other and unknowable, results in 
a different frame of spectatorship. It is necessary to examine other models of autobiographical 
performance by people who are ‘mad’ in order to establish how a relationship and connection 
not based upon pity, but rather upon alterity, and thereby an ethical encounter, can be 
achieved. 
The Ethical Encounter, Performance and Levinas 
‘The only thing that can distinguish theatre now is an ethical stance’ (Read 1993: 6). This bold 
statement by Alan Read, placing ethics as the principal objective of contemporary theatre, 
quickly leads to another question: what constitutes an ‘ethical’ theatre? Claire Wallace notes 
that in the work of both Read and Lehmann, there is a suggestion that, ‘theatre’s ethical 
promise lies in illuminating and enacting forms of relationality and connection’ (Wallace 2014: 
118). That it is theatre’s concern with connectivity – not only between performers, but crucially 
between performer and audience – that capacitates it ethically.  
In terms of ethics, I am not referring to the adherence to a system of rules, the possession of 
certain personality traits, or the pursuit of certain consequences and outcomes. Rather, ethics 
is an encounter that occurs between the self and an Other, whereby the self understands itself 
as responsible to and for this Other. Ethics is not the systematisation of this obligation, it 
evades systematization, to systematize is to do violence to it; rather it is the compulsion and 
feeling of obligation itself. Nor is it the reciprocation of this obligation; the ethical relationship 
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between the self and Other is fundamentally a-symmetrical; the self feels obligated, but does 
not claim the Other reciprocates this obligation. 
The work of Emmanuel Levinas can be helpful in elucidating the notion of ethics; following the 
‘ethical turn’ in Theatre and Performance Studies across the last 15 years, the work of Levinas 
has been useful in understanding the ethical possibilities of theatre. Levinas (1991, 1994) claims 
that ethical responsibility is instilled by the face-to-face encounter with the Other. This face is 
not a literal ‘face’, but nevertheless is phenomenological, an encounter with a presence than is 
Other than ourselves. The encounter with the face results in an ethical ‘demande’ to the self; 
the Other remains unknowable to the self, but the self is obligated. This phenomenological 
aspect to Levinas’s theory explains the appeal to those studying performance; the presence of 
the performer and the audience’s relationship to the performer’s embodied presence is a 
defining trait of performance. 
The application of the philosophy of Levinas to performance is not unproblematic. Levinas 
himself was highly sceptical of art, arguing in his article ‘Reality and its Shadow’ that the 
aesthetic process was a needless obstruction to the naturally occurring ethical encounter, 
claiming that it, ‘constitutes, in a world of initiative and responsibility, a dimension of evasion’ 
(Levinas 1989: 141), that it is ‘the very event of obscuring, a descent of the night an invasion of 
shadow’ (Levinas 1989: 132). In this spirit, it is important to note that I do not argue theatre is 
simply a replication or practical manifestation of Levinas’s ethics as a whole. Indeed, as Simon 
Critichley has noted, the welcome increasing use of Levinas has often been accompanied by a 
fawning reverence, ‘much of the work on Levinas tends to confine itself to exegesis, 
commentary … and at its worst, homage’ (Critchley 2004: 172) Rather, I am drawing specifically 
upon his notions of ethics as a phenomenological encounter, as an asymmetrical relationship of 
obligation, as unsystematized, and as based upon a fundamental alterity. Following these 
notions, I am exploring how certain performances have demonstrated how this ethical 
encounter can be instigated and, moreover, how in the context of madness its instigation can 
be a radical act of resistance. 
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The adoption of the ethical should not necessarily involve an abandonment of the political. The 
work of Howard Caygill (2002) clearly exposes the rich political backdrop to Levinas’s work. That 
his work emerged between the twin catastrophes of twentieth century anti-Semitism - the 
Dreyfus Affair and the Shoah - is key to Levinas’s critique of Martin Heidegger. In his recourse to 
communality, there is a clear influence of French republicanism, in his reconceptualization of 
‘fraternité’. Likewise, his problematic statements concerning Israel, when faced with the plight 
of the Palestinians, that, ‘in alterity we can find an enemy’ (Levinas 1989: 294).  
Whilst the sundering of the ethical and political may be of great conceptual use, they rely upon 
one another, one capacitating the other. If the ethical encounter composes a question that 
must be answered with a decision, then that decision must take place in a political arena. 
Jacques Derrida has thoughtfully expounded upon this; noting that, the ethical not only 
requires a decision in the political arena, it capacitates the political. The infinite demand of the 
ethical encounter means no decision, or answer, can be fully just; as a result, our response 
becomes undecidable, and thereby a meaningful decision (an ‘already decidable decision’ is 
meaningless). The hiatus between the political and ethical capacitates the decision, whereas, 
‘without silence, without the hiatus … we could simply unfold knowledge into a programme of 
or course of action. Nothing could make us more irresponsible; nothing could be more 
totalitarian’ (Derrida 1999: 117). I am not questioning to what extent these performances 
provide a political ‘answer’ which the audiences can adopt; but I am noting that any such 
decision the audience makes will necessarily take form in the political arena. 
Beyond this, I want to suggest and explore how the ‘face of the Other’ can become obscured. 
Hegemonic structures that construct our understanding of madness have situated the mad 
person as ‘knowable’, and thereby undermined the alterity that is the basis of an ethical 
encounter. Where political and social structures have obstructed the ethical relationship 
through this knowability, I would suggest that performance can have a crucial role in 
reinstituting the ethical encounter and re-incorporating the alterity of the Other. In contrast to 
Levinas, who reveals an almost Platonic suspicion of the aesthetic, where art is only obstruction 
to the natural ethical encounter, I want to follow the possibility of performer as a positive and 
proactive force to re-imagine and invigorate the ethical encounter. 
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To what extent do the performances of this chapter capacitate this radical ethical questioning, 
and position the audience’s decision? There is a sentiment that an emphasis upon the 
immediacy of performance underwrites its ethical potential, Nicholas Ridout notes: 
Levinas’ account of the encounter with the face offers the appealing prospect of 
identifying theatre and performance (in which such encounters are presumed to be a 
central element) as a cultural practice particularly well suited to the exploration of ethics 
(Ridout 2009: 54).  
This suggests that utilising the precarity and responsivity of performance can emphasize the 
presence of the Other. It relies upon the phenomenological immediacy of the encounter with 
the actor’s body (and face) in performance. This becomes heightened in the context of 
autobiographical performance, as the body of the performer becomes synonymous with the 
body of the performed subject. Unlike textual accounts of autobiography, the audience are 
confronted, in a phenomenological encounter, with both the metaphorical and literal ‘face’ of 
the Other. Yet this understanding of ethics as an untroubled phenomenological encounter is 
problematic. I would argue that this neglects the importance of alterity in the ethical 
relationship. It is the fundamental ‘unknowability’ of the Other that informs and capacitates our 
ethical relationship. If the Other is knowable, it is possible to systematize and satisfactorily 
‘answer’ the ethical question. However, the unknowability of the Other necessitates that ethics 
is an ongoing process of continually reassessing our relationship to the Other. In this sense, we 
can understand the ethical relationship as contrary to essentialist narratives which inculcate a 
relationship of pity. 
Sherrill Grace suggests that autobiographical performance has the potential to ‘use the facts of 
a personal story to make us rethink the concept of self and the relationship of self to other’ 
(Grace 2001: 15, italics in original). Following this, I want to ask how the forthcoming 
autobiographical performances instigate an ethical response from the audience, not merely by 
playing upon the precarity and immediacy of performance, but by simultaneously 
problematizing and complicating our relationship with this precarity. I do not wish to deny that 
the ‘reality’ of the phenomenological encounter in theatre elicits particular effects. I want to 
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question to what extent these performances play upon what Rick Knowles (2006) terms as a 
‘phenomenological frisson’, whereby a tension develops between the compulsion of the 
phenomenological encounter of performance and its theatrical semiotic framing. 
Related to this, many of these pieces play upon a notion or sentiment of the ‘authentic’. As 
discussed earlier, the ‘autobiographical pact’ involves the sentiment the work however ‘real’, 
that in performance the performer and performed are synonymous. This thesis is un-interested 
in the application or achievability of the authentic. Rather, I am interested in how ‘aesthetics of 
authenticity’ are constructed and manipulated by these performances. By problematizing our 
encounter with the performer, by bringing the politics of representation to a crisis, the 
audience’s relationship and aesthetic interpretation of the performer and performance 
becomes fundamentally undecidable. It is that which renders our relationship with the 
performer based upon alterity. Whilst we are called to make a decision, the decision is never 
finalized and is always in doubt. Indeed, it is the doubt and alterity that render it an ethical 
‘decision’ rather than merely consequential.  
The Uncertain Hand in James Leadbitter’s Mental 
James Leadbitter’s Mental is a work preoccupied with talking and showing; Leadbitter 
(otherwise known as ‘the vacuum cleaner’) talks candidly and explicitly about his experiences 
with sectioning, political activism, modern psychiatry, suicide, and the police. It is a 
performance that could appear initially as adopting aesthetics with no scepticism of the 
potential of performance to unambiguously communicate the experience of madness. 
However, I will suggest that Mental radically shifts in its aesthetic, and leads the audience to 
question the autobiographical theatre and its relationship with mimesis. 
Throughout Mental, Leadbitter is alert to the structuration of identity, and its political 
signification. The performance is made possible through the acquisition of his personal records 
through the Freedom of Information Act of the United Kingdom 2000. Leadbitter’s account 
necessarily frames the treatment of his mental health with his history of political activism and 
encounters with the police. Police reports upon Leadbitter’s activism and his medical records 
are interwoven; the audience are invited to see parallels between these two bodies of social 
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control. Police frequently appear at the most catastrophic points of Leadbitter’s narrative; two 
policemen discover him following his second suicide attempt. Leadbitter notes how one of the 
policemen insulted and mocked him upon their discovery. The performance is haunted by the 
presence of undercover policemen in various environmentalist activist groups and their 
eventual betrayal. When a psychiatric profiling test labels Leadbitter as ‘paranoid’, the audience 
laugh, confronted with the absurdity of a state apparatus that justifies such suspicion and then 
proceeds to medicalize it. 
In the climax of the performance, Leadbitter creates his own Mental Health Act and sections 
himself under it, a renunciation of the state’s oppressive legislation, premised upon the 
facilitation of art and use of self-expression. The notion of sectioning oneself is an absurdity; yet 
it represents a reclaiming of personal sovereignty. It is an act of resistance; to prevent being 
sectioned by the state, he decides to commit himself. In doing so, rather than recourse to a de-
politicized or essentialist self, he explicitly creates his own narrative and legalistic framework. 
That is to say, by appropriating the legalistic terms of ‘mental health act’ and ‘sectioning’, 
rather than attempting to create an ‘authentic’ or ‘unmediated’ confession, Leadbitter is 
acknowledging his resistance is also a narrative and legalistic framework, and thereby 
constructed. Rather than a recourse to essentialism, Leadbitter incorporates the contingency of 
his narrative, whilst establishing himself as a legitimate producer of narratives. Additionally, this 
has the effect of highlighting the contingency of the ‘official’ narrative created by the state. The 
reclaiming of the mad person’s right to construct his or her own identity is the basis of the 
performance (the requisition of his documents makes the performance possible) and the 
performance itself (the performance itself, the ‘end’ of the narrative, is a public reclaiming of 
his narrative). 
James Leadbitter’s background, rather than a traditional theatrical performer, has been as a 
performance artist and as an activist. His work teases the edges between artist and activist; in a 
project such as Madlove, Leadbitter attempts to reimagine the asylum, working with people 
deemed mad by society, with lived experience of acute mental health difficulties, to forge their 
own spaces of care. His own work in Mental both emerges and discusses these aesthetic 
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practices. Mental itself emerged out of Ship of Fools, an initiative whereby he sectioned himself 
as resistance to being forcibly admitted to a psychiatric ward. 
This section will concern itself with the work by artists who have been sectioned; the rest of this 
chapter contains autobiographical work by those who, if having a turbulent relationship with 
mental health services, were never formally sectioned. In addition to Leadbitter, I shall briefly 
bring Talk About Something You Like by Byron Vincent into comparison. Both these figures were 
sectioned multiple times throughout their 20s, in an environment whereby sectioning was 
sharply increasing as a mode to control mad bodies (following Labour’s authoritarian shifts in 
the New Labour period, culminating in the 2007 reforms to the 1983 Mental Health Act), even 
as mental health services were perennially underfunded and the supposed ‘parity of esteem’ 
between physical and mental health services stood as a fog of fantastical rhetoric bathing over 
an ever-depreciating landscape. 
The analysis of this performances stems from watching Leadbitter perform in Bristol in 2014 
and Vincent’s 2014 production in Exeter in The Bikeshed. Leadbitter has toured the show to 
various locations. Much of this analysis stems from a thick observation of the encounter that 
occurred between myself, the audience, and Leadbitter. By nature of Leadbitter’s use of setting 
(avoiding traditional theatre venues), the experience of the encounter would vary according to 
the venue chosen, the means of staging, the size of the audience. As a result, my analysis is tied 
to the Bristol performance, though informed more widely by commentators who attended the 
work at other locations. 
The Aesthetic of Authenticity 
Despite the clear acknowledgment of political construction, Mental at first seems to adopt a 
more essentialist faith in the possibilities of the immediacy of performance. Rather than taking 
place in a traditional theatrical space, Mental is performed in a small house; spectators are 
given the address a few days prior to the performance. This unconventional build-up to a 
production is followed by an unusual form of hospitality; upon arrival, they are escorted to 
small room in which to wait, asked to remove their shoes, and provided with a cup of tea and a 
slice of carrot cake. All of this suggests an attempt to undercut our traditional understandings 
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of theatrical artifice. Rather, it attempts to replace this with an aesthetic of authenticity; it 
appears to more closely follow the conventions of a social gathering, rather than the 
attendance of a theatrical production. 
Eventually, the audience are taken to the room where the performance will take place, a small 
and stuffy bedroom with little room and space. The majority of the space is taken up by a 
duvet, from under which James Leadbitter climbs out of to begin his performance. His mode of 
address to the audience is direct; it is easy to form eye-contact, as the lighting is merely that of 
a domestic bedroom. He states that he will be talking about suicide, and notes if anyone wants 
to leave, that is understandable. Later on, he again enquires if the audience is ok, whether 
anyone is feeling upset. No-one responds, yet he pauses, and appears willing to communicate 
or respond to the audience. He appears to treat the audience, not as passive spectators, but as 
emotional individuals with whom he wishes to connect. 
This aesthetic of the authentic continues in his use of equipment and props. The technology is 
mostly analogue: music is intermittently played on a record player, medical records are 
displayed through an over-head projector. When he shows his medical and police records that 
he has procured through the Freedom of Information Act 2000, he pulls out the piles and piles 
of physical copies from underneath the duvet; as though the bureaucratic weight and heaviness 
can be conveyed by their physical presence. Likewise, when discussing the medication given to 
him and its side effects, large numbers of anti-depressant packaging and pills are piled before 
the audience. In both these cases, ‘heaviness’ (whether of bureaucracy or medication) is 
conveyed by literal bulk and weight, a preference of metonym over metaphor. 
The manner in which Leadbitter describes his lived experience of mental distress follows this 
notion; he denies any obstacle or difficulty in understanding his experiences. Far from 
suggesting that suicide is an incomprehensible trauma, Leadbitter claims to the audience that 
understanding suicide is simple. He asks the audience to imagine a physical pain so 
overwhelming that life becomes unbearable. This comparison again is not metaphorical, but 
rather a substitution; suicide is not something ‘traumatic’ and unfathomable, but rather the 
mental equivalent of physical pain. 
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Leadbitter frequently draws upon the importance and placing of his body within the 
performance. At one point of the performance, he reads a police report of his presence at a 
protest, noting the words ‘Our Civilization is Fucked’ scarred upon his back. Sardonically 
correcting the report, Leadbitter turns his back to the audience and pulls up his top to reveal 
the words, ‘This Civilisation is Fucked,’ a clear shift in its lack of a possessive.  The scars 
themselves, procured in a performance piece with Franko B, alert to the politicization of the 
body, are a reclaiming of the space of his body, so often confined and claimed by the state 
through the process of sectioning. But this correction of the police report also takes advantage 
of the immediacy of performance, to establish Leadbitter as the ultimate authority over his 
body. 
Whilst discussing suicide, he attempts to comfort the audience, by noting that however 
distressing, the story is fundamentally one of survival. His body is a guarantee of this fact; no 
matter what form of distressing subject matter, from a chronological standpoint, the end of his 
story is always the performance which the audience is experiencing. Jill Dolan suggests that 
performance is an encounter with the mortality of the actor, claiming that, ‘sharing the liveness 
promotes a necessary and moving confrontation with mortality.’ (Dolan 2001: 459) However, 
this is not sufficient, as Stephenson notes, ‘death is both promised by autobiography and 
explicitly excluded from it.’ (Stephenson 2013: 131); alongside the promise of the actor’s 
eventual death, we also regard its current procrastination; performance is also a denial of 
death, a defiant ‘not yet’. Following this, I would suggest all autobiographical performance is a 
testament to the continued survival of the subject.16 In contrast to Barthes’ notion in Camera 
Lucida (1993) of the photograph-as-memorial, continually observant of death, autobiographical 
performance is lively, vivacious, a paean to life. His survival is necessary for the performance to 
function. In making this observation, he is evoking the notion of the body as site and archive for 
previous lived experience. He continually endorses the authentic notion of body as immediate 
presence and phenomenological encounter. 
                                                          
16 Even performances playing upon the imminent mortality of the performer, for instance Ken Garnhum’s 1994 
performance piece Pants on Fire, require (by virtue of the necessary continued presence) the continued survival of 
the performer. 
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Leadbitter is never naïve or essentialist concerning his identity as mad person; all of these 
aesthetic strategies frame Leadbitter’s identity in a political setting. The narrative is not one of 
his ‘essential’ truth, but rather framing his experiences with mental health services. The 
production is made possible through Leadbitter’s requisition of his personal records, a 
reclaiming of identity, as he attempts to create his own narrative. The body is regarded as a site 
of struggle that needs to be reclaimed from the state. Yet, it could potentially appear that 
Leadbitter is indulging in an aesthetic of authenticity: he attempts to undermine the traditional 
rituals that denote a performance and thereby inculcate artificiality; he addresses the audience 
directly, asks after their emotional state; the mise en scène of the production insists upon the 
‘physical truth’ of the performance; his use of the body engages in its immediate presence, 
rather than the discourses which construct it. Whilst Leadbitter is suspicious of essentialism of 
identity, it could appear that he is indulging in another problematic aesthetic: the heralding of 
performance as unproblematically immediate, and the fundamental comprehensibility of the 
Other. However, I wish to suggest that rather than purely indulge, the production disrupts this 
aesthetic. 
The Rupture of the Aesthetic of Authenticity 
In a later episode of the piece, Leadbitter clearly and unambiguously ruptures the artifice of 
authenticity that he had produced. He describes his actions prior to his second suicide attempt. 
He notes how, before the attempt, he goes to a café in order to enjoy two of his favourite 
things: a slice of carrot cake and a cup of tea. This reframed the carrot cake and tea received on 
arrival from a kind act of hospitality to an integrated part of the performance. The aesthetics of 
the performance are ruptured; what was previously a moment framing the performance as 
‘authentic’ and ‘un-performative’ is reframed as semiotic, structured and re-integrated into the 
artificial semiotics of performance.  
This is not a gesture intended to elicit a response of identification or sympathy, to incorporate 
the audience into the act of the suicide attempt, but rather to disturb the experience of 
spectatorship. Leadbitter shatters the illusion of ‘authenticity’ that he had so carefully 
developed at the beginning of the performance. Leadbitter had carefully developed an 
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aesthetic of authenticity, using the variety of methods described beforehand, only to break it 
apart. He encourages the audience into not interpreting the work as a traditional performance; 
only to later emphasize how this ‘authentic moment’ was, in fact, a construct. In the 
performance that I saw, upon arrival people were readily conversant with strangers, the tea 
and cake having relaxed their sensibilities; however, upon the end of the production, most 
were silent, quickly picked up their belongings and left. 
In this context, it is possible to approach the conflict between these two aspects of the 
production: the appeal for authenticity followed by its renunciation. This breach of 
‘authenticity’ is arguably more effective than a continual aesthetic scepticism or nervousness. 
The audience is aesthetically jilted; cultivated expectations have been deliberately undermined. 
In the context of his earlier comment that suicide was ‘easy’ to understand, comparable to a 
physical pain, the gesture of the carrot cake and cup of tea seems a complete renunciation. 
Rather than understand or comprehend Leadbitter’s experience, the inadequacy of our 
understanding is illuminated. 
This conflict, between authenticity and aesthetic scepticism, finds its culmination in a particular 
moment of the performance. At one instance in the production I saw, Leadbitter began to 
stumble on his words, till he fell silent, at the brink of tears. He breathed in deeply, before 
apologising and saying he normally doesn’t find performing the performance as difficult. The 
spectators find it difficult to know how to respond, and look at one another. There is a long 
silence. One person reaches out, and almost puts her hand upon Leadbitter’s arm. 
In some ways, this is a continuation of the stripping back of theatrical artifice, the aesthetic of 
‘authenticity’, whereby the performer can acknowledge emotional difficulty or pain in the midst 
of the ‘performance’. It could emphasize the precarity of performance, and thereby the 
unmediated encounter with the performer: an emotional outburst or reaction can emerge from 
within the performance itself, rather than structured or edited subsequently. Yet my reaction to 
this moment was not an immediate acceptance of this as an emotional outburst; rather I 
questioned whether the event had been premeditated or if it was spontaneous. Far from 
feeling a sense of unquestioned ‘immediacy’ with Leadbitter, I found myself suspicious and 
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resistant. This is rendered further complicated by a blog-post describing a later production of 
Mental, produced at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival, where Lyn Gardner similarly describes how 
Leadbitter breaks down and says he is finding it difficult (Gardner 2014: np). Consulting others 
who had seen the performance, it was clear this outburst had occurred on other occasions. 
However, it was also clear that Leadbitter did not perform this ‘breakdown’ in every 
performance. This further complicates the event’s relationship with precarity. However, I would 
resist the notion that this ‘unreliable’ or ‘improvised’ aspect of performance results in an 
unfettered precarity. Far from rendering the event un-problematically ‘live’ and immediate, I 
wold claim that it demonstrates how even precarity can be structured. The emotional 
breakdown becomes a potential ‘event’; those who read Gardner’s review will wonder if they 
potentially will have it occur in their production. 
The nature of live performance means that spontaneous events can ‘intrude’ upon the planned 
structure of performance; the most famous examples being the phenomena of drying and 
corpsing. On the other hand, it is also possible to fake and use the supposed ‘spontaneity’ of 
these phenomena, to exploit the particular effect that the ‘accidental’ inculcates. There is a 
series of alternative explanations for how Leadbitter’s breakdown occurred: that it is a 
constructed moment repeated for each performance; that it is a genuine event that has 
irrupted several times; that he has constructed a particular way to ‘perform’ when he is 
genuinely upset in rehearsals for the production; that he felt genuinely upset performing on 
one occasion, and decided to represent and repeat it in future performances; that it is a 
manufactured event he occasionally performs. All of these different possibilities offer differing 
notions and explanations of the relationship between the ‘authentic’ and ‘mimesis’. 
Ethical Responses to Mimetic Shimmering 
In order to fully understand what Leadbitter is doing in this moment, Patrick Duggan’s 
interpretation of Michael Taussig’s work in Mimesis and Alterity (1993) is highly pertinent. In 
my first reaction to Leadbitter’s ‘breakdown’, I was drawn into the confusion as to its status as 
either ‘real’ or ‘representation’. This binary is a false dichotomy; the concepts are mutually 
constitutive. Theatre is always simultaneously both real and representational; in Duggan’s 
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words, ‘the theatrical or performative event is always already both representational, at the 
level of its fiction, and real, at the level of it happening in the world’ (Duggan 2014: 191). This is 
further complicated by the relationship of representation to the politics of madness in 
autobiographical performance.  
There are moments and shifts in performance whereby the tensions within the aporia of 
real/representation are brought to the spectator’s attention; in these situations, the status of a 
moment as either ‘real’ or ‘fiction’ becomes fundamentally undecidable. Duggan claims that 
these moments can be the result of careful planning and procedure. He notes two main ways in 
which this ambiguity occurs, one of which is ‘an irruption of the mimetic into the real which 
unsettles the viewer; the possibility that what we are watching might after all be imitative’ 
(Duggan 2014: 64). Duggan terms this uncertainty, whereby the status of something is 
undecidable as either ‘real’ or ‘mimesis’, as ‘mimetic shimmering’. 
In the instance when Leadbitter breaks down, there is no ‘correct answer’ with which to 
understand or bracket the experience. Rather, the various possible explanations are an attempt 
to grapple with the aporia being presented. This aporia, between ‘authenticity’ and 
‘performance’, emerges across the performance. But this moment represents a fulcrum, 
whereby the aesthetic of the real begins to reach a crisis. It creates a form of Duggan’s ‘mimetic 
shimmering’, as the mimetic irrupts into the real. This interrogation of the mimetic practice of 
theatre is intimately connected to the aporia of autobiographical performance. 
For Duggan, these moments of mimetic shimmering can result in an experience of trauma itself. 
Duggan claims that the clash of the aporia of mimesis and reality forms a synecdochal 
relationship with trauma as a whole. However, I find this argument problematic; in contrast, I 
would not presume that the breakdown of Leadbitter allowed me to approach or experience 
his psychological viewpoint, nor the trauma of his suicide attempt. Critchley (1999: 185) has 
suggested that the ethical language of Levinas is premised upon a fundamentally traumatic 
semiotics. Pushing this, I would suggest the trauma Duggan denotes, is not the trauma of the 
performer, but rather the traumatic structures of ethical language. I would suggest that the 
crisis and confusion of representation, in the particular context of autobiographical 
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performance, leads to an ethical encounter. In other words, our aesthetic interpretation of the 
performer becomes ethically loaded.  
When Lyn Gardner responded to the event, she describes her doubts and confusion in highly 
ethical terms: ‘I feel that maybe we have failed him. That maybe we should have given him a 
hug at that moment. After all, it's not as if there was any kind of fourth wall. Or would that 
simply have been patronising?’ (Gardner 2014: np). The aesthetic crisis causes us to be unsure 
how to interpret and understand what is occurring. However, as this is autobiographical 
performance, wherein the performer is also the performer, the aesthetic crisis also becomes 
interlinked with how the audience regard the performer as Levinasian Other. In the context of 
Mental, the way I interpret Leadbitter’s breakdown becomes connected with how I should be 
ethically responsible to Leadbitter himself. Is my suspicion of his practice ungenerous or 
callous? Do I owe it to him to believe? Or rather, as Gardner suggests, is it patronising to 
rescind my instinctive suspicion?  
This moment of decision can only exist in a climate when the audience is unsure as to its status 
as engaging in mimesis or the real. In negotiating this status, the audience is also confronting 
the fundamental alterity of Leadbitter as an Other. It is the undecidability, leading to an alterity 
with the Other, that establishes a connection based upon ethical responsibility. This contrasts 
to a relationship of pity, which is premised upon the fundamental knowability of the Other, 
when the performer supposedly ‘reveals’ him or herself to us through confession. 
Alternative Directions of Mimetic Shimmering 
In the case of Mental, the mimetic shimmering is engineered by a shift from the ‘authentic’ and 
‘real’ to the ‘structured’ and ‘mimetic’. However, it should be noted that mimetic shimmering 
can be elicited in both directions. A performance can adopt a fundamentally sceptical aesthetic, 
before shifting to a gesture towards the ‘real’. In order to illustrate this alternative and to offer 
a comparison to Mental, I shall briefly explore Talk About Something You Like by Byron Vincent. 
Vincent incorporates the impossibility of his imparting ‘truth’, the problematic aspects of 
autobiography, into his performance. Moreover, he links the failure to connect with the 
audience to his mental health. Throughout the performance, he notes the ongoing conflict 
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between artifice and authenticity, connection and distance, and shows how these issues 
enmesh with questions of mental health. In one particular moment, through a consolidation 
and crisis of the various themes and attitudes, the audience is brought to a crisis of 
representation. At the culmination of the performance, Vincent acknowledges that he cannot 
fully enable himself to talk about empathy or human connection in the arena of the 
performance, as it would sound false or platitudinous; in contrast, Vincent describes how his 
moments of ‘mania’ allow him to understand and express things he otherwise could not.  
However, performance excludes the possibility of being in a ‘manic state’. Throughout the 
performance, various video segments are shown of Vincent wearing a Mexican wrestler’s mask 
whilst speaking in an unidentifiable accent. He reveals that these segments were created in his 
bedroom during a manic phase and were not formed with the production in mind. 
As with Mental, the use of the precarious, the ‘accidental’ and the ‘unintentional’, even in a 
structured context, are used in order to play upon notions of the ‘real’. The ‘accidental’ incident 
of Mental, in the form of Leadbitter’s breakdown, brought an aesthetic of authenticity to a 
crisis of representation; in contrast, Vincent’s display of the ‘accidental’ is a gesture to 
authenticity after a show that has carefully attempted to tread around the issue of self-
representation. Prior to this moment, the production has continually shown scepticism to 
notions of authenticity, and the notion of the ‘unperformed’ autobiography. However, there 
has been no reconciliation between his wish to ‘connect’ and the recognition of difference. The 
performance has continually vacillated between these two desires.  
Vincent uses the possibilities of digital recording to impart his spontaneity; there is a suggestion 
that spontaneity can be ‘captured’; however, this spontaneity is edited, displayed and placed in 
the context of live performance. The difficulty and impossibility of authenticity does not cease 
at this juncture. As in the context of Mental, such moments of authenticity are always possible 
to scrutinize. He could be lying. He could have intended to use the material amidst his manic 
episode. Even if it was not intended specifically for the production, it could have been 
developed in the knowledge it would be potential future material. In this sense, Vincent’s 
announcement that the videos were unintended for performance becomes a form of plea. 
Vincent has been rigorous in noting the structures and aporias in autobiography and 
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performance; his shift to a more emotional, seemingly sentimental, approach to representation 
must be understood in this context. Far from sentimental, Vincent acknowledges the structural 
problems of ‘authenticity’. He is, in this context, asking the audience to put aside the anxieties 
of representation and believe him.  
To return to Duggan’s notion of ‘mimetic shimmering’, after continual reminders of the mimetic 
processes inherent in representation, Vincent is attempting to incorporate the ‘real’. Duggan 
notes that ‘mimetic shimmering’ can happen from both the irruption of the real into the 
mimetic and the mimetic into the real (Duggan 2014: 64). In contrast to Mental, Talk About 
Something You Like is incorporating the ‘real’ into the mimetic. This irruption is not necessarily 
the video itself, but rather the appeal from the performer. As an audience member, I myself 
became confused and unsure as to how to respond, confronted with this appeal for a belief in 
authenticity in the context of a piece that highlighting the artificiality of representation. 
Mimetic shimmering does not, within and of itself, possess political content. Whilst Mental 
continually brackets and frames our relationship with Leadbitter in political terms, it should be 
noted that the ethical response is not a particular choice made, but rather, the process of 
making a decision in relation to the Other-as-Mad-Person. Different audience members will 
have had completely different responses to Leadbitter’s breakdown; the performer cannot 
solicit a particular response. However, the performance asks the audience a question, to which 
each member is compelled to respond.  Rather than the particularities of how each audience 
member chooses to react to the instance of ‘mimetic shimmering’, the crucial factor that 
renders the performance as a site of resistance is the ethical confrontation and how the 
performance compels the audience member to make a decision.  
Mental achieves this mimetic shimmering through a clash of ‘authenticity’ and ‘representation’; 
the performance begins by cultivating an aesthetic of authenticity, only to undercut this 
aesthetic and reveal its mimetic moorings. In contrast, Talk About Something You Like 
deconstructs the aporia of mimesis and the real from the beginning, but attempts to resolve it 
by an appeal for belief in authenticity at the very end. Despite, in some senses, acting in 
opposite paths, these performances are both participating in the same destabilization of 
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representational politics. Contemporary attitudes of madness have silenced and clouded our 
ethical relationship to the mad person; modern psychiatry deems the mad person 
fundamentally knowable. This knowability obscures the face of the Other-as-Mad Person; the 
danger of autobiographical performance is that a sentimental notion of the ontology of 
performance providing unmediated access to the performer can re-enforce this knowability. 
However, through mimetic shimmering, the alterity of the mad person can be reinstated, and 
our ethical encounter renewed. 
Hearing Silence in Dylan Tighe’s RECORD 
RECORD is an exploration of Dylan Tighe’s personal experience with depression, medication and 
the Irish psychiatric system. Conceived as a multi-platform performance project, RECORD 
denotes a variety of artistic responses to Tighe’s experiences, including an album, public fora, 
interviews, and an ‘alternative opera’, a theatrical performance inspired and structured by 
songs from the album. This analysis will primarily be concerned with the performance of this 
‘opera’.  A collage of a filmed interview, verbatim recitations of his medical records, fictional 
scenes imagining an alternative treatment, and songs written by Tighe himself, RECORD situates 
Tighe’s personal experience in a political landscape. 
Throughout RECORD, Tighe barely speaks. He recites documents, lines from Hamlet, and 
intersperses the performance with his songs, but hardly talks in his own words throughout the 
entire performance. Tighe’s production revolves around silence: as an imposition (the silencing 
of Tighe by modern psychiatry), as a practicality (his silence is, in part, a pragmatic solution to 
Tighe’s struggles with learning lines), and as a means of resistance. The means of this resistance 
is multifarious. I see Tighe re-perform the act of his ‘silencing’. I see him partake in silence-as-
withdrawal, as he recedes from ‘reality’ in a sequence of fictional scenes, imagining an 
alternative path of treatment. I see him deliberately deprive us of commentary, through 
physical and verbal language. The question of silence – how it is produced, what it does, how it 
functions – haunts performance. It is a challenge of interpretation to the audience, a spectacle 
infinitely readable. Park-Fuller notes how autobiographical narrative particularly benefits from 
performance’s affinity with silence, as performance, ‘provides a platform for the unspoken – 
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the absent – word – as well as an aesthetic space in which to evoke an absent world’ (Park-
Fuller 2000: 23, italics in original) 
In the context of autobiographical theatre, wherein the performer is the performed, the 
audience are not only engaging with the body of the performer, but the subject of the 
performed. The subject of interpretation, the referent and signified of the semiotic structures, 
is an individual Other. If we follow Phelan (1993), that silence not only excites our interpretative 
processes, but results in a self-reflexive understanding of our ‘reckoning,’ then in the context of 
autobiographical theatre, we are drawn to critique how we interpret the performing and 
performed subject. The silence acts as a mirror, reflecting ourselves in our spectatorship, to 
look back at our looking. John Lutterbie (1999) suggests that in the face of silence, even this 
meta-construction becomes an arbitrary imposition upon the silence. However, in contrast to 
Lutterbie, I suggest that in the context of autobiographical performance, in our reconsideration 
of ‘looking’, ceasing to search for a stable meaning, there results in an embrace and 
confrontation with the alterity of the Other. This alerts how interpretation can act as 
engagement, yet can also be intrusive, act as violence upon the Other. This raises awareness of 
the ethical implications of spectatorship. 
The potential of autobiographical performance’s ability to resist depends upon the means by 
which it frames and controls the audience-performer relationship. I wish to suggest that 
through RECORD’s use of silence (as palpable in its immediacy and as withdrawing from 
authenticity), the audience becomes confronted, the relationship between the performer and 
audience fundamentally challenged. The silence forces an acknowledgement of the performer, 
whilst restricting any information that could elucidate or explain him. Indeed, the silence is 
presented as necessary and essential for approaching the performer, as the means by which 
Tighe can express his lived experience. I shall now explore the different forms of Tighe’s silence, 
as re-performance, as withdrawal, as refusal, and how these modes affect the audience. 
In contrast to Leadbitter, Dylan Tighe is a professional actor, of both theatre and television. 
Throughout the piece, he plays with this background. In noting the various connections of the 
companies and practitioners across this thesis, Tighe has recently worked with Dead Centre on 
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Chekhov’s First Play. RECORD represents his first professional foray into professional music. 
RECORD played at the Half Moon Theatre at the Cork Theatre Festival in 2012, my analysis is 
drawn from a recording of the production during the festival, from Tighe’s own commentary 
concerning his work, and an assortment of accounts of the performance by those who saw it 
live. 
Tighe’s background and experiences have been within the Irish mental health system. Whilst 
there are marked similarities between the British and Irish systems and legislation and Tighe 
focuses upon the rise of medication as a treatment tool that is certainly common to both, the 
particular background of Ireland offers particular challenges. To invoke silence, to invoke the 
speaking over of a voice, offers a different significance in the context of Ireland. The 
significance of erasure of language, of silence and the voice, takes on particular purchase where 
an indigenous language has been attempted to be removed by a colonial force. This analysis 
attempts to take into account the particularity, even as it draws connections between the wider 
context of autobiographical performance. 
Silence Made Palpable For the Audience 
The work of the composer John Cage would suggest that there is no true silence in 
performance, that there is always noise, if only the pumping of our heart and the electronic 
signals of our nervous system. But this is to ignore the endemic structural silences of the world, 
silences notable by the absence of what we expected to hear. John Lutterbie suggests that the 
silence of the performer is made noticeable by means of the ‘ambient noise’, for Lutterbie, ‘it is 
the oscillation between the ambient and the still presence of the live performer that gives her 
silence its rhetorical effect. “Why are you doing this? Tell me what you mean!”’ (Lutterbie 1999: 
14) Going further than Lutterbie, I would suggest silence is made possible and palpable by its 
framing, by the context and structure that surrounds it. In autobiographical performance, the 
audience encounter the body of the performer, knowing the body is the archive and site of the 
performed subject’s experience; the audience expect the body to speak. 
In the beginning of RECORD, Tighe reads out his medical documentation, requisitioned through 
the Freedom of Information Act of Ireland 1997. Tighe’s condition is catalogued and listed as 
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various symptoms of disease, rather than the emotional turmoil and subjective experience of 
Tighe. In effect, the medical records ‘translate’ Tighe’s emotional experience and mental 
distress into ‘objective’ information (in other words, identifiable symptoms) relevant to the 
biomedical paradigm. This information is then collated in order to make an eventual diagnosis 
of, ‘a depressive episode on a bipolar basis’. This diagnosis is, in effect, a depersonalization and 
categorization of Tighe. It has translated his subjective experience, into an objective, 
identifiable, categorical malady. By doing this, it has externalized and alienated his experience 
into something separate from himself. The diagnosis is followed by recommended treatment, 
predominantly the prescription of medication. Having translated his experience into diagnosis, 
his treatment is similarly objective and physiological. Consistent with the biomedical model, 
rather than respond to the subjective experience, it treats a physical malady with the 
physiological effects of medication.  
In performing this, is Tighe repeating an act of oppression, or is it rather an act of resistance? 
Tighe suggests he cannot even speak in his own performance. Is the demonstration of the 
silencing of the mad, and its insidious extent, merely a reiteration of his oppression? Would a 
determination to speak ‘against’ silence, rather than ‘through it’, be a greater act of resistance? 
This depends on our understanding of silence: what constitutes it and what it can be made to 
express. 
Foucault (1988) and his notion of silence haunts all contemporary understandings of madness; 
silence is an infliction and imposition. The ‘silencing’ of the mad renders the mad person 
speechless, the individual dispossessed of the means to articulate their experience. In this 
sense, it presents us with silence as a negation or deprivation: as something lacking, or as 
something ignored rather than something observed. Silence is a failure, a lacuna, a vacuum 
within which speech has been deprived. 
However, the notion of silence as necessarily oppressive seems reductive; there are a myriad of 
alternative forms and notions of silence. There are a variety of different modes and forms of 
silence in theatre. In his paper on dramaturgy and silence, Geoffrey Proehl (2003) delineates a 
variety of different forms and purposes of silence: silence as frustration, as an imposition, as 
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invisibility, as power, as pleasure, as safety and humility.  Moreover, silence within a language 
regime is not equivalent with a silence upon a stage. The phenomenological experience of 
theatre, temporally and spatially situated, renders silence palpable, something that is 
performed, something intentional. To express it another way: through theatre, silence can 
become noisy. I will suggest that, in the context of autobiographical theatre, silence can also be 
deployed as a strategy and mode of resistance. 
Tighe is using silence. This is not merely a silence endemic to all theatre or autobiography, but 
an ‘act’ of silence. Far from another iteration of Tighe’s ‘silencing’, this act represents a 
reclaiming of silence. Tighe has not simply re-enacted the ‘silencing’ inherent in the practice of 
modern psychiatry, but has appropriated it. A purely textual understanding ignores the 
importance in performance of the presence of the speaker. The context of performance 
reframes the documents. Whilst the language of the documents objectifies and alienates Tighe, 
by using his own voice – the voice of the subject – he is instead reframing their meaning. By 
interpolating these documents into the performance, whereby the voice of the subject can 
speak them, he is re-interpreting and translating these back into the voice of the subject. This is 
emphasized by the physical presence of Tighe on stage, having re-embodied the experience 
that was previously separated from him as an external disease. He is, through speaking out the 
medical records, reclaiming experience. He is reversing the act of silencing, by being silent. 
Tighe re-embodies and reclaims his personal experience from the process of disassociation. By 
‘performing’ the act of silencing, Tighe transmogrifies the silence of the mad person from an 
enforced muteness to an intentional resistance. 
The audience is presented with the spectacle and body of Tighe, talking about a personal 
experience, but without a personal account. In his recitation of medical documents written 
‘about’ him, the audience hears the aural ‘voice’ of Tighe, but not the words or subjective 
‘voice’ of Tighe.  It is the staging of this dissonance that allows Tighe to use silence to re-enact 
his silencing. It is the dissonance between the staged subject, and its failure to speak, that 
renders the silence palpable for the audience, and allows it to be heard. In this sense, the 
audience is spectator to both a performative and political act. Throughout the reading, Tighe 
makes no personal commentary, no testimony as to his lived experience. There is, rather, a 
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display and performance of his silencing. Both his silence, and the political circumstances of his 
silencing, is made palpable. 
Silence as Withdrawal, Fiction as the Autobiographical 
This notion of ‘reclaiming’ silence is a viable means of articulating voices subdued and ignored 
in modern society. This is not necessarily the re-performance of silencing, in order to make 
silence palpable. Whilst analyzing the work of Deb Margolin, Gwendoyn Alker describes how, 
‘Margolin’s reclamation of silence comes by way of an obsession with dialogic creativity and a 
deferred obsession with messianic hope. Her performances shift standard definitions of logos 
and offer a feminist alternative to the sedimentation of patriarchy that surrounds this term.’ 
(Alker 2008: 120, italics in original) Performance, and its silence, can offer alternatives to the 
logocentric paradigms of ‘representation’. Likewise, Tighe uses silence to challenge the existing 
narratives and representational politics. Tighe describes how he, ‘began to engage with 
withdrawal as both a strategy and starting point for a larger creative project.’ (Tighe 2014: 113) 
Throughout the production, fictional scenes written by Tighe are shown, imagining an 
alternative course of treatment. Tighe has previously performed his own silencing by modern 
psychiatry; the ‘reality’ determined by modern psychiatry has no space for his own account; the 
only possible recourse to create his own narrative is fiction. The reimagining of his treatment is 
only made possible through a prior silence: the silence and withdrawal from psychiatry. Tighe 
claims that, ‘non-compliance became a line in the sand, a starting point from where the future, 
and past, could be reimagined.’ (Tighe 2014: 113) In this withdrawal, silence as non-compliance 
becomes an engine for the fictional narrative and a capacitor for change. 
From this starting point of silence, it is through the use of fiction that Tighe is able to imagine 
the possibility of change. In an interview with Pat Bracken played in the performance, Tighe 
suggests that part of the difficulty of change is our incapability to imagine alternative 
possibilities. Tighe, on the one hand, uses his real-world lived experience of mental health and 
its social context as a starting point; yet, he also uses fictional scenes as a method to reimagine 
and examine other means of treatment. It is the interplay between the socio-political 
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circumstances of Tighe’s actual treatment and the utopic alternative course of treatment, two 
sides of the RECORD, which capacitates this as a work that can imagine change. 
The title RECORD itself is the conflation of two differing aspects of Tighe’s performance. On the 
one hand, RECORD as the medical ‘records’ that Tighe appropriates. On the other hand, 
RECORD as the musical record that he has composed, and sings from at various points of the 
performance. The use of song over spoken language is telling; a suspicion of the logos, and its 
ability to express without denotation upon the individual. The lyrics are evocative rather than 
descriptive; rather than attempt to explain the emotional experience of Tighe, it relies upon 
pathos. Music is presented as an alternative and liberating mode; Tighe (2014), following 
Nicholas Bourriaud, suggests that music is something that extends beyond language. These two 
concepts of ‘recording’ are brought into conflict, one as bureaucratic denotation and the other 
as artistic expression; Tighe is promoting the later as a preferable means of relating to mental 
health. It is a preference of the aesthetic over the psychiatric, in Tighe’s own words: ‘I set out to 
examine my experiences as an artistic question and to apply my theatre-making methodologies 
to (my) mental health. I set out to view myself as an artistic subject rather than as a subject of 
external examination.’ (Tighe 2014: 113) For Tighe, the wish to set the ‘record’ straight involves 
the shift from the psychiatric to the artistic, that shifts his position from the passive object (the 
subject of examination) to the agent of meaning (the subject as producer). In other words, he 
retakes control over his narrative from the psychiatric bureaucracy, and uses art as a means to 
explore that narrative. 
Yet these scenes are not only made possible by means of silence, but, again, show Tighe 
participating in silence. Far from vocal or expressive in these scenes, Tighe refuses to speak to 
either the doctor or the nurse. Initially, the doctor insists this silence is a symptom of an illness, 
rather than any form of protest. However, the nurse argues that the silence could be the result 
of a decision, a defence mechanism that is evidence of mental strength rather than cognitive 
illness. As the performance continues, the nurse and psychiatrist are altered by Tighe’s silence. 
They become more sympathetic, the doctor offers his summerhouse as a place for rest and 
recuperation. These scenes work as both the use of silence, and a commentary upon silence. 
His relationship with the nurse acts as a commentary upon the effects of silence, and how 
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silence can be an active force. Taking inspiration from Ingmar Bergman’s Persona (2003), the 
nurse is changed by Tighe’s silence, her personality challenged and overwhelmed by it. She 
remarks how she has never been listened to, and how the listening changes her. But this 
relationship is not destructive, rather, silence acts as a positive force; she ceases her role as a 
nurse within an authoritarian system. 
In an autobiographical context, the use of fiction can trouble the relationship of the audience to 
the performer. In a sense, these scenes are merely more explicit in their use of fiction; as 
Stephenson suggests, autobiography, ‘is always a fictional construction, featuring an 
inescapable gap between the real-world referent and its fictional twin’ (Stephenson 2013: 3). 
Yet, in their explicit fiction, these scenes are a disturbance of what Lejeune terms as the 
‘autobiographical pact’, the understanding that, despite its status as ‘art’, autobiography must 
necessarily engage with what is ‘real’ and ‘true’. Tighe, however, suggests that the ‘real’ is 
inadequate for the expression and exploration of his mental distress. The myth of the 
‘authentic’ conflation of performer and performed dissolves. 
Silence as Refusal to Represent 
Tighe’s silence is not only restricted to a re-performing and appropriation of his silencing. It is 
(even in his fantastical alternative treatment) his refusal to represent, explicate, or provide any 
signifiers with which the audience can interpret him. The new narratives of Tighe are not 
merely creating an alternative system of representation, but troubling the need for 
representation in the first place. Tighe claims that ‘I did not merely want to represent distress 
but to move beyond representation’ (Tighe 2014: 114). 
The silence of Tighe’s voice, the absence of personal commentary, is a frustration of audience 
expectations. The conventions of the autobiographical lead to an expectation of some form of 
personal commentary. Yet Tighe provides no help or assistance for the audience to 
‘understand’ his experience. He deprives the audience of any ‘self-revelation’ that often typifies 
the autobiographical genre. He rejects the exploration of personal life for the extrapolation of 
‘meaning’. In the short moments when I see him speak in his own words (rather than the recite 
the words of another), it is obliquely, at a slant; I see his face in the interview with Pat Bracken, 
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articulately discussing the question of mental health treatment against a wider social structure. 
Yet the recording of a speaking and eloquent Tighe renders the silence of the performance 
immediately in front of us pronounced and deliberate. He avoids the interpreting gaze of the 
audience, denies them any satisfactory ‘revelation’. 
The silence also applies to his physical performance and the use of his body. The audience is 
denied traditional signifiers of depression, such as the head clutched in the hands, shouting 
exclamations, twitching. This difference, between the societal ‘expectations’ of drama and of 
madness is highlighted in one scene wherein the nurse, in an attempt to help Dylan, persuades 
him to act out Act I Scene ii from Hamlet, a play similarly concerned with madness and the 
politics of ‘seeming’. However, his performance of Hamlet frustrates the nurse, she attempts to 
direct him to be more animate and more ‘dramatic’. He fails to satisfy her notion of depression 
as a ‘dramatic’ disease, of inner turmoil expressed by extreme, external performance. In this 
refutation, Tighe suggests that ‘depression’ is not readable, nor something that can be 
extrapolated or divorced from experience. In the performance, the show-reel of Tighe’s acting 
career is played; the performances contained within the reel become gradually more animate, 
involving increasing portrayals of mad persons and extreme acts. Again, the juxtaposition 
between the recorded and animated Tighe against the immediate and phlegmatic Tighe in 
RECORD forces us to acknowledge the silence of Tighe’s performance as a choice and strategy. 
Tighe is rendering it impossible for the audience to ‘read’ both his voice and his body. He even 
refuses to be held to account by ‘reality’. The notion that madness is written upon the body - 
extrapolating subjective experience from external and physical phenomena - is a core part of 
the bio-medical model. By his silence of voice and minimalist acting, Tighe renders it impossible 
to read for signs and signifiers of a mental ‘illness’. Rather, the audience are confronted with an 
individual who refuses to represent himself or his experience. 
It is notable that in both these cases, Tighe emphasizes the ‘recorded’ as vocal, as active, as 
animated. In contrast, the performing Tighe, with whom the audience have an immediate and 
phenomenological encounter, is silent. Immediacy has not granted us more information or 
knowledge of Tighe, RECORD resists the notion that autobiographical performance, by dint of 
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the presence of the body, provides us with another layer of understanding. Rather, Tighe seems 
to frame performance as a place where silence is preferable. RECORD suggests that immediacy, 
and the direct encounter with the performer, are both defined by an implacable refusal to 
disclose. In doing so, Tighe resists the notion of performance as a confessional space and the 
inculcation of pity from the audience. 
The Confusion of Aesthetics Resulting in an Ethical Response 
Deb Margolin suggests that silence as a dramatic force can compress the interaction between 
the audience and performer. But what manner is this interaction? Margolin suggests it renders 
the performance synecdochal, with the performer positioned as an Everyman (Alker 2008), an 
invitation to explore communality. However, Tighe’s performance in RECORD does not invite 
self-identification, but rather is a refusal to be identified. Far from relying upon the ‘closeness’ 
of performance, RECORD suggests that immediacy is defined by a refusal to disclose, and 
authenticity by a recourse to fiction. How does this compress, rather than increase the distance 
between performer and audience? 
Tighe provides us with three different forms of silence: a silence that re-performs his silencing 
by modern psychiatry, and thereby makes his silencing palpable to the audience; a silence that 
withdraws from modern psychiatry, and situates fiction and art as the only means to resist and 
express; finally, a silence that, even in this fictional ‘world’ refuses to communicate, to signify or 
represent the ‘self’ of Tighe. Through the combination and clash of these different silences, a 
cultivation and elicitation of a particular performer-audience relationship emerges. Tighe forces 
us to acknowledge and regard his silencing, to acknowledge him. Yet, even his alternative 
‘Record’, his recourse to fiction in order to capacitate expression, results in a refusal to 
represent. He capacitates expression, only to intentionally withdraw from it. RECORD compels 
us to regard Tighe, only to refuse explanation or explication. There is no ‘confession’ or self-
revelation. There is only the audience’s encounter with the silence of Tighe. 
Through these complicated intersections and inter-relations between differing forms of silence, 
I would suggest that the audience encounter the alterity of Tighe. The audience are forced to 
regard him (through making silence palpable), Tighe reclaims his ability to speak (through 
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silence as withdrawal), but he deprives us of any information with which to interpret or read 
him. In this sense, throughout Tighe’s use of silence, the audience are compelled towards an 
ethical encounter. The audience are forced to consider our own notion of spectatorship; the 
refusal to communicate reflects back upon ourselves.  As Phelan remarks, catching herself in 
the process: 
While all this addition and subtraction is going on in my accountant eyes, I begin to realize 
this too is superficial. The performance resides somewhere else – somewhere in the 
reckoning itself and not at all in the sums and differences of our difficult relationship to it 
(Phelan 1993: 162). 
In other words, rather than incessantly placing words upon the silence, silence forces us to self-
reflect, to consider what we are doing in our construction of meaning and narratives. It compels 
us to assess the implications of our spectatorship; silence becomes a reassessment of our 
ethical relationship. Rather than able to interpret, our interpretation is thrown back upon us. 
Silence renders interpretation fundamentally undecidable. We can examine the political 
structures that delineate and surround a silence, but not to the silence in and of itself; rather, 
the audience have to acknowledge the silence and decide how they will respond. Yet, in the 
context of autobiographical theatre, the silence relates to a person, to an Other, to the 
performer/performed. In this manner, aesthetic interpretation becomes ethically loaded. The 
means by which the audience choose to deal and function with this silence becomes how they 
choose to respond to Tighe as Other and his alterity to them. Whilst the use of silence offers a 
different strategy to the mimetic shimmering of Mental, both productions are engaged in a 
double motion between pulling the audience towards an acknowledgement of the performer 
and the push to disturb the notion that performance provides an authentic or privileged 
knowledge of the performer. It is in the interval and the interaction between these two 
movements that alterity is regarded, and an ethical encounter is made possible. 
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The Obscured Face of the Volunteer in Bryony Kimmings’ and Tim Grayburn’s 
Fake It ‘Til You Make It 
The performances so far have engaged with various crises of representation - through mimetic 
shimmering, through the multiplicity of silence – but their positioning of the 
performer/performed is from a consistently professional angle. Backgrounds vary – Leadbitter 
an activist and performance artist, Vincent a performance poet, Tighe an actor and musician – 
but all possess some experience of working a stage and an audience. All performances 
demonstrate, enact and even use the difficulties of performance as mode of autobiography: 
Leadbitter’s unbearable intensity of the encounter, Vincent’s inability to perform through a 
period of mania, Tighe’s anxiety at learning lines. But these are the obstructions of 
professionals, with years of experience in the field. What does it mean for those without 
professional experience, who have never dubbed themselves ‘performer’ before in a 
professional capacity, to perform their narrative? What does it mean for the distinctions 
between performer and performed, if the performer is unsure of their status as performer? 
In Fake It ‘Til You Make It, professional performer seems to act as facilitator for the 
autobiographical narrative of the non-performer. In the performance, Bryony Kimmings, an 
accomplished performance artist, performs alongside her partner Tim Grayburn, a man 
previously employed in the finance industry. Kimmings has previous experience in performing 
alongside non-professional actors; in Credible Likeable Superstar Role Model, Kimmings shares 
the stage with her 10-year old niece in a piece eviscerating the sexual commodification of 
young girls. Fake It ‘Til You Make It is the story of Kimmings’ and Grayburn’s relationship and 
Grayburn’s own experience of depression. Whilst other performances in this chapter have more 
particularly critiqued the psychiatric industry, Kimmings and Grayburn are more concerned with 
structures of masculinity, of stigma, and of the silence of men in the face of depression. For 
Grayburn, his resistance of becoming ‘performer’, his anxiety and shyness, becomes indicative 
of the silence concerning depression. 
Across the performance, the status of Grayburn, as rejecting and embracing his role as 
performer, is interrogated. The title itself denotes the concerns of the production, between the 
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fake and the actual, between the unconfident amateur and the assured professional, and the 
conflation of these two states. The popular phrase, to fake it until you make it, assumes a 
slippage between the performance of a thing and the thing itself. The performance repeatedly 
returns to this structure, of Grayburn ‘faking’ a skill, until he eventually authentically acquires it. 
This orientates around the three initial ‘rules’ that Grayburn establishes as the requirements for 
his participation. Firstly, in order not to suffer from anxiety, that he would not have to look at 
the audience. Secondly, that having no tangible stage skill, that he would learn one. Thirdly, 
that the production would make him look like a ‘real’ man. Each of these lines follows a 
different relation to Grayburn’s status as volunteer-performer: as the manifestation of stage 
fright and anxiety and avoidance of the gaze, against a compulsion to display virtuosity in a 
theatrical setting, culminating in a masculine desire to project strength and no vulnerability. As 
the performance evolves, each of these lines is developed and critiqued, leading to a rich 
tapestry and representational crisis of what it constitutes to be performer.  
In contrast to previous performances discussed in this chapter, Fake It ‘Til You Make It is less 
concerned with a critique of the psychiatric system, than with generalized stigma and 
poisonous construction of masculinity. At points, this can potentially dampen its political 
radicalism, and espouse simplistic attitudes to medication and treatment. Yet, despite this, I 
want to suggest Fake It ‘Til You Make It uses the construction of Grayburn, the various lines 
following his varying states as performer, to ethically load aesthetic interpretation. 
Fake It ‘Til You Make It emerged at a time of crisis for male depression, more specifically male 
suicide. Male suicide now stands as the leading cause of death for men aged under 50. Similar 
to how Leadbitter’s Mental emerged from wider political activism (and continues through the 
Madlove project) and Tighe conceived RECORD as a multimedia project that combined to a 
more generalized project of activism, Kimmings and Grayburn were drawn to the wider 
possibilities of their performance. At the end of the performance I saw at the Southbank Centre 
in 2015, a panel talk was organized with two workers in psychiatry and a representative from 
the Campaign Against Living Miserably (CALM), a charity that focuses upon male suicide. The 
project of Kimmings and Grayburn extended into a multimedia mode of activism, including a 
videogame named An Interview, a series of abstract expressions of depression with recorded 
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audio segments by Kimmings and Grayburn. If I am analysing the particularities of the 
performance, it should also be noted that the project burst free of the individual production. 
Kimmings and the Possibility of the Non-Professional Performer 
Before extrapolating upon the multi-leveled construction of Grayburn as a performer, it is 
necessary to consider the presence of Kimmings in the production. The work notably, is a joint 
autobiographical effort; it is firmly concerned with Grayburn’s experience of depression 
through their relationship, less concerned with depressive episodes that have occurred 
previously. Even the aesthetic disturbance, between authenticity and narrative, is framed in 
terms of the couple at the beginning of the performance. In describing their relationship, 
Kimmings alternates between an affirmation of the authentic, that, ‘Tim and I are a real life 
human being couple’ (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 31) with an acknowledgement of the 
artistry of narrative, that, ‘as with all love stories, in the movies, in books … or onstage, we had 
to leave quite a lot of stuff out’ (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 31). With this focus on their 
relationship, with multiple performers occupying the stage, our considerations of the ethical 
terrain are complicated. If this chapter is concerned with an ethical encounter between 
performer and audience, then this is complicated in Fake It ‘Til You Make It by another ethical 
horizon: the obligations and responsibility of the performers themselves. 
Work on the ethics of the praxis, of the obligations of the autobiographical performer, often 
draw upon the inter-relationality of identity as a launchpad for understanding the demand to 
the Other. In this configuration, self is, ‘not only a historical and cultural construct but imbued 
with, and indeed is inseparable from, others’ (Heddon 2008: 124). Following this inter-
connectivity, we can ask whether the performer has any ethical obligation to those necessarily 
entangled in their own narrative. In the performances of this chapter, stories involve the 
mothers and fathers, partners, fellow patients, and political allies of the performer. To what 
extent does a performer have a right to disclose the stories of others, and what potential 
violence can occur? In terms of madness, where the mad person is frequently invoked or use 
within other narratives, to what extent do we license and legitimize violence? Oliver Sacks 
would frequently use the narratives of patients to facilitate his work; G. Thomas Couser 
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concluding that, ‘if his patients have consented to having their stories told, there is no violation 
of their autonomy and no appropriation of their stories’ (Couser 2004: 77). But to what extent 
can ethical obligation be contained in liberal understandings of consent? Hilde Lindemann 
sardonically notes that this argument presumes, ‘the doctor-patient relationship were one in 
which the parties bargain from positions of equality’ (Lindemann 2004: 373). 
In placing Kimmings and Grayburn together on stage, these questions take a more concrete 
form throughout the performance. Far from embedded ethical quandaries, whereby the inter-
relationality is implied, the ethical wrangling is set in front of the audience. Responses to the 
production have frequently expanded into an ethical interrogation of Kimmings’ handling of 
Grayburn, both in terms of structure of the piece and behaviour on stage. For Catherine Love, 
it’s the ‘very visible care that Bryony and Tim take of one another on stage throughout the 
show, there in little looks and fleeting touches’ (Love 2015: np). Alternative takes regard the 
danger or risk of Kimmings speaking over or ‘for’ Grayburn, that her professional vocabulary 
overrides his non-professional autobiographical declarations. Leadbitter, in his foreword for the 
playtext, expresses his anxiety, 'I'm halfway through watching Fake It ‘Til You Make It and one 
question is bothering me. Where is Tim's voice?' (Leadbitter 2015: 1, italics in original). 
Likewise, a review by Andrzej Lukowski has worries that Grayburn, ‘largely serves as the chatty 
Kimmings’s laconic foil and backup dancer’ (Lukowski 2016: np). 
These questions risk ungenerosity, and even more problematically, a diminution of Grayburn’s 
own artistic input. If a simplistic notion of the ‘consent’ of Grayburn does not solve these 
ethical dilemmas, neither does a patronizing accord that depreciates the agency of Grayburn. 
Yet, the performance itself plays upon the possibility of artistic exploitation and the hierarchies 
of professionalism between Kimmings and Grayburn.  As Kimmings and Grayburn relate their 
response to his 'outing' as a depressive, Kimmings notes that, 'I secretly had the idea for this 
show' (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 48). She is projected as creative force. Meanwhile, 
Grayburn positions himself not as pro-active artistic force, but as volunteer, and maintains a 
certain passive distance to performance: ‘I agreed to do this show in case it helped people like 
me … As simple as that sounds, that is why I am here, in this fucking outfit, dancing around on a 
stage with my mental girlfriend’ (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 61).  
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Does this entail a compromize on the autobiographical project? Is it that Kimmings has 
deployed a series of theatrical devices to speak over Grayburn? Does Kimmings’ own 
performative expertise preclude the possibility of Grayburn’s speech? Far from any of these 
absolute terms, I suggest the presence of Kimmings is precisely what capacitates our 
apprehension of Grayburn as the performer without expertise, as the performer with anxiety 
about performance itself. If the presence of Kimmings alongside Grayburn issues a series of 
ethical quandaries about collaboration and praxis, then these concerns not only lead to a crisis 
of representation with regards to Grayburn, but the ethical dilemma bleeds into the audience’s 
own encounter with Grayburn. Kimmings is what capacitates our fraught apprehension of 
Grayburn himself. Far from obscuring his face, Kimmings troubles it, resulting in an ethical 
encounter emerging from alterity. 
The Obscured Face of the Volunteer 
Grayburn is an unseasoned performer. In order to facilitate this, the first rule he establishes, as 
Kimmings informs the audience, ‘he didn’t want to have to look any of you lot in the eye’ 
(Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 34). In order to circumvent this difficulty, for the majority of 
the performance, Grayburn wears various different forms of head-gear to obscure his sight. He 
puts a basket on his head, has binoculars stuck to his eyes, has puffy clouds surrounding his 
face, wears blackout glasses, a paper bag, and the ‘head of a giant beast with horns’ (Kimmings 
and Grayburn 2015a: 54). All of these various head-gears stands as a form of metaphor for 
Grayburn’s own depressive experiences, at different extremities; the light clouds when upon 
medication, the giant beast goat-head when enduring a particularly severe episode. More than 
a clever use of Grayburn’s confessed limitations as a performer, it situates Grayburn’s 
reluctance to perform as function of his depression, as indicative of his attempt to hide and 
conceal his depression, to ‘pass’. 
It would be simplistic and problematic to simply suggest these masks obscure the possibility of 
performance. Masks have a long tradition in performance, and require adept skill of the 
performer, in performing the object. The mask, for John Emigh, relishes the complicated 
epistemologies of performer and performed, masks in performance, ‘play with perception and 
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experience, converting epistemological dis-ease into a field for humour and paradox’ (Emigh 
1996: xviii). The mask, far from hiding the performer, is a particular form of contract into which 
the performer enters. The use of the mask is the challenge to the actor, on how to perform the 
Other, ‘the otherness of the mask becomes both the obstacle and the goal. He or she must 
redefine the sense of self in order to wear the other’s face and be true to it in spirit, thought, 
and action’ (Emigh 1996: xviii). 
Complicating this, however, is the nature of the autobiographical theatre, whereby performer 
and performed are meant to be conflated. Yet, the use of the mask disturbs this possibility, 
creates an epistemological break. Grayburn is not confronting how to perform the Other, he is 
confronting how to perform himself. Thus, the mask itself stands for himself, Grayburn as 
performer hides behind the mask of Grayburn as performed. In this way, ironically, Grayburn is 
adopting a highly performative expression of his anxieties about performativity, of his 
incapability of holding to a performative autobiographical pact. He can only play himself by 
playing himself as someone else. 
Rather than the masks themselves, it is the declaration of anxiety that disturbs a traditional 
viewing of Grayburn. We can understand masks as mode of performance, but Grayburn 
specifically frames them as mode of escape, of avoidance. Ridout (2006: 39) has noted how the 
possibility of stage fright has, in some forms of modern acting training, an almost foundational 
basis. The terror of stage fright becomes what capacitates the actor. But, the declaration of 
stage fright, of anxiety, fails to yield such productive possibilities. To invoke stage fright, to 
stage it, is to spread anxiety from the personal to the aesthetic. If the performer is uncertain 
about their status as performer, then the audience are disturbed in turn about what they are 
watching. If autobiographical performance often appeals to a concept of the authentic, 
however desiccated, then the various head-gear garlanding Grayburn’s head implodes these 
series of presumptions. Stage fright exposes the gap between the performed and the 
performer, a gap that the autobiographical pact seeks to ignore. If suddenly the performance of 
the self becomes a burden or an imposition, if the performer becomes anxious about the 
performance of the self, then the autobiographical pact is ripped apart. 
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It would be a simplistic argument to suggest the mask obscures the literal face, and thereby the 
ethical face, of Grayburn. But, the mask itself is not an obscuration at all, merely a 
theatricalizing of a dilemma with the uncertain performer. He avoids the gaze of the audience, 
not simply by hiding behind these various masks, but by disturbing the epistemological 
assumptions of autobiographical performance. He avoids the gaze, that is, which presumes 
performer and performed have become conflated, that he is deemed knowable. Ironically, in 
announcing his wish to not look at us, he immediately troubles our ability to look at him. 
The Revelation of the Face, Naïve Structures of the Authentic 
Kimmings and Grayburn use the obscuration of the face to play upon the status of the 
performer, and the audience’s mode of engagement. To simply read these various coverings of 
the face, however, is to ignore the broader arc of the performance. The face of Grayburn is not 
obscured throughout the entirety of the performance. If Grayburn confuses typical 
understandings of the ‘authentic’ with the litany of props adorning and covering his head, the 
finale is a recourse to the sentimental real. Eventually, Grayburn removes his mask, obscuring 
his face, and addresses the audience directly, from the microphone. The image evokes 
Kimmings’ own monologue at the start of the production. The monologue is naturalistic, 
somewhat awkward, and yet is the demonstration of capable performer. 
Across this shift, from the obscuration of the face, to its revelation, follows a chartered 
narrative. From the obscured face of the non-performer, to being tentatively capable of 
engagement of the final sections, reveals a metaphor for his development in dealing with 
depression. Namely, the process by which he ceases to hide his depression from the public 
arena, into a public declaration. Alongside this is a shift from the problematization of the 
authentic to an aesthetic of the authentic, a naturalism that attempts to conflate performer 
and performed as indistinguishable to the audience. Grayburn, at the end of the performance, 
is finally capable of performing himself. The status of the performer becomes expressive of the 
piece’s need for the depressive to disclose, to not remain hidden. In part, this results in the 
piece’s indulgence for a naïve strand of authenticity. 
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At first, this could suggest the final moments of the performance recourse to an aesthetic of 
essentialism, that could engender ‘pity’, autobiography as confession. However, this aesthetic 
of the true, authentic performer, hardly stands to scrutiny. Grayburn’s journey, from stage-
fright to confidence, is hardly one he performs in each show, but rather will have occurred over 
a longer stretch. But, this chartered narrative ignores the repetition of the performance, the 
performance as performed again and again. Kimmings and Grayburn seem to sell us the 
mythology of the individual performance, as performed for the first time every time. Yet the 
wider project, of performing multiple performances, results in a different narrative. Grayburn 
himself relates: 
It was the scariest moment of my life doing that first show. Once upon a time I struggled 
talking in front of four or five people. Now I’m in my underwear in front of 100 people, 
talking about my depression. I’m not nervous at all any more. We’ve done the show 60 
times. It’s given me confidence I never had. (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015b: np) 
Indeed, the irony is that this ‘revelation’ is precisely the moment whereby the construction 
comes to the fore. If Grayburn had maintained his masks throughout the performance, we 
could conceive of it as an ‘authentic’ mode by which to contain his stage-fright and 
inexperience. As it is, the final moments of the production reveal he is more than capable of 
public speaking, as a performer. As such, the ‘authentic’ premise behind the masks beforehand 
is disrupted, shattered. It is unsure as to what constitutes the real or the fake. 
This shift (from the problematization of representation to an aesthetic of authenticity) is not 
limited to the use of masks and obscuration of the face. After the avoidance of eye contact, 
Grayburn’s second ‘rule’ of participation was to gain a stage skill, namely to, ‘learn how to play 
the guitar’ (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 34). This offers a different aspect of the performer, 
the notion that they have to display some particular form of virtuosity, to appear interesting to 
the audience. Grayburn, reveals that he has wished since a child to be able to play the guitar; 
this wish becomes a locus for the performance, as the needs of the performance have 
compelled him to take lessons, to begin to learn it. As he expresses this original information, 
and he confidently expresses his growing improvement, Kimmings shakes her head to the 
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audience, comically undercutting Grayburn's claims of success. Kimmings again, is set as 
confident performer to the neophyte of Grayburn.  
Again, as with the masks, the application of this rule troubles our understanding of the 
performer. In a later sequence, still covering his head, Grayburn mimes with a guitar, as adroit 
guitar music is played in the background. An ironic juxtaposition is made concerning his inability 
to perform, lacking the skill to do so, requiring a theatrical device of miming, that emphasizes 
the disjuncture between the performed song and the performer. Yet, is the playing of the guitar 
any more a ‘stage skill’ than miming to the music in the background? The absurdity of the 
sequence, the joy Grayburn has in his mimicry, sheds light on the utter absurdity of deeming a 
performer by the possession of particular skills.  
As with the first rule, the final twist is a seeming recourse to an aesthetic of the authentic. 
However, in the final sections of the performance, he tentatively and cautiously plays a song to 
Kimmings. He has written the song himself, the song is simple, the playing not virtuosic, a series 
of basic chords. It is clear he has learnt, to a certain degree, the ability to play the guitar. Again, 
there is a return to the aesthetic of the authentic, a preference over the simple and stumbling 
over the overtly theatrical. Yet, as with the masks, if he was capable of playing the guitar, why 
indulge in ‘fakery’? Again, our notions of authenticity, and the source of the ‘fake’ are brought 
into relief. 
What is behind this vacillation between the real and the fake, between the authentic and the 
mimetic? Referring back at the first two rules of Grayburn’s participation, we see a common 
thread, of an evisceration of what the ‘real’ autobiographical performer is meant to do. In both 
of these, a rule is established, troubled through ‘fakery’ (the mask or the mimicry of the guitar), 
and finally resolved in a gesture to authenticity, that nevertheless breaks apart under scrutiny. 
 In the final rule for participation, Fake It ‘Til You Make It eviscerates and politicizes this appeal 
to the authentic. Grayburn’s third rule for participation states that Grayburn, ‘wanted to always 
appear like a real man’ (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 34). Yet, in his revelatory monologue, 
as he finally appears face-to-face with the audience, he expresses that, ‘a real man understands 
that there is no such thing as a real man’ (Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 61). This phrase 
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adopts a paradoxical quality; the only real thing is to repudiate the notion of realness itself. At 
this point, negotiating with the third rule, the notion of an authentic masculinity is deemed 
poisonous, as the cause for Grayburn’s own difficulties. In this third rule of participation, the 
aesthetic of the authentic is repudiated, even as it is invoked. 
The suspicion of the ‘real man’ infects and inveigles itself into the rest of the work. Our 
understanding of the ‘real man’ becomes as unproductive as the ‘true performer’. This returns 
to the title of the performance, the disturbances of different levels of performance in the 
imperative to Fake It ‘Til You Make It. Performance, by its nature, disturbs lines between 
mimicry and the authentic. To ‘fake’ performance is no different from ‘making’ performance. To 
perform oneself as a mask, or to perform oneself through one’s own face, both involve the 
talent of the performer; to imitate the pre-recorded music or to play the guitar, both are forms 
of performance. To ‘pass’ as a performer is to be a performer.  
The Ethical Consequences of the Non-Performer 
If we understand Kimmings’ role as both ethically fraught and that which capacitates 
Grayburn’s complications of what it means to be a performer, what is the audience’s own 
relationship to their ethical relationship to Grayburn? Are the audience simply involved in a 
tentative judgement of their relationship, or are the audience engaged in a wider process, in an 
ethical encounter themselves? Throughout this chapter, I have argued a re-establishment of 
the ethical encounter with the mad person can only be forged through a radical alterity. To 
what extent does the ethical questioning spiral out into the audience? 
The ethical silence, the diminution, in Fake It ‘Til You Make It is subtly different from the other 
performances. For Mental, it was the process of sectioning, for RECORD the broader process of 
the psychiatric services, but in this production, it is the broader intersection of masculinity and 
depression. Namely, the social condition by which society refuses to acknowledge or explicate 
difficulties of mental health. Rather than a silencing that occurs through treatment specifically, 
this is a silence that refuses to engage the possibility of the mad person, and installs the 
necessity of passing. 
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This, from the establishment of the ethical encounter, poses a dilemma. On the one hand, 
resistance to this silencing could seem to necessitate a form of expression, to cease to try to 
‘pass’, to perform one’s depression. And yet, as argued, these forms of narrative, constructed 
as confessionals, risk inculcating pity, rather than a substantial relationship with the audience. 
In an attempt to make oneself known as depressive, one instead condemns oneself to be 
framed as knowable, as a difficulty which the audience can solve.  
If we follow that the ethical decision must necessarily be undecidable, then such a solution is 
unbearable. If the Other is fundamentally knowable, there is no decision at all; as Derrida 
observes it is the hiatus that capacitates the decision, ‘where decisions must be made and 
responsibility, as we say, taken, without the assurance of an ontological foundation?’ (Derrida 
1999: 21). So, how is it possible to resist the act of silencing, to cease to pass as depressive, 
without curtailing the uncertainty of the ethical response? In Fake It ‘Til You Make It, it occurs 
through a crisis of the performer themselves, through a disclosure that, nevertheless, 
fundamentally disturbs the process of disclosure. what it means to perform, or to pass. 
As a result, through the performance, the notion of passing segues between passing as ‘normal’ 
and passing as ‘performer’. Grayburn is relating his own difficulties (attempting to cease to 
pass) to the expectations of the performer. In doing so, the structures of spectatorship are 
fundamentally complicated. Notions of authenticity of the performer are directly linked to the 
construct of passing as a ‘real man’; essentialism and sentimentality for the authentic is 
irrevocably linked to patriarchal structures. The dangers of one dangerous authentic mode 
becomes supplanted by another.  
Grayburn resists displacing one mythos of authenticity (the real man) for another (the true 
performer). He uses the construct of the performer as a means to reduce and rip-apart the 
structures of the authentic. Grayburn notes the autobiographical performer (following his three 
rules of participation) has to be seen, has to perform, has to project himself as real. But then, 
he disturbs each of these possibilities, not simply through a rejection of them, but a 
disturbance. The mask does not hide the performer, but merely emphasizes the hiatus between 
performer and performed. The skill of ‘actually’ performing a guitar is no more performative 
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than that of mimicry. The projection of the ‘real’, as the ‘real man’, demonstrated in a 
paradoxical statement that ‘a real man understands that there is no such thing as a real man’ 
(Kimmings and Grayburn 2015a: 61), ironically can only occur with the dispersion of the real 
altogether. The status of the performer is rendered undecidable. It fluctuates between 
aesthetics of the authentic and the mimetic. To fake it and to make it are indistinguishable. 
But likewise, these conceptions of the performer are not simply internal progressions, a 
narrative for the audience to relish. To pass is not simply a solo act in the mirror; to pass 
involves a sublimation into the gaze, to act in accordance with what the spectator expects. To 
pass is to make yourself discernible, to relieve the burden of alterity. Passing always exceeds 
the individual, into the process of spectatorship itself. In Grayburn’s disturbance of the act of 
performing, and thereby of ‘passing’, the audience are not simply passive spectators to an 
internal development. The audience are fundamentally implicated in these proceedings of care. 
In other words, the process of spectatorship is disturbed, and in each case, the naïve structures 
of the authentic are problematized. Grayburn-as-performer becomes fundamentally 
undecidable. Far from simply an expression of Grayburn’s own internal anxieties, the 
disturbance becomes an interrogation of our expectations of the performers themselves. 
It is by this means through which Kimmings and Grayburn manage to split the Gordian Knot, of 
how to ethically re-engage with one who passes. By problematizing the performer and the 
process of performance, by shifting between imitation the real and revealing the redundancy of 
their separation, Grayburn forces the audience’s interpretative modes into doubt. Attempts to 
deem Grayburn’s performance as ‘real’ or ‘fake’ quickly face an obstacle. Our interpretation is 
undecidable. The audience, even as the ‘passing’ narrative is structured, is fundamentally 
frustrated. Grayburn is elusive, he fluctuates, refuses easy expression. Not only are attempts to 
define frustrated, but the process of spectatorship itself is implicated in the political structures 
of passing. Alterity is compelled, even as the Other is regarded. An ethical encounter with 
Grayburn is re-established. 
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Conclusion 
The possibilities of autobiographical performance, as a form of resistance, seem evident. 
Particularly for madness, those who have so frequently been deprived of a voice, can finally 
seize control of their own narrative. And yet, the possibility of resistance is complicated, by a 
series of factors. Firstly, often the language in which they can speak is a language which 
dispossesses or trivializes them. Likewise, whilst tempting, the trumpeting of the real, of the 
authentic body, quickly leads to more regressive politics. It adheres to a confessional 
performance, whereby the mad person displays themselves before the audience, to be tasted, 
to be pitied. 
The implications of what is possible, and how we can avoid these narratives, can be articulated 
through Levinas’s conception of the ethical. Levinas’s notion of the ethical revolves around the 
alterity of the Other, of the infinite demand of the Other, of the inability to define or reduce the 
Other. Levinas’s ethics provide a confusion to us, rupturing normal standardisations of ethical 
behaviour, whether appeal to virtues, to particular rules, or the pursuit of desirable 
consequences. These, whilst perhaps legitimate formulations, are nevertheless potential 
decisions, are answers to the ethical question, rather than the ethical question itself. Whereas, 
as Derrida notes, Levinasian ethics, ‘is an Ethics without law and without concept … is an Ethics 
of Ethics’ (Derrida 2001: 138). It is a form, it is a compulsion, but it has no inherent content. 
In this sense, we could ask what form of resistance can Levinas’s conceptualisation of the 
ethical provide madness? If these ethics preclude moral content, can there be a resistance that 
is, itself, a thing deprived of content? But by extending and, in a sense, correcting Levinas, we 
can imagine two powerful articulations of how the political and ethical can interact, and note 
how resistance takes place across these two horizons. Firstly, that the ethical question must be 
answered within a political horizon, that indeed, the ethical question is what makes the political 
decision possible. And secondly, that the face of the Other-As-Mad can be obscured, can be 
blocked, we don’t see our ethical relationship to them. In this regard, we can conceive that 
resistance can involve a re-establishment of the ethical encounter. 
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As I have covered these various performances, I have attempted to demarcate how they 
approach and re-institute such an encounter. Throughout all of them, however, is a resistance 
to the notion that simply the immediate face-to-face encounter, within itself, can institute such 
an ethical encounter. The re-establishment of the ethical encounter does not occur through 
recourse to the immediate presence of the Other, or through some plea to authenticity. The 
alterity that marks the relation of the self to the Other can only be possible in a crisis of 
representation. In Mental, the mimetic shimmering of Leadbitter, leads to an uncertainty 
between aesthetics of mimesis and authenticity, our consideration of a breakdown renders our 
aesthetic interpretation ethically loaded. In Tighe’s RECORD, silence becomes multifarious, as 
invitation and rejection; he capacitates his ability to speak, only to refuse to disclose. For 
Grayburn, in Fake It ‘Til You Make It, the authentic performer is paired with the authentic man, 
and in both their demonstrability becomes profoundly troubled. 
This encounter with alterity becomes a form of aesthetic wavering. The wavering is crucial, in 
that, alterity cannot simply be codified, and resolved as exoticized, orientalized Other rather 
than ethical Other. I want to touch, I want to understand; but this touch and understanding 
must be premised upon the impossibility of both. The hand, that reached out for Leadbitter, 
only to flinch back, becomes a synecdoche for the ethical encounter. In RECORD, the silence is 
both invitation for interpretation, and its rejection.  I am compelled to look, to engage, but also 
deprived of the ability to resolve, to contain the Other. 
This is not to suggest that the response to the ethical encounter in these performances is 
necessarily a productive one. One response can be to fail to listen, to return to a codification, or 
to nestle back into sentimentality. I am not making a claim for the nature of the answer that is 
provided by the audience. Rather, I am suggesting that these performances, in various ways 
and to varying levels of success, pose a question to the audience: how will you respond to me? 
And that our interpretation, whether to the ‘realness’ of Leadbitter, the silence of Tighe, the 
‘performance’ of Grayburn, all become loaded ethically. 
Our response, nevertheless, is located in the political realm which these performers construct. 
Whether Leadbitter’s fear of the police and sectioning, Tighe’s negative response to treatment, 
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or the dangers of Grayburn’s attempts to pass as ‘normal’, our response (even if a rejection of 
these concerns) must be placed within these political matrices. This chapter has not been about 
the triangulation of the decision made, but the compulsion of the decision itself. For those who 
have been obscured ethically, who have been regarded as objects, easily discernible and 
controllable, the positing of the question itself becomes a radicalism. The audience can finally 
ethically engage with the mad person and their testimony. Their faces are seen anew. 
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CONCLUSION 
Across this thesis, I have sought to form new conceptual modes of thinking through resistance 
and madness. This has involved asking throughout three key interlinking questions. In what way 
can theatre provide a site of resistance to hegemonic structures of madness? In what way does 
the question of resistance relate to the representation of madness? And how do these modes 
take advantage of the particular opportunities of the theatrical and the performative? Through 
an interrogation of theatre in Britain and Ireland across the past twenty-five years, I have set 
out to think through the possibilities (and occasionally limitations) of resistance by a close 
engagement with selected plays and performance, using textual and performative analysis.  
My first chapter imagined the possibilities of a theatrical ‘practical critique’, drawing upon the 
later work of Michel Foucault, and his myriad conceptions of resistance. I interrogated what the 
concept of the practical critique means in a context of the representations of the contemporary 
asylum’s de-centralized series of power networks. I examined plays that reflected upon the 
legislative, instructional and cultural structures of the asylum contemporaneous to the original 
production of the play. The plays selected - Sarah Daniels’s Head-Rot Holiday (1994b), Joe 
Penhall’s Blue/Orange (2000), and Lucy Prebble’s The Effect (2014) - demonstrated a variety of 
different contexts and institutional structures of madness. Likewise, they are almost entirely set 
within psychiatric institutions; the gaze is perennially upon and within the institution itself. I 
examined how resistance could be formulated and imagined from ‘within’ hegemonic 
structures, and was concerned with how realist plays could articulate a response to the 
contemporary asylum without re-inscribing its power structures. If realism is the prevalent 
aesthetic ideology of the asylum, how can it represent without becoming a re-iteration of its 
violence? 
Looking at plays covering the history of psychiatric and legislative background of the past 
twenty-five years, I suggested that it is the aesthetic nervousness of representation, of the 
pluralistic (rather than monolithic) operations of power that allow us to reimagine from within. 
To veer between different possibilities, to shift between different lenses, to embrace the 
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polyvocal possibilities of theatre, allows us not only to apprehend the pluralistic power 
operations of the contemporary asylum (frequently at odds, frequently operating through 
conflict and aporia), but to reveal the contingency of these power structures. Likewise, these 
plays surround and touch upon the mad body, and perform how these competing and various 
power structures fight over this body, rendering it silent. Even as what the mad body 
constitutes varies (from the female body, to the black body, to the dispersed), the alternating 
and competing power structures compete across it. Emerging from this is a concept of 
resistance that refuses the possibility of a roadmap to resistance, yet does not simply remain 
within a passive observation of psychiatric violence. Rather, it provides a critique from within, 
that exposes the contingencies of power and arbitrary inflictions upon the mad body, revealing 
the possibility of change. 
In my second chapter, I shifted to a consideration of spatial politics, and how thinking through 
space can help us re-imagine madness. I considered the spatial logics of hallucination, how 
cultural idioms surround it and control the manner in which we spatially conceive of madness. 
The spatial logic of hallucination not only divorces and sunders madness from our construction 
of ‘reality’, it also allows us to present and represent mad experience. Hallucination exoticizes 
madness, and through doing so, frames it as knowable; it is a spatial logic through which we 
control and contain madness. Through an engagement of the spatial theory of Henri Lefebvre, I 
was drawn towards an apprehension of space as multitudinous, and considered the particular 
opportunities theatre lent in a radical re-imagination of space. This, far from trying to represent 
or create a ‘space’ for madness, involved puncturing such a problematic, isolated bubble. 
In doing so, I discovered the potential for theatre to puncture and trouble the traditional 
existing spatial logics of hallucination, and gesture towards a new spatiality of madness. I was 
drawn to plays that, in some sense, troubled the easy inner-outer logic of hallucination. All 
three plays, John Haynes’ and David Wood’s’s The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western 
Lapland (2014), Caryl Churchill’s The Skriker (1998b), and debbie tucker green’s nut (2013), all 
disturb the traditional spatial logics of hallucination. If these plays never fully step away from 
hallucination, they use various means to disturb its spatial logics. In part, this occurs through 
manipulation of material space; in part through a troubling of visibility, invisibility, and 
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experience. These plays use the internal spatial logics of genre to supplement their own 
innovative spatial logics of hallucination. What this capacitates is a radical re-politicization of 
our representation of hallucination. Hallucination cannot be divorced from political concerns 
such as family, globalization, and race. This occurs in both directions. Madness become 
informed and framed through other political perspectives. But likewise, consideration of these 
other political concerns becomes radicalized through our consideration of madness. Without a 
romanticized suggestion that theatre could completely sunder itself from the spatial structures 
of hallucination, I suggested that through a multifaceted, playful approach to space, theatre 
could begin to point to new directions. In this way, it offered resistance by giving us new ways 
in which to imagine and see madness. 
Moving to my third chapter, I was interested in the possibility of witnessing, and what 
witnessing meant within a theatrical context. More specifically, I looked at how witnessing 
allowed us to relate and respond to suicide. I wanted to see how witnessing allows us to regard 
suicide, without attempting to imprint ourselves upon its occurrence. Drawing upon the 
theories of Jacques Derrida, François Lyotard, Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, I noted that the 
history of witnessing seemed to primarily revolve around the Shoah and the semiotic. I 
suggested that suicide and theatre offered a different set of challenges. However, I drew upon 
some of the divisions of witnessing between testimony, witnessing and meta-witnessing, and 
noting how these concerns between the speaker, the listener, and self-reflection were always 
co-dependant.  
Across Sarah Kane’s 4.48 Psychosis (2001), David Greig’s Fragile (2011), and Bush Moukarzel’s 
and Mark O’Halloran’s Lippy (2014), I observed the complexities of what it means to witness, to 
look back upon our looking. Alongside this, I interrogated the audience’s own place within the 
theatrical processes; yet, far from simply a transformation of the audience, from passive 
spectator to active witness, I suggested that witnessing was a process in which the theatrical 
productions interrogated themselves, which encapsulated the audience into their circles and 
processes of self-reflexion, against the ability to speak and the ability to listen. All three plays 
were drawn towards a world outside the theatre. Beyond written language, I observed it was 
possible to witness through an interrogation and elicitation of sight, voice and response. I noted 
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that, whilst premised upon aporia, these works understood witnessing as a never completed 
act. Far from simply failure, I suggested this contributed to an understanding of witnessing as 
process, as something ongoing, that could never cease. In doing so, I conceptualized theatrical 
witnessing as another mode of resistance, which allowed us to look back upon our own looking, 
to reflect upon the possible violence of representation, to deconstruct the violence of our gaze 
as against the necessity to look. 
In the final chapter, I shifted to the notion of the ethical encounter itself. I looked specifically at 
autobiographical theatre, and the recent rise in using this genre to explore questions of 
madness. I was cautious about the suggestion that autobiographical performance, by putting 
forward the mad person’s voice, was de facto a radical act. Rather, I explored the dangers of 
the confessional narrative, how this frequently creates a narrative of overcoming de-politicized 
personal struggle, and how this leads to the unproductive inculcation of pity. Instead, I used 
certain aspects of the theory of Emmanuel Levinas, to suggest the ethical response emerges 
from an immediate, phenomenological encounter premised upon alterity. Far from following 
the easy ethical-political divide, I noted that there are intense political concerns to Levinas’s 
conception of the ethical. Building upon this, I was interested in how autobiographical 
performance could instil the audience’s regard whilst rejecting easy comprehension. I asked 
how did the selected performances – James Leadbitter’s Mental, Dylan Tighe’s RECORD, and 
Bryony Kimmings and Tim Grayburn’s Fake It ‘Til You Make It, reinstate the alterity of the mad 
person? 
These performances all usher in a crisis of representation in order to elicit an ethical encounter. 
This can revolve around a disturbance of the structures of ‘authenticity’ surrounding the 
performance or the performer, an implosion of the confluence of performer and performed, or 
through playfulness with the multiplicity of silence; in each case, the representation of madness 
is always accompanied by a troubling of various theatrical tools underlying the representation. 
It was through this aesthetic wavering or shimmering that an ethical question was posed to the 
audience.  
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Each one of these chapters has tangled with the complexity of madness and the possibilities of 
theatre to create new conceptualizations of resistance. This is not simply the implementation of 
philosophical schemas onto a theatrical canvas. Rather, using various thinkers as a launchpad, I 
have interrogated their ideas, then explored the various performances and plays, to forge new 
conceptualizations of what resistance can mean. In doing so, I have identified four different 
modes by which contemporary British and Irish theatre can offer resistance to structures of 
madness. I have contributed to new modes and ways of thinking through resistance in theatre 
with regards to madness, responding to the current dearth of literature in this arena. 
Across these chapters, we can see a shift from a concern with institutional structures to the 
lived experience of the individual, from structural concerns to individual voices. If the 
contemporary asylum represents the most concrete example of the institution of madness, 
then the mad person’s testimony refocuses upon individual lived experience. Yet, rising 
throughout the thesis, is their intertwining nature, their necessary concurrence. In the 
contemporary asylum, institutional logics take place and occur through and upon mad bodies. 
The spatial logics of hallucination are an attempt to install psychiatric power and containment 
around mad experience. The deeply personal act of suicide is used as an excuse to control mad 
bodies, utterly implied in the construction of madness; likewise, our comprehension behind it 
veers between the social apprehension of suicidology and the individual ethical apprehensions, 
it is both a social and individual phenomenon. Even in the testimony of the mad person and 
their attempts to resist the act of silencing, they talk within the institution; the language 
provided, the cultural idioms through which they can speak, all emerge from institutional 
apparatus.  
This thesis has attempted, throughout, to position and triangulate between the political 
structures of madness, the lived experience of the mad person, and the aesthetic 
representation of both. Looking back across these various conceptualizations, I note that the 
question of representation has become bound up with non-representation, the politics of what 
is shown tied with what is not. Each of these conceptualizations of resistance seems bound up 
with a refusal or caution in the representation of mad experience. In the practical critique, we 
observe the power structures around the mad body, but mad experience itself is not 
238 
 
represented. The investigation of new spatialities of hallucination attempts to disturb and move 
away from easy inner-outer logics whereby internal mad experience is visualized on stage. In 
witnessing suicide, we acknowledge the incommensurability of understanding, to witness is to 
confront the poverty of understanding, and the violence behind the assumption that we can. 
Meanwhile, ethical responsibility is not brought forth through an explanation or untroubled 
representation of mad experience, but rather through the establishment of alterity, of the 
refusal to represent. 
This offers the obvious question: if non-representation can be radical, why represent 
whatsoever? But, this is to imply that non-representation is homogenous, simply absence. Each 
of these chapters has attempted to carefully delineate structures of power, the political and 
ethical compulsions, and the narratological modes, by which we trace around this gap. If these 
plays avoid forming architectures of mad experience, then they do so by charting out the ways 
in which political structures of madness seeks to inform and control the mad person. 
In these various negotiations and triangulations, I hope to have demonstrated that the 
resistance of theatre is not a utopic plane, but rather the push against existing power structures 
in order to discover new possibilities. Often these plays have, on some level, encountered 
difficulties, or to some level reinscribe the formulations they seek to resist. The realist plays of 
the contemporary asylum still silence the mad body. Plays concerning hallucination, even as 
they trouble its spatial structure, still find themselves collapsing into hallucinatory tropes. The 
process of witnessing suicide is never complete. If autobiographical performance can re-
establish the ethical encounter, re-pose the question, it cannot structure or determine the 
audience. Despite this incompletion, this is not failure, but rather pushing against the language 
and idioms through which we conceive the mad. This thesis has not been about complete 
conceptual emancipation, but rather the first steps towards more progressive lines of thought. 
Potential Future Developments of Research 
In terms of future developments of this work, I hope that this thesis can point towards new 
directions in a multitude of ways. The sheer extent of what madness covers and constitutes, 
coupled with the comparative lack of research in this area, offers a wide range of future 
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opportunities. In this work, I have covered four different modes of resistance and analyzed four 
separate logics of madness. However, this research is in no way an exhaustive overview of 
madness in theatre. As stated in the introduction, it would be possible to set many of the 
conceptualizations of resistance against different logics of madness; to perform, for example, a 
practical critique of suicide, or an interrogation of the spatial logic of the asylum. Likewise, 
analyses of other plays could potentially bring to bear additional considerations: different 
modes of resistance or alternative logics of madness. The framework and mode of conceptual 
work I have performed is an open process. 
I have chosen to look at British and Irish theatre for this thesis; this thesis is firmly embedded 
within this context. An extension or shift of this work, however, could look at theatre cultures 
outside of this particular context, in comparative studies across different communities. There 
are different genealogies and varying constructions of what madness constitutes according to 
context; Foucault’s understanding of madness, for example, would be less appropriate in a non-
Western context. Given this, one possible way of extending this research would be to identify 
the differences and other means by which resistance is forged in other contexts of madness.  
Moreover, a consideration of the particularities of conceptualizing resistance with regards to 
madness could be further developed and used in other concerns of identity and the political. 
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to be intersectional in my analysis, and to forge 
conceptualizations of resistance to madness open to the multiplicities and complexities of 
identity. However, using the modes of resistance that I’ve suggested, it would be possible to 
integrate and interrogate other politically dominant modes of resistance. Following this, it 
would be possible to look at plays under-represented in considerations of intersectionality. For 
instance, a sustained investigation purely concerned with how diasporic communities and non-
white demographics work alongside madness in theatrical representations would be beneficial 
to existing scholarship. In setting the theoretical constructs of this thesis alongside conceptual 
frameworks emerging from an interrogation of other political structures, as well as their 
intellectual legacies of resistance, we could inform back and deepen our appreciation of 
madness, representation and resistance. 
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Finally, this work has been focused upon a textual and performance analysis of various works. 
However, it would also be informative to study the different responses and positions of the 
audience with regards to performances that engage with madness. In particular, many plays 
assume or revolve around the assumption of a ‘sane’ audience, who are then exposed or 
confronted with madness and mad experience. Yet, many of these audiences contain several 
members who have experience of psychiatric services, are on medication, or have received a 
psychiatric diagnosis. Troubling many of the assumptions about the makeup of the audience, I 
would be interested in a study investigating these more diverse experiences; for example, how 
does a voice hearer experience a work that attempts to simulate voice-hearing? 
The possibilities of building upon this thesis are wide and various. The development and reach 
of this thesis was inspired by the lacuna present in performance studies, of the necessity to 
create a foothold in the studies of madness and performance. Unsurprisingly, the lack of 
literature provides a wide terrain of opportunities, across theoretical and practical possibilities. 
If this thesis represents the initial steps towards a way of thinking through madness and 
performance, then emerging from this is less a singular direction than a sprawl of new 
concerns. Madness offers not simply a singular line of inquiry, but a wide field of discourse and 
study. This thesis has not attempted (and would not have been able) to cover such a wide area. 
Rather, it has sought to think through madness and performance, conceptualizing what it 
means to resist, and how it is represented in British and Irish theatre. I hope that, in future 
years, our relative neglect becomes corrected, with an eye towards aesthetic representation, 
with a consideration of the political structures of madness, and most of all, with an ethical 
engagement with those subjected to the diagnostic gaze, contained within these multiple 
logics, and deemed mad.  
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